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Following the 15 April 1969 downing of 
an EC-121 USN reconnaissance plane by 
North Korean fighters, a C-130 Hercules 
cargo plane circled overhead and took 
photos. The cover photo shows crewmem-
bers on the deck of a Russian antisub-
marine ship and a whaleboat off its bow, 
both looking for debris from the downed 
plane. In “‘Improbable Allies,”’ Bill 
Streifer and Irek Sabitov relate the story 
of the joint U.S.-Soviet search-and-rescue 
and recovery operations that followed 
the downing, an example of internation-
al and interservice cooperation at sea 
during the depths of the Cold War.
Source: Associated Press, from an  
Air Force Reserve handout
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FROM THE EDITORS
The question of command accountability goes to the heart of what it means to 
be a military professional. Over the last few years, several major tragic accidents 
involving USN vessels have trained a bright spotlight on this question. In “From 
Accountability to Punishment,” Michael Junge offers a careful analysis of inci-
dents of naval officers dismissed from the naval service, going back to World 
War II. He argues that a major change can be discerned in Navy practice from 
roughly the mid-1980s, when the widely acknowledged “zero defects” culture of 
today first became dominant. Over these years, the distinctions between account-
ability, responsibility, and culpability have become fatally blurred, resulting in a 
higher rate of officer firings than in the past, with debilitating consequences for 
the naval profession. Captain Michael Junge, USN, is a professor in the College 
of Leadership and Ethics at the Naval War College.
Since the nineteenth century, war gaming has played an important role in the 
professional education of military and naval officers in many countries, and it 
remains one of the key missions of the Naval War College today. The increasing 
technological sophistication of commercial war games certainly helps to explain 
their wide popular appeal, but in the context of military education technology has 
its limitations. John Curry, in “The Utility of Narrative Matrix Games: A Baltic 
Example,” makes the case for so-called matrix games designed to test human 
decision-making in relatively open-ended scenarios, with reference specifically 
to a recent NATO war game with a Baltic scenario. John Curry is a senior lecturer 
at Bath Spa University, United Kingdom.
The recent decision by the current American administration to change the 
name of U.S. Pacific Command to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command appears to be a 
move of some geostrategic consequence, but so far its implications remain quite 
unclear. It leaves unchanged the western boundary of the command’s area of 
responsibility—an artificial line extending from the India-Pakistan border—
rather than expanding it to include all of the Indian Ocean. It is, therefore, of 
considerable interest what the Indians themselves make of this. In “The ‘Indo’ 
in the ‘Indo-Pacific’: An Indian View,” Yogendra Kumar and Probal K. Ghosh 
provide what seems intended as an authoritative tour d’horizon of India’s view 
of the current state of maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean, as 
well as various suggestions for how that cooperation can be strengthened. Their 
9
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treatment of China is muted, but they indicate that, while China is not pres-
ently in a position to undermine the Indian Ocean’s current maritime “system,” 
this could change in the future, and they go so far as to suggest that the region’s 
maritime states should consider establishing a regime governing use of the area’s 
ports by “extraregional” powers. Yogendra Kumar, a retired Indian ambassador, 
and Probal K. Ghosh, a former officer in the Indian Navy, both write extensively 
on maritime affairs.
As the United States steps up its confrontation with Iran with the targeted kill-
ing of Major General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020, it is instructive to revisit 
our last shooting encounter with Iran, Operation EARNEST WILL, during the 
last years of the Reagan administration. Little remembered today, these efforts, 
triggered by the reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers by the United States to protect 
them from Iranian strikes during the final stage of the Iran-Iraq War, constituted 
the largest American naval engagement since World War II, resulting in the de-
struction of a large fraction of Iran’s navy. In “Operation EARNEST WILL: The U.S. 
Foreign Policy behind U.S. Naval Operations in the Persian Gulf 1987–89; A Cu-
rious Case,” Andrew R. Marvin examines the strategic considerations driving the 
American decision to involve itself in the Iran-Iraq struggle, arguing (contrary to 
much conventional wisdom) that it had less to do with protecting the flow of Gulf 
oil than with preventing the Soviet Union from gaining a foothold in the region. 
Andrew R. Marvin is an analyst in the Department of Homeland Security and a 
former U.S. Army officer.
In another footnote to the naval history of the Cold War, Bill Streifer and 
Irek Sabitov, in “‘Improbable Allies’: The North Korean Downing of a U.S. Navy 
EC-121 and U.S.-Soviet Cooperation during the Cold War,” revisit the April 
1969 incident, on the basis of much new material, particularly interviews with 
Soviet naval personnel directly involved in it. Then as now, the leader of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was named “Kim.” Bill Streifer and Irek 
Sabitov are journalists.
In “Sir John Orde and the Trafalgar Campaign: A Failure of Information Shar-
ing,” J. Ross Dancy and Evan Wilson examine a neglected aspect of the situation 
preceding the famous victory of Nelson at Trafalgar in May 1805: the relationship 
between Admirals Nelson and Orde. The latter commanded a British squadron 
off Cádiz, which was effectively, if not technically, within Nelson’s area of op-
erations in the Mediterranean. The authors argue that Orde’s later reputation is 
undeserved, and that both he and the Admiralty made unnecessary mistakes in 
the way they managed command relationships and communication during this 
critical period. J. Ross Dancy and Evan Wilson are professors in the John B. Hat-
tendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research at the Naval War College.
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IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters 
Harbor Island complex. For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to 
meet you at the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead 
of time (401-841-2236).
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Timothy P. Schultz, PhD, Associate Dean of Academics at the  
Naval War College, delivered a version of the following as an  
address at NWC’s 13 November 2019 graduation ceremony. 
UNLEARN
 Graduates—thank you. There is no higher privilege than interacting and learning together with people like those in this room. I have been looking 
forward to this one last engagement with you—the final gathering before the 
scattering.
Families: Let us enjoy this time together. It is your time, after all, and we owe 
you. Don’t let the formality of this ceremony make you shy.
Faculty: Graduation is our crystallizing moment. You have given these gradu-
ates a new life of the mind—one book, one lesson, one seminar, one war game, 
one tutorial, and one red-ink-covered page at a time.
A poet said, “A professor is one who talks in someone else’s sleep.” The best 
professors change your thought life; they speak to you in your dreams. So, you 
have that to look forward to. It will be like having Milan Vego’s 1,500-page book 
on joint operational warfare as your pillow. And imagine decades of pillow talk 
with professors like Marc Genest and Tom Nichols . . .
Recently I learned a couple of new words: lapidary and tortuosity. Lapidary re-
lates to the art of etching in stone. Tortuosity is a technical term meteorologists use 
to describe the degree of zigging and zagging by a bolt of lightning. Your education 
here has been both lapidary and tortuous—but in a good way!—both engraved in 
stone and full of unpredictable power. I’ll come back to these words later.
First, let me voice some dissent within this storied institution of higher 
learning. We talk a lot about being lifelong learners. That’s good—but not good 
enough. I expect more from our graduates; I want you to be lifelong un-learners. 
Dedicate yourselves to the higher, and more elusive, art of unlearning. Why? Be-
cause unlearning is the mark of true learning.
Think of the things we’ve had to unlearn in the past (and it was hard!):
• We had to unlearn that Earth is the center of the universe.
• Doctors had to unlearn that leeches are usually a good idea.
13
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• The cavalry had to unlearn the value of the sword and then unlearn the value 
of the horse, to remain relevant in the twentieth century.
• Navies had to unlearn the battleship mind-set.
• Air forces had to unlearn that the bomber always gets through.
• Garry Kasparov had to unlearn how to play chess after losing to a computer.
• As a U-2 pilot [at 70,000 feet], I had to unlearn my old worldview and 
perceive how the Earth curves, its borders blur, and its inhabitants compete 
under a thin veil of atmosphere. It changed my perspective.
Think of the things that you may have to unlearn in the future: 
• Quantum computing may require us to unlearn our traditional cryptology, 
and how we keep secrets.
• You may have to unlearn the AI-constructed “deep fake” images that will ap-
pear on your screens and enter your minds.
• You may have to unlearn the traditional limits of human capability.
• You must unlearn the pretensions that have set themselves up as truth. 
In my office I have a “Table of Disruptive Technologies” that is designed 
like the periodic table. It includes elements such as “wireless energy transfer,” 
“biohacking,” and about a hundred others. We constantly discover elements that 
disrupt our status quo understanding of the world. What new forms of expert 
knowledge will the future require? Who knows? But the first step will be to un-
learn some of the old forms of expert knowledge so you can lead in the modern 
world. In that sense, unlearning is a process of creative destruction.
On your first day at NWC last year I shared with you this quote from Lincoln: 
“The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present.” It is hard 
to unlearn dogma, but you must. Ralph Waldo Emerson, a contemporary of 
Lincoln, said, as many of you have heard, that “a foolish consistency is the hob-
goblin of little minds.” In the same poem he advised, “Speak what you think now 
in hard words, and tomorrow speak what tomorrow thinks in hard words again, 
though it contradict every thing you said today.” These are the practices of life-
long unlearners. They seek hard truths and speak—and write—hard words. Rear 
Admiral Grace Hopper, a pioneering intellect in computers, had a clock on her 
wall that told the correct time—but it ran counterclockwise. Why? She wanted to 
demonstrate that the argument “We’ve always done it that way” is a refuge for the 
complacent. She was an unlearner.
I am not advocating for change for the sake of change; all of us have seen fads 
come and go. I am advocating for thinking that is simultaneously rigorous yet 
14
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unbound by convention. And developing that ability demands time and energy, 
because it is inherently inefficient. It is easy to visualize your education as some-
thing that is efficient—a ladder, say. Expend some energy in a predefined direc-
tion and you’ll get to the next rung. It is one-size-fits-all, and everyone pretty 
much does the same thing. In a very basic sense, you’ve done that here; when 
you climb these stairs and walk across the stage, you will have stepped up a rung. 
That’s great, and we’re here to celebrate that.
But it’s not just that, because real learning—true education—is much more. 
So let me make a different comparison. Learning—and unlearning—is less like 
a ladder than like climbing a cliff, or a rock wall. The rock wall is the unknown. 
You find your own way up by grasping new things and contemplating new direc-
tions. You have done some free-climbing this year, in the form of your electives, 
your papers, your research, your presentations, and your discussions with each 
other as you’ve developed your own intellectual strengths and abilities; you’ve 
“gripped” new ideas. Now you’re moving onto a steeper face—and there are no 
safety ropes. Here are some things about climbing a rock wall that are similar to 
your ongoing education:
• There is no straight line.
• It requires (mental) agility.
• It requires tenacity and focus.
• It requires taking risks.
• It requires a high index of suspicion.
• Is that handhold as good as it appears to be?
• You have to do some unlearning on the way up. Some grips and ledges 
may not be what they appear. Your assumptions literally may not hold; 
in fact, they may be fatally wrong if they cannot support the weight you 
thought they could. They may have to be unlearned.
• It requires innovation. That means there may be some trial and error, some 
false moves that reveal better moves. If you’re not making mistakes, you’re 
not moving very far.
And just as there are hazards to navigation at sea, there are some hazards to 
navigation on the rock wall.
• One of them is thinking you know more than you actually do. Stephen 
Hawking said the greatest enemy is “not ignorance, it is the illusion of 
knowledge.” The ancients called this hubris. And everyone in this room 
today suffers from it.
15
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• Another hazard is a lack of ideas. If you only have one idea, one method, one 
technique, you’ll get stuck—and passed by.
• An inability to think a few moves ahead poses another hazard, and so does 
comfortably clinging to one spot or one idea. If you cling, you can’t move; 
when you cling to doctrine, it becomes dogma. 
So when you leave here today, you’ll be making it up as you move up; there is 
no set path. But the ideas you’ve learned here will provide future traction; they 
are the grips and toeholds and ledges that allow you to climb higher.
And here is where this idea of lapidary comes in. You have had an immersive, 
lapidary experience here. It takes time, energy, and focus for things to become 
etched into stone, and the ideas you’ve grappled with here are lapidary; they are 
engraved in—sometimes pounded in. They are anchor points in the rock wall—
things that you can grasp and that can give you purchase.
So, your professors won’t be speaking to you just in your dreams but during 
your climb as well. You can recognize their influence by your familiarity with 
grappling with complex problems; otherwise, you may see nothing but slick, 
steep rock. And as you learn, you can etch more ideas, more friction points into 
the stone and use them to move in different directions. So, an effective education 
is lapidary.
People who climb rocks and face the unknown also know something about 
the value of threading a pathway from point to point, from strength to strength— 
often an unpredictable pathway. And here’s where tortuosity comes in. Remember, 
a lightning bolt is measured by its degree of tortuosity. Step back and look at the 
pathway a climber ends up taking; maybe it’s like the pathway you’ve navigated 
while here. It very likely zigs and zags; it has tortuosity. That is because education 
is nothing like a straight line; education is inherently inefficient. It’s tailored; no 
two paths toward wisdom are exactly the same. And that, like a lightning bolt, is a 
mark of power—a symbol of creative destruction. Your climb may seem random 
and wandering to an observer below, but it has its own internal reasons and exter-
nal influences. And it is a display of the energy you are gathering and harnessing 
for a future purpose. Your lifelong learning and unlearning should create heat, 
light, and fire. And it will etch your mark into the rock.
So, yes, you have climbed a ladder here, and you now have a much better view. 
But, more importantly, you have spent some time on the face of the rock, testing 
new ideas and techniques, while you yourselves have been tested as well.
So, think of your education in these terms.
• It involves a commitment to unlearning.
• Its lapidary etchings and carvings create lasting value.
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• It lets you see and explore different directions; it has powerful tortuosity.
• Lifelong unlearners don’t care much about ladders; they prefer to free-climb 
mountains—they prefer to discover.
This is a constant struggle. There are effective ways to cultivate your mind, but 
none of them are efficient; there is no straight path of least resistance. In some 
sense, your education is like war. You have learned that in war there are no easy 
solutions or shortcuts, and it’s the same with learning. Both are difficult, messy, 
unpredictable, and reactive. In war, as in education, the results are never final—
and you’re never home by Christmas.
As you climb your rock wall, your struggle is against more than the pull of 
gravity. You struggle against what plagued the ancient Greeks and their Olympian 
gods: the constant pull of hubris—pride in dearly held pretensions; a resistance 
to a greater truth, and satisfaction with a lesser one; and an unwillingness to un-
learn. The modern world and its little gods of metal and silicon only strengthen 
these forces against which you must climb. They must be fought and overcome 
in your minds and in the future you will create.
And what if you fall? As the great visionary novelist Ray Bradbury advised, 
“Build wings on the way down.”
So now: go forth, act justly, love mercy, walk humbly, confront evil, unlearn, 
and climb on.
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Rear Admiral Shoshana Chatfield is the fifty- 
seventh President of the U.S. Naval War College and 
a career naval helicopter pilot. A native of Garden 
Grove, California, she graduated from Boston Uni-
versity in 1987 with a bachelor of arts in interna-
tional relations and French language and literature. 
She received her commission through the Naval Re-
serve Officers Training Corps in 1988 and earned her 
wings of gold in 1989. Chatfield was awarded the Na-
vy’s Political/Military Scholarship and attended the 
Kennedy School of Government, receiving a master 
in public administration from Harvard University in 
1997. In 2009, the University of San Diego conferred 
on her a doctorate of education in leadership studies.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
IT IS MY DIFFICULT DUTY to advise our many readers of the pass-
ing of one of our treasured professors, Dr. William F. Bundy, 
who passed away on December 15. Our College is blessed with a host of remark-
able researchers and educators, and Will’s body of work and connections will stand 
as a lasting example to and enduring source of motivation for this talented group.
Professor Bundy’s life cannot be summed up easily, because he impacted so 
many people in wildly varying ways. He was keenly aware of his legacy as one 
of the Centennial Seven—the first seven African Americans to command a 
submarine in the first hundred years of our nation’s submarine force. With that 
awareness came his commitment to mentoring and guiding Naval War College 
students, faculty, and staff of all races and ethnicities. He left an indelible imprint 
on their experiences at the College and their career experiences going forward. 
It was heartening to see that all five of the surviving members of the Centennial 
Seven gathered in Rhode Island to pay their respects to Will at his funeral.
Those who had the opportunity to work with Professor Bundy can attest to 
his untiring work ethic. He constantly engaged other faculty members and col-
laborated on new and innovative ideas. He was extremely proud of his advanced 
research project work with the Gravely Group. Honoring Vice Admiral Samuel 
L. Gravely Jr., the first African American naval officer to command a U.S. com-
batant ship, Dr. Bundy transformed the group by looking at current technical 
challenges of naval operations and created a place where he also could educate, 
mentor, and inspire officers from across all the services.
As Pericles said, “What you leave behind is not what is engraved in stone 
monuments but what is woven into the lives of others.” Professor Bundy wove his 
approach to life into the many people with whom he interacted, and because of 
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that he made the Naval War College, the Navy, and our community so much bet-
ter. His presence will be carried on in the continued work on his various projects 
all around the College. Dr. Bundy will be missed by us all.
In other events around the College in recent months, our Center for Naval 
Warfare Studies (CNWS) had the opportunity to showcase its vast wargaming 
capabilities to the Department of the Navy’s Chief Learning Officer (CLO), Dr. 
John Kroger, in December. Our War Gaming Department combines a depth of 
operational experience with a wide breadth of academic expertise in the oldest 
military operations research method to provide optimal output for the Navy and 
Department of Defense (DoD). During the CLO’s visit, we highlighted the wide 
variety of events the College supports to the acting SECNAV’s principal adviser 
for education.
Over the past fiscal year, our wargaming team executed more than forty events, 
including eight large-scale war games for DoD and numerous other efforts, both 
inside and outside the College. One of these war games was an ongoing bilateral 
effort with a critical ally, another was the first in a series of trilateral war games 
with two key allies, and one was a large, strategic-level war game involving the 
whole of the U.S. government. In addition, War Gaming faculty are leading a 
NATO research task group on innovation in analytical war gaming, which is the 
largest systems analysis research effort currently under way in NATO and a key 
component in NATO’s modernization mission. With the most sophisticated fa-
cilities and a widely respected team of professionals, we provide a service to our 
Navy and our nation that no other institution in the world can match.
Continuous advancements in our wargaming capabilities were highlighted 
when CNWS was selected to design and execute the Globally Integrated War 
Games 2020 (GIWG 20-1 and GIWG 20-2) for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (CJCS). This largest and most complex game to date tackled pressing joint 
global-integration and force-design issues. Over four hundred personnel with 
an average of seventeen years’ experience in their individual warfare specialties 
participated in GIWG 20-2, including thirty-seven flag and general officers and 
senior executives from over sixty commands across DoD and the Intelligence 
Community. Additionally, forty-one senior leaders, among whom were eighteen 
four-star flag and general officers (including the CJCS, the vice chairman, com-
batant commanders, and service chiefs), participated in the Senior Leader Event 
on the final day of the game. The CJCS has directed the Joint Staff J7 to use find-
ings from GIWG 20 to inform joint concepts of operation and future joint-force 
design and development.
Finally, I’d like to report that the College recently dedicated our command 
conference room in memory of the late Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale, 
20
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/1
 P R E S I D E N T ’ S  F O RU M  1 5
USN (Ret.). As President of the Naval War College from 1977 to 1979, he cre-
ated a military ethics course that has proved timeless and enduring. Universally 
known as the “Stockdale course,” the Foundations of Moral Obligation class still 
is being taught more than forty years after Stockdale’s departure and is one of the 
College’s most popular elective courses.
The Stockdale Conference Room features paintings, books, and photographs 
depicting Stockdale’s career, including the 1976 ceremony in which he was 
awarded the Medal of Honor by President Gerald R. Ford for his courage and 
leadership during his seven years as a prisoner of war in Vietnam. Books lining 
the shelves of the conference room include Stockdale’s own work Thoughts of a 
Philosophical Fighter Pilot and, with his wife, Sybil Stockdale, In Love and War. 
Also represented are books that Stockdale credited with influencing him—in 
particular, the work of the Greek thinker Epictetus, whose ideas about Stoicism 
helped Stockdale endure his torture and captivity.
At the ceremonial dedication on December 4, Stockdale’s eldest son, Dr. James 
B. Stockdale II, said that nothing would make his father more proud than to see 
his life’s work continuing: “Dad would be positively honored, and he would be 
humbled. He was a realist, and when he left the War College, it was his earnest 
hope that his work might continue in some way. He would be grateful that so 
many took his words to heart and made them a part of their professional and 
personal lives.”
It is hard to overstate just how much of an effect Admiral Stockdale had on 
the United States Navy and our ideas about moral foundations, ethical behavior, 
philosophy, and the profession of arms.
As we embark on a new decade, we do so with a renewed commitment to the 
professional education and development of our students, and to the research and 
analysis that will enable the Navy and all of DoD to defend our nation and its al-
lies against those who might challenge the concepts and values we hold so dear.
SHOSHANA S. CHATFIELD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
(If you are interested in reading our full statement on the passing of Professor Bundy, 
it is available on our website at www.usnwc.edu/News-and-Events/News/NWC 
-Statement-on-the-Passing-of-Professor-William-Bundy.)
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FROM ACCOUNTABILITY TO PUNISHMENT
Michael Junge
 Why does the Navy fire so many commanding officers? Is it, as one Naval War College professor often asserts in lectures, a feature in the system?1 
Is there a problem in the command selection process? Are people just flawed 
individuals? All the above? Or something else? After a decade of research that 
examined almost two thousand individual cases and incidents and hundreds of 
investigations, the answer is clear: the Navy fires commanders who fall short of 
the Navy’s standards. These officers are held to a high standard and are account-
able for their actions. Removal is now nearly synonymous with accountable.
Supporting an argument from largely self-evident cases makes for preconclu-
sive reading. Yet what is falling short? Why does falling short mean removal from 
command? These embedded questions—as well as how standards are defined, 
the temporal nature of standards, what happens after removal, and an assessment 
of the modern removal process and rate compared with historical removals—are 
the central issues of this article. After a very long look at history and analysis of 
the language in dozens of official Navy investigations, an answer to each question 
reveals itself to us. What does the answer to “Why does the Navy remove com-
manding officers?” mean for today’s commanders?
Historically, removal from command followed from a violation directly tied to 
command itself and was described through a term of art—crimes of command—
the most obvious examples of which are collisions, allisions, and groundings. 
Collisions occur when two moving objects strike each other. For example, if, while 
driving home, you strike another moving car on the highway, that is a collision. 
Allisions occur when a moving object strikes a nonmoving object. If, on that same 
drive home, instead of striking a moving car you strike a telephone pole, guard-
rail, or tree, that is an allision. Groundings occur when a ship’s bottom strikes the 
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seafloor. Some groundings are intentional and may not inherently constitute a 
crime of command; the same is true of some collisions and allisions. Sorting out 
the intent is part of the accountability process for these incidents. Major fires, 
weapons accidents, and aviation accidents can fit within the broad definition of 
a crime of command as well.
Why are the examples given above considered crimes of command, whereas 
poor leadership, infidelity, misappropriation of funds, and drunkenness are not? 
If a ship collides, allides, or grounds, the commanding officer is responsible for 
what happened; that responsibility is inherent in command. The commanding 
officer has the power and obligation to train the crew to avoid collisions, alli-
sions, and groundings; to stow 
and secure flammable materi-
als and weapons properly; 
and to adhere to established 
standards. When he or she 
becomes aware of violations of 
rules or regulations, the com-
manding officer also has the 
obligation and power to act. 
Whether the commander was involved directly in an incident is irrelevant; the 
nature of command is inherent in the movements of the ship.
In contrast, infidelity, embezzlement, and drunkenness are individual actions. 
A commander who cheats on a spouse is not involving the command. A com-
mander who uses a government aircraft for personal transportation is acting for 
personal benefit. A drunken commander is just drunk. Likewise, the actions of 
individual sailors do not reflect on or impact the command, necessarily. Each of 
these actions is improper, regardless of whether the individual is in command. 
But if a ship collides, those directly involved in operating the ship and the com-
manding officer are responsible for what happened; they alone are accountable 
for their actions.
History shows that three current trends differ from past patterns. First, today’s 
commanding officers are more likely to be removed for personal failings (moral 
indiscretions, financial mishandlings) or for accidents (fire, grounding, collision) 
that once barely made the news. Second, they are removed via an administrative 
investigation that is far from that outlined in Navy regulations and procedures. 
Finally, this culture of removal arises because of an improper conflation of the 
concepts of accountability, responsibility, and culpability. As the Navy reenters 
an era of great-power competition, it is past the time that we should evaluate our 
culture of command and relearn precise language before we jettison superb com-
manding officers for ahistorical reasons.
[F]lashy events—arrest, grounding, collision, 
death of a sailor—are more likely to result in 
. . . removing a commander than mediocre 
performance, an unpublicized affair, or funds 
mismanagement. However, if those things 
make it into the press, then removal from 
command is far more likely.
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IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM
In 2004 and 2010, the Naval Inspector General (IG) sought to answer these same 
questions: Why are we removing so many commanders, and for what reasons? 
Two naval officers, Captain Mark Light and Captain Jason Vogt, published papers 
addressing the subject.2 Neither the papers nor the IG reports provided specific 
answers to any of the questions, and in fact they asserted that even with a hun-
dred removals there were insufficient data to draw any trends or overall linkage.
Both the reports and the papers, however, called attention to the fact that 
removals hovered around 1 percent of commanders, and that this 1 percent 
was historically normal.3 If 1 percent was normal or acceptable, and the reasons 
for removal were accepted and normal when the Navy removed twenty-six of-
ficers in 2003, from a service with 376,000 sailors and 297 ships, then how many 
commanders were removed in 1983, when the Navy had 533 ships and 779,000 
sailors? Or in 1963, when there were 857 ships and almost a million sailors? From 
mere napkin math, the answers should be two times and three times as many 
removals, respectively. But where were the sensational headlines then?
I ultimately identified over 1,500 incidents, including crimes of command 
and personal failures, in the seventy years between 1945 and 2015. Unlike 
the IG reports and the papers by Light and Vogt, the incidents in my study 
displayed a clear trend, a clear change, and evidence that what the Navy does 
today is not what it did in the past. In the decades after World War II, remov-
als occurred, but they were uncommon. Officers who committed missteps in 
command routinely were retained in command, often forgiven, and allowed to 
continue with their careers. If their career paths allowed time for rehabilitation 
or if their prior performance outweighed the misstep, they were promoted and 
remained in the service. While custom and tradition implied that commanders 
would lose command for collisions or groundings, the reality at that time was 
far different.
To evaluate the impact of these incidents, my study identified the incident 
commanding officer and determined whether the commander was removed 
overtly from command, suspiciously departed with a reduced-length tour, was 
relieved by an officer who held command for a few days or weeks, or was relieved 
by someone identified as acting or interim commander. Once the individual 
names were located and combined with evidence—or an educated guess—on 
each removal, I consulted Navy promotion records. Was the officer removed, and 
then failed to promote? Did the officer retain command, but fail to promote? Or, 
as happened in a number of cases, did the officer—whether removed or not—still 
promote after committing a crime of command? 
Graph 1 illustrates trends where, of the 1,500 cases examined, over 330 
commanders were removed overtly from command, and a majority of those 
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removals—305—happened between 1986 and 2015. Another significant differ-
ence lies in the number of officers forgiven or allowed rehabilitation. Between 
1985 and 2015, only sixty-five officers experienced some sort of misstep but were 
promoted afterward, while between 1945 and 1985, over 250 officers recovered—
or about a quarter of the thousand incidents.
RESULTS? ANSWERS? OR MORE QUESTIONS?
So, why are commanding officers removed from command? In general, news and 
Navy reports tell us that commanders are removed because of some mixture of 
alcohol, indiscretion, financial misdeeds, sexual relationships, and other inap-
propriate relationships between senior leaders and junior sailors. Some analysts 
have linked increased removals directly to the presence of women in the Navy.4 
In almost all cases, the official Navy response includes some manner of a “loss of 
confidence in ability to command” and a reference to the “absolute accountability 
of command.”
Graphing the incidents, removals, and recoveries over seventy years (as seen 
in graph 1) reveals the following trends.
1. The Navy is safer today than before—explosions and major fires are rare.
2. Collisions are a constant issue.
3. Groundings are less likely.
4. Individual personal behavior is held to a different standard than in 
previous decades.
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5. Fewer officers recover from missteps.
6. The changes are most apparent before and after the early 1980s, 
specifically before 1983 and after 1986.
The first finding evident in this data set is that in the modern Navy, a com-
mander is most likely to be removed for personal misconduct or when the crime 
of command includes one or all of the following elements: death, press coverage, 
or significant damage to the Navy, whether materially or to its reputation.
An immediate superior in command (ISIC) may remove a commander for 
one or more of four reasons: misconduct, substandard performance involving 
gross negligence, substandard performance over an extended period, or a loss 
of confidence. Each of these is largely subjective and unlikely to be questioned.5 
Whether an ISIC thinks actions constitute misconduct is more important than 
the actions themselves, and in all cases each ISIC has another ISIC above him or 
her, so a commander is subject to the opinions of the captain and each flag officer 
in the chain of command. This is one reason that flashy events—arrest, ground-
ing, collision, death of a sailor—are more likely to result in conversations about 
removing a commander than mediocre performance, an unpublicized affair, or 
funds mismanagement. However, if those things make it into the press, then re-
moval from command is far more likely.
There are no crimes of command that guarantee removal, and there is no 
comprehensive list of reasons for removal. Reportedly, some officers are re-
moved from command to send a message. Perhaps some are removed because 
mixed performance resulted in a strained relationship with the ISIC, and when 
a significant enough event presented itself the ISIC removed a perceived under-
performing commander. In the consideration of the specific reason relating to 
removal, each case should, and must, be treated separately. However, this does 
not preclude recognizing some trends that may allow the Navy to identify future 
issues and reduce command removal rates.
Since 1945, the Navy also has done the following:
1. Reduced the number of senior officers at sea and aboard ships
2. Relied on less-formal fact-finding bodies
3. Conflated operational and personal missteps
4. Focused on rules and consequences rather than intent and capability
To some degree, it is obvious that the Navy is safer today and groundings 
are less likely. We no longer have 1,200-pounds-per-square-inch steam ships, 
we have fewer sailors, we use safer munitions, and we have global positioning 
systems to aid in navigation. Mortality rates for today’s sailor are four times less 
than they were in 1980, and active-duty sailor mortality rates are sixteen times 
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less than the population at large. Graph 2 shows the decline in major fires and 
explosions, especially since the late 1980s. This century has seen seventeen major 
fires afloat, while there were fifteen in 1980 alone. Fifteen fires per year remained 
a rough rolling three-year average into the late 1980s, compared with an average 
of less than one a year since the turn of the century. The result of a safer Navy is 
that each active-duty death is more noticeable. 
Navigation today is far more precise—often more precise even than is useful to 
a ship’s crew. While groundings are rare (see graph 3), collisions remain reduced 
but somewhat constant (see graph 4). The frequency of collisions relates more to 
ships entering and leaving port, operating in congested waters, and conducting 
underway replenishment operations than it does to changes in technology. The 
fact that the Navy is operationally safer supports the decreased removal rate for 
clear crimes of command, but does not explain why fewer officers recover after 
incidents or why personal standards are different now from what they once were. 
The underlying rules and traditions governing command have not changed—
only the standard for removal has.
Through the 1970s, and even into the 1980s, flagships were where the flag 
officer lived and worked. Fleet commanders, and even Chiefs of Naval Opera-
tions, embarked in ships for extended periods—and not only aircraft carriers. 
Today, most sea commands are led by commanders who may never see their 
captain ISIC, much less the flag officer in command of the strike group or fleet. 
This separation among commanders, combined with the more-varied commis-
sioning sources in modern accessions, leads to commanders who no longer have 
personal relationships with most of their subordinate commanders. This removes 
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the possibility of applying a knowing “benefit of the doubt”—the sort that likely 
kept Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey in command even after he endured two 
disastrous typhoons and committed operational missteps at the Battle of Leyte 
Gulf. This personal-professional relationship among commanders was one of the 
reasons for more frequent rehabilitation in the decades after World War II.
Another reason for the modern difference lies in how the Navy investigates 
incidents. Incidents that occurred through the mid-1970s were investigated by 
boards and courts of inquiry. Three or more officers sat together and interviewed 
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witnesses and interested parties before issuing their findings and opinions. Ev-
eryone went on the record. Some of these courts were contentious; many, if not 
most, were routine. Even complicated cases such as the 1952 collision between 
USS Wasp (CV 18) and USS Hobson (DMS 26) took little over a month from 
incident to report completion. The internationally sensitive 1969 collision be-
tween USS Frank E. Evans (DD 754) and HMAS Melbourne (R21) took a little 
over five weeks, with inter-
views and testimony taking 
three weeks and involving 
seventy-nine witnesses. The 
only modern court of in-
quiry was of USS Greeneville 
(SSN 772) regarding its 9 
February 2001 collision with 
Japanese fishing vessel Ehime Maru. The court was appointed eight days after the 
collision but did not convene until 5 March 2001. After twelve days of testimony, 
the court closed on 20 March but did not issue its report until 13 April, sixty-
three days after the collision. The Navy has not held a court or board of inquiry 
for a major incident since, in no small part because the participants believed that 
courts of inquiry, while appropriate to their case, required significant investments 
of resources and time. In other words, they were hard, and there were easier and 
more-efficient ways to accomplish the same result.6
The veracity of this claim is subject to challenge. USS Fitzgerald collided on 
17 June 2017, and the command triad was removed two months later. USS John 
S. McCain collided on 21 August 2017, and the commanding officer and execu-
tive officer were removed on 10 October of the same year. A narrative report was 
released to the press on 1 November, but the actual reports remain withheld and 
the courts-martial for officers in the Fitzgerald incident finally were canceled 
without trial in April 2018.
Other modern cases took similar amounts of time. The investigation into 
the October 2000 attack on USS Cole (DDG 67) was completed forty-eight 
days after the investigation. The investigation into the 1987 attack on USS Stark 
(FFG 31) took twenty-six days. The investigation into the 2005 collision between 
USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81) and USS McFaul (DDG 74) took twenty-five 
days. The investigation into the 2013 helicopter mishap aboard USS William P. 
Lawrence (DDG 110) took sixty-one days. The biggest differences between these 
investigations and the courts of inquiry are not time and resources but Navy 
regulations and the rights of the commanders involved.
The older courts of inquiry and the individual officer investigations that have 
dominated the last four decades are governed by the same instruction: The Manual 
[A] commanding officer who sexually harasses 
subordinates, a commander whose ship runs 
aground and is lost to the Navy, or an officer 
who has a minor collision are all treated the 
same way by the Navy. This treatment is in-
consistent with historical practice.
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of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN). This document delineates the require-
ments for preliminary inquiries, command or administrative investigations, and 
courts and boards of inquiry. Command investigations, per the JAGMAN, are 
for ship groundings, shipboard flooding, fires, or collision and aviation mishaps, 
provided they are not identified as major incidents. The JAGMAN defines major 
incidents as follows:
An extraordinary incident occurring during the course of official duties resulting in 
multiple deaths, substantial property loss, or substantial harm to the environment, 
where the circumstances suggest a significant departure from the expected level of 
professionalism, leadership, judgment, communication, state of material readiness, or 
other relevant standard. Substantial property loss or other harm is that which greatly 
exceeds what is normally encountered in the course of day-to-day operations. These 
cases are often accompanied by national public and press interest and significant 
congressional attention. They may also have the potential of undermining public 
confidence in the Naval service. That the case is a major incident may be apparent 
when it is first reported or as additional facts become known.7
This definition has not changed since 1990 and is consistent with prewar 
definitions as found in the 1937 edition of Courts and Boards. Why, then, would 
the Navy use the single-officer investigation over the mandated court of inquiry? 
Courts of inquiry provide for greater legal representation of the commanders and 
other interested parties and the information presented becomes part of an open 
record. In fact, most courts of inquiry were open to spectators and reporters. By 
contrast, today’s investigations are completed, acted on—and subsequently not 
disseminated to the fleet. They become available only to judge advocates on large 
staffs or via the Freedom of Information Act process, which in itself reduces 
the amount of released information, if any is released at all. In many cases, the 
individuals removed from command are not provided copies of the applicable 
investigation, even when they ask for one.
Because commanders are now judged via an administrative process during 
which they enjoy fewer rights than they would in a judicial process, removal for 
personal misconduct is lumped in with operational incidents. Much of the rea-
soning for this process lies in the Navy’s own regulations, wherein any removal is 
treated the same, whether an officer requests relief for some reason or is removed 
by the ISIC for a significant event or personal misconduct. The result is that a 
commanding officer who sexually harasses subordinates, a commander whose 
ship runs aground and is lost to the Navy, and an officer who has a minor colli-
sion are all treated the same way by the Navy.
This treatment is inconsistent with historical practice. John Barry, recognized 
as the “father of the Navy,” ran USS Raleigh aground and abandoned it to the 
British in 1778. William Bainbridge grounded and lost USS Philadelphia in 1803 
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and then was imprisoned in Tripoli for nineteen months. Ensign Chester Nimitz 
ran his first command, USS Decatur, aground. Today all of these officers have 
ships named for them and are revered as heroes of the Navy. And these officers 
are not anomalies, but rather well known. Between 1945 and 2015, over three 
hundred officers recovered from some form of crime of command or personal 
misstep and were promoted or continued on to other commands. In this century, 
across over two hundred crimes of command, only twelve officers recovered, 
with none of those in this decade.
These examples illustrate what was then, and what is now. Other major ques-
tions are how and why. How did the Navy change from a service that allowed re-
covery after an incident to one that never forgives? Where did the idea of a zero- 
defect culture originate? Why does the Navy remove commanders and discard 
them regardless of their prior or potential future contributions? Neither Barry, 
Bainbridge, nor Nimitz—nor even Halsey, Raborn, Mullen, or Natter—would 
survive in today’s Navy. How and why are we here? The answer comes down to 
a single individual who, oddly, held command for roughly six months but was a 
flag officer for almost three decades: Hyman G. Rickover.
WORDS MATTER
For some the groan is audible: “Rickover!?!” Admiral Rickover is both lauded 
and blamed for every facet of the modern Navy. Every success and every failure 
might, in some way, link back to him. At the beginning of this research, Rickover’s 
legacy had no place. Nuclear weapons and nuclear power, yes, but Rickover? No. 
In hindsight, this was an exceptionally naive view. Any study of command must 
at least acknowledge someone who had such a significant impact on the Navy. 
But that is hindsight. It was not until I was reading through the investigations and 
cases that Rickover’s influence started to show through. There are any number of 
stories or tales that can link Rickover to command and removal from command, 
but no instance more directly links to how we got here, and why we got here, than 
Rickover’s statements on responsibility.
In 1961, Rickover testified before Congress as follows:
Responsibility is a unique concept: it can only reside and inhere in a single individual. 
You may share it with others, but your portion is not diminished. You may delegate it, 
but it is still with you. You may disclaim it, but you cannot divest yourself of it. Even 
if you do not recognize it or admit its presence, you cannot escape it. If responsibility 
is rightfully yours, no evasion, or ignorance, or passing the blame can shift the bur-
den to someone else. Unless you can point your finger at the man who is responsible 
when something goes wrong, then you have never had anyone really responsible.8
Certainly, many readers recognize this statement, or something similar to it. It 
appeared in one form or another in a few of the investigations after the mid-1980s 
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and has been quoted often since. It is similar to what lies at the core of the next 
issue. What Rickover left behind is not what he said, but how others internalized 
and repeated it.
In 2014, Admiral Dave Oliver, USN (Ret.), wrote in a book about Rickover: 
“Do you agree with Rickover’s concept of accountability? He phrased it thusly: 
‘You may share it with others, but your portion is not diminished. You may del-
egate it, but it is still with you. . . . If responsibility is rightfully yours, no evasion, 
or ignorance or passing the blame can shift the burden to someone else.’”9
An astute reader will have seen the difference already. Rickover said responsi-
bility; Oliver wrote accountability. While the modern Navy uses the words inter-
changeably, they are two different words and two different concepts, and they are 
misused all too often. These two words also frequently supplant another word: 
culpability. The simple fact is that we no longer differentiate among accountable, 
responsible, and culpable.
Accountability is the condition of someone who is accountable. Being account-
able, or to give account, entails the need to explain one’s actions or to provide a 
balancing of sums. Responsibility is different, even when used synonymously. Re-
sponsibility is the condition of being responsible—that of an obligation or power 
to act or respond. Responsibility carries an additional subtext of claim, credit, 
blame, and sometimes trust. Culpability is the state of being culpable; it often is 
defined as being responsible for a fault or deserving blame. This definition is dif-
ferent from the other two: culpability is associated solely with blame. Culpability 
looks back after an action, as does accountability when one gives account for an 
action. Responsibility is the only word with both a forward-looking (power to 
act) and a backward-looking component (the power to respond). While these 
three terms commonly are used together or in place of each other, their confla-
tion illustrates one of the issues the Navy faces today: imprecision in language 
means not only that we are uncertain about what these words mean today, but we 
misunderstand them when they are used in historical context.
The Navy also does not seem to differentiate between mistake and sin or guilt 
and shame. We all too often think of these different concepts as identical. A mis-
take is not a sin: a mistake is unknowingly doing something wrong, while a sin 
is knowingly doing something wrong. If you know the rule and choose to violate 
it, that is sin. If you should have known the rule and chose not to learn it and 
violated it, that is also sin. If you did not know the rule, you did not know about 
the rule, no one drew your attention to the rule, or you were accustomed to some 
other standard, that is a mistake.
Likewise, guilt and shame are very different concepts. Guilt relates to actions, 
while shame relates to self. The guilty person feels bad that something happened, 
while the ashamed person feels bad about him- or herself. The guilty commander 
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says, “I can’t believe I ran the ship aground.” The ashamed commander says, “I 
can’t believe I ran the ship aground.” This extrapolates up the chain of command 
(and down) with ISICs who are upset that Commander Smith-Jones ran the ship 
aground. How the ISIC frames it—action or person—determines whether the ac-
tion is one that induces guilt or shame; that is, if it is the action being criticized or 
the individual. Guilt is something one can repent from and atone for, but shame 
is not. When we internalize shame, either as an individual or as an institution, we 
say that someone brings shame and discredit on the Navy, and we are saying that 
their actions are unforgivable and irredeemable. This is something we should say 
only in rare cases, and never lightly.
If an officer does not know better or if an officer works within a culture that 
is consistent and constant for the fifteen years prior to command—and is evalu-
ated by an officer who has not 
been to sea in four, seven, or 
ten years, or who never com-
manded a ship at all—then 
those officers are working 
from different frames of refer-
ence. Each officer has a differ-
ent idea of “is,” which leads to a different idea of how things “ought to be.” And 
it is easy to confuse what “is” with what “ought to be” when what “is” generally 
has worked in your favor.10 One of the challenges that leaders face is identifying 
what a subordinate knows, should know, and honestly does not know. Another 
lies in creating the system that imparts the lessons necessary for success in peace 
and war.
One path that helps to guide us through this model of language, rules, under-
standing, and what is or what ought to be is ethics. Professional military ethics 
came into popular understanding with Samuel P. Huntington’s seminal 1957 
work The Soldier and the State. Huntington laid out three criteria for a profes-
sion: special expertise, responsibility toward society, and a sense of corporate-
ness. This sense of corporateness includes a self-policing function whereby the 
profession examines and evaluates members against recognized standards. What 
the Navy has done, however, is to turn from ethics to rules. Ethics are about right 
or wrong, and sometimes about choosing the least wrong of two wrongs. Rules 
are different. Rules are about “shall” or “shall not.” Ethics cannot, and should not, 
be rules. Ethics imply a level of autonomy that requires decision-making, while 
rules do not.
Rickover’s words and legacy provide insight. In 1978, a submarine officer 
who was on his way to his first nuclear submarine for his department head tour 
after initial qualification in diesel submarines wrote that submarine officers were 
How did the Navy change from a service that 
allowed recovery after an incident to one that 
never forgives? . . . Why does the Navy remove 
commanders and discard them regardless of 
their prior or potential future contributions?
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“given responsibility, but not authority, [and] the natural reaction is to ask to be 
told exactly what to do, to request rudder orders. An officer working in a nuclear 
billet can become a commanding officer if he simply makes no major mistakes. 
Leadership is not nearly so important a criterion of success. A leader who does 
what he is told and ensures that he is told everything that he must do does not 
make mistakes.”11
Look at the language: “responsibility, but not authority,” “not make mistakes.” 
Phrases such as these still ring true today and reflect the view of many junior, and 
some senior, officers. If I do not make a mistake, I can make it to command. If I 
take a risk, I might make a mistake. If I follow the rules, I will not be taking a risk. 
This is where the zero-defect culture, the accountability culture, has brought us. 
Do what you are told, nothing more and nothing less, and you will advance. Take 
no risks, make no mistakes, and you will advance. It does not matter that this is 
not what Rickover lived or believed, or that modern leaders do not believe this. 
Enough junior officers do believe it, which is what makes a culture—and culture 
is everything.
For those who wonder and think, “Nineteen seventy-eight—that was forty 
years ago; I was in grade school (or not even born),” look at how the Navy viewed 
ethics in a 2014 white paper written at the Naval War College: The Navy’s “pre-
dominant approach to ethics is legalistic in content and often negative in tone. . . . 
At best, we employ a checklist of what not to do, and at worst, ethical development 
of our people is a chore or a burden that takes away from getting the job done.”12
This is how we moved from broad to narrow, from latitude to checklist. This 
is how we lost focus on the profession and instead emphasized protecting the 
perception and reputation of the Navy. We traded judgment for following orders.
What can we do to right the ship? First of all, we must follow Rickover’s lead. 
Rather than misunderstand him, we must study and learn from his example. 
Imagine if we put as much study into the human psyche, into leadership and 
ethics, as Rickover and the nuclear enterprise put into nuclear power, materials, 
controls, and testing. We must understand and standardize our language so that 
we know the difference between clear concepts such as allision and collision, and 
less clear ones such as accountable, responsible, and culpable. We must know 
where rules matter and where principles are more important. The simple fact is 
that the more rules that exist, the more likely sailors and officers are to violate 
and then ignore them. If rules are no longer applicable, change them. If the eight-
decades-old guidance for courts of inquiry is no longer applicable, change it. But 
do not ignore it out of personal or institutional convenience.
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke had a saying that “a commander who fails to exceed 
his authority is not of much use to his subordinates.” This is not about command-
ers overstepping standards beyond their authority or taking personal liberties 
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with command funds and equipment. Burke was talking about commanders 
exceeding given authority to the betterment and benefit of subordinates: back-
dating awards to advance a well-deserving petty officer who just missed the final 
multiple, or sending fathers home from deployment for a child’s birth.
The Navy also must relearn institutional forgiveness. This is not recom-
mended lightly. The perceived ability to recover from failure is more important 
than any commander’s exhortation that we do not have a zero-defect culture. If 
commanders make a mistake, then they deserve a better education, they deserve 
a chance to show what they have learned, and they deserve to move up. However, 
if they sin—no matter what the results—they must be investigated and evalu-
ated—for the decision, not the outcome. Flouting regulations cannot be absolved 
because everything turned out fine. Likewise, just because something turned out 
badly does not make the decision inherently wrong.
Studies show that forgiveness matters. Many studies, going back centuries, 
have showed us that people lie and people cheat.13 It is part of who we are; it is 
human nature. We also know that those who are absolved of sin, who know that 
repentance is accepted, or who are reminded of the group standard that eschews 
lying or cheating are less likely to sin, or less likely to sin again.14 Some believe 
that if there is no chance of repentance, then they might as well keep doing bad 
things. This is a culture we should avoid at all costs—but we might be headed 
down this road already.
Rickover knew the value of forgiveness. As a junior officer his ship went 
aground and his commanding officer was court-martialed. The court verdict is 
unknown, but this officer, Herbert Kays, was not removed from command and 
went on to be promoted and to command a light cruiser and a destroyer squad-
ron before retiring. In the Navy’s nuclear-propulsion program, legend depicts 
Rickover summarily removing commanders from command for trivial reasons; 
the legend is apocryphal. At least one officer was removed from command of a 
nuclear-powered submarine, twice—but he still was promoted to captain. Er-
nest Barrett commanded USS Permit (SSN 594) until the submarine ran into a 
freighter during precommissioning trials, whereupon he transferred ashore. But 
two years later he reentered the command course, this time for nuclear missile 
submarines. After taking command of USS Ethan Allen (SSBN 608), his boat 
collided with a merchant ship in January 1965, and again he was removed from 
command. But Barrett was promoted to captain before he retired in 1971.15
The Navy removes commanders when they do not meet the standards set for 
them. Despite a constant underpinning of law, regulations, and tradition, Navy 
custom and action have raised those standards and divorced them from historical 
context, such that today’s commanders are held to a higher standard than those 
before them. What began as aspirational now has become the minimum. We 
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should not be surprised if someone does not meet an aspirational standard. This 
also means that more commanders are removed from command, and removed 
from the service, than in past decades. This leads to weakened command, risk-
averse commanders, and a focus that places results ahead of intent. Results are 
important, but ill-intentioned success is more corrosive than the poor results of 
good and well-intentioned commanders. Differentiating the two is the Navy’s 
challenge going forward.
Yet even with this information, some might insist that the responsibility of 
the commanding officer is absolute, and that when blood and treasure are lost 
accountability must be demanded. That argument is valid and correct; however, 
neither accountability nor responsibility mandates removing an officer from 
command. In fact, had the Navy lived by this idea of absolute removal, the follow-
ing officers never would have risen to important positions in our forces:
• Captain Robert J. Kelly, USN, who commanded USS Enterprise (CVN 65) 
when it ran aground in 1983. Kelly served as Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
from 1991 to 1994.
• Commander Mike Boorda, USN, who commanded USS Farragut (DDG 37) 
when it ran aground in 1975. Boorda was Chief of Naval Operations from 
1994 to 1996.
• Captain Leon “Bud” Edney, USN, who commanded USS Constellation  
(CV 64) when it collided with a Bangladeshi merchant ship in 1980. Edney 
also dealt with an explosion aboard USS Ponchatoula (AO 148) when he 
commanded it in 1976. He served as Vice Chief of Naval Operations from 
1988 to 1990.
• Lieutenant Michael Mullen, USN, who in 1973 allided with a buoy when he 
commanded USS Noxubee (AOG 56). Mullen was Chief of Naval Operations 
from 2005 to 2007 and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2007 to 
2011.
• Captain Roy L. Johnson, USN, who collided with USS Pinnacle (MSO 462) 
while in command of USS Forrestal (CVA 59) in 1956. He commanded U.S. 
Pacific Fleet from 1965 to 1967.
• Captain Joseph S. Mobley, USN, who in 1990 lost twenty-one sailors to a 
liberty boat accident when he commanded USS Saratoga (CV 60). Mobley 
commanded Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet from 1998 to 2001.
• Captain William Raborn, USN, who in 1954 lost 103 sailors when the hydrau-
lic catapult system exploded aboard USS Bennington (CV 20). Raborn retired 
as a vice admiral after overseeing development of the Polaris missile system.
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These are only a few of the more than 150 officers who commanded ships 
during crimes of command yet rose to flag rank before retirement. Those officers 
benefited from a less draconian view of accountability, and the Navy benefited 
from their service and experience. What have we lost in the hundreds of officers 
handled differently over the past three decades?
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 The long contribution of war gaming to military training, operational analy-sis, and military planning has been well documented by numerous authors.1 
War games have been used for many purposes, and there are numerous different 
methods and types from which to choose, depending on the stakeholders’ aims. 
For example, war colleges have used war games as an integrated part of their 
curricula as part of the experiential learning cycle.2 The Pentagon wargames to 
develop and test new doctrine and war plans. Think tanks have used war games 
to generate new insights. The respective interests of these different users of war 
games determine the focus of their gaming efforts.3
The focus of professional gaming has shifted over time from the kinetic so as 
to include wider aspects of confrontations beyond war fighting, such as nation-
al will, social media, economics, and the laws of war. Traditional wargame mod-
els have struggled to represent these factors adequately. Developed from the 
hobby-war-game space, the matrix game narrative wargame method has been 
discussed widely in the wargaming community of practice and the method is 
now in general use. It is timely and valuable for 
the wider professional community to apply some 
scrutiny to both the worth of the method and its 
challenges. This article traces the origin of the 
method, briefly explains how it works, then uses 
a case study of a game based on a confrontation 
short of war in the Baltic to highlight some chal-
lenges with the method. The article concludes 
with an assessment of the utility of the matrix 
game method for gaming current political crises.
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THE LONG ROAD TO NARRATIVE GAMING
War Gaming’s Infancy
War gaming first became embedded in military training with the Prussian 
kriegsspiel of the nineteenth century. These training games usually emphasized 
the operational movement and combat aspects of warfare rather than the political 
aspects of confrontations. These early war games could be seen as an engaging 
tool for communicating the combat experience of veterans to the next generation 
of soldiers. The games supplemented traditional teaching methods of lectures, 
reading, staff problems, field exercises, and so on. Junior leaders would make 
decisions within these games and then the umpires, who were veterans, would 
intervene with reflections based on their actual combat experiences in similar 
situations. The increasingly detailed kriegsspiel rule books attempted to codify 
the experience of such veterans so that the games could run in a realistic manner 
even in the absence of veterans as umpires.4
The Prussian war games clearly were popular in the late nineteenth century, 
as shown by their dissemination internationally. For example, members of the 
British Volunteer movement (part-time reservists) played these games on their 
own time.5 The games were effective at teaching a number of military skills, such 
The 25th London Cyclist Regiment playing a kriegsspiel variant, “Bellum,” at their London regimental headquarters. Traditional kriegsspiel had opposing 
teams in different rooms looking at their own maps. The umpires would tell the players in each room what they could see. Bellum kept the players in 
one room and used a simple screen between the two forces to conceal movement until the main battle commenced. The rules were also simplified so a 
game could be completed in a single training evening.
Source: Reproduced from Curry, The British Kriegsspiel (1872) Including RUSI’s Polemos (1888).
FIGURE 1
EXAMPLE OF KRIEGSSPIEL IN ACTION IN 1915
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as the delivery of orders, combat appreciations, map reading (the games used 
actual military maps), and tactical decision-making. However, the key weakness 
of these games was that if too many rules were introduced (so as to include as 
much of the detail of real combat operations as possible) the pace of the games 
slowed down, making them less engaging and reducing the chance to practice 
other military skills.6
Naval War Gaming
Royal Navy officers pioneered the adaptation of the concept of kriegsspiel to naval 
warfare. John Fredrick Thomas “Fred T.” Jane was the best-known “father” of na-
val war gaming, but his war game actually rested on foundations built by the pro-
fessional naval officers of the time. At the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 
in 1873, Lieutenant W. M. F. Castle, Royal Navy (RN), presented The Game of 
Naval Tactics and the chair of the session, Admiral Sir Frederick W. E. Nicolson, 
10th Baronet, CB, prophetically said, “I cannot help feeling that, at present, we are 
only on the threshold of a very difficult and complicated question, which may, in 
the end, be extremely useful to the Naval Service in general.”7 A few years later, in 
1879, Captain Philip H. Colomb, RN, presented The Duel: A Naval Wargame at 
RUSI; then in 1888 Lieutenant H. Chamberlain, RN, demonstrated his Game of 
Naval Blockade at a RUSI evening session. Minutes of these meetings show that 
the audience of professional naval officers and academics examined the merits 
of these war games vigorously.8 In many ways, these early discussions of profes-
sional war games were exemplars of good practice; they assessed each game on 
its merits, applying such questions as “Is this game realistic?,” “Does it teach the 
correct lessons?,” and “Is it a cost-effective use of officers’ time?”
Fred Jane published his wargame rules in 1898 and the classic Jane’s Fighting 
Ships series of books was the world’s first wargaming supplement.9 The books 
classified ships using the naval wargame armor-classification system. The rules 
were sufficiently realistic to gain professional credibility and the British and other 
navies used them widely. They were useful for developing an understanding of 
naval tactics, in particular what happened when ships of the line closed for a sea 
battle. The war games taught other lessons; the model ships used helped to de-
velop ship-recognition skills, and playing the game helped teach participants the 
speeds, ranges, armors, penetration ranges, and the like of those ships.10 In the 
interwar years 1919–38, there was a general acceptance of war games as part of 
a naval officer’s mental equipment.11 The Naval War College’s war games’ impact 
on World War II combat is documented particularly well.12
The vast majority of these early professional war games dealt with low-level 
tactical warfare, typically focusing on the details of various weapons and their 
effects. Yet interestingly, some of these tactical games had important strategic 
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effects. One of the classic examples was the Western Approaches Tactical Game 
that Captain Gilbert Roberts, RN, ran in 1942–45. The game trained convoy and 
escort ship commanders in anti-U-boat tactics for the critical convoy battles in 
the Atlantic during World War II.13 Later commentary on these games presents 
them as a single game, but Roberts actually ran three types of games.14 The first 
was for operational analysis—reenacting, on the floor, recent U-boat attacks on 
convoys. Relying on the after-action accounts of the escorts, Roberts and his 
team worked out where the attacking U-boats could have been and then statisti-
cally worked out the best tactic to maximize the chance of catching the attacking 
U-boat.15 The second type of game was training—teaching escort commanders 
of various nationalities to apply these new tactics. The third type of game was 
strategic—a map game mimicking the actual Battle of the Atlantic, with the aim 
of establishing whether rushing escort groups (naval support groups) to support 
convoys under attack actually would work (it did).
FIGURE 2
A NEWSPAPER REPORT ON FRED T. JANE’S NAVAL WAR GAME BEING PLAYED IN 
PORTSMOUTH, U.K., IN 1903
Source: Reproduced from Curry, The Fred Jane Naval War Game (1906), Including the Royal Navy’s Wargaming Rules (1921). 
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Post–World War II Tactical Gaming
At the start of the Cold War in 1945, a succession of manual, then computer-
based, war games focused on training or developing better war-fighting strate-
gies. Many of the American games looked at a potential war between NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact in central Europe.16 Dunn Kempf (1977–97) was a game that 
used 1 : 300–scale miniatures and had been developed from a hobby set of rules. 
Units were expected to make terrain boards that looked like their training or 
deployment areas. Units could make a plan, play the war game according to their 
plan, modify it, and then deploy into the field to exercise over the very terrain 
over which they had gamed.17
Tacspiel (1966) is an example of tactical war games that were used for opera-
tional analysis during the Vietnam War.18 It played an important role in improv-
ing the effectiveness of U.S. Army counterinsurgency techniques. The Tacspiel 
FIGURE 3
WESTERN APPROACHES TACTICAL UNIT ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE WAR GAME (1942–
45) IN OPERATION
It was played on the floor, with the players who represented escort captains sequestered behind screens, which limited what they could see to just the 
playing areas.
Source: Imperial War Museum Collection.
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“games” typically took two days to play just thirty minutes of simulated combat. 
The analysts would examine a situation such as an American infantry company 
being ambushed, then look at all the evidence to identify the best response. This 
response then informed subsequent training and doctrine.19
The Introduction of Game Theory
Along with the various tactical games, there were developments into the new 
area of political-military (pol-mil) gaming. In the 1940s, John von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern developed game theory to model mathematically the interac-
tions among rational actors regarding economic matters; it was later adopted in 
other decision-making environments, such as pol-mil gaming.20
For example, the advent of the atomic bomb in 1945 changed the nature of 
warfare radically. No longer could war be assumed to be a zero-sum game, in 
which the person with the highest score wins, such that the loss of a “chess piece” 
by one side necessarily would represent an equal and opposite gain to the other.21 
In chess, the aim is to win by achieving checkmate, regardless of how many pieces 
are lost in the process. Victory in chess is irrespective of the “casualty rate” among 
the pieces. In contrast, the major goal for each power bloc during the Cold War 
(1945–91) was to attempt to achieve as many political objectives as possible—but 
not at any cost. Both sides wished to avoid a nuclear exchange that threatened 
devastation far worse than any possible political advantage that could accrue. 
Here was a situation in which both sides could lose horrifically but could win 
only relatively marginally. Understanding such a situation required a new theory.
Game theory in its simplest form can be applied to a situation in which each 
of the players selects a strategy from a limited number of predefined options. 
Each option has been quantified as having a positive, negative, or zero score. 
Game theory teaches that a player must adopt the strategy that best maximizes 
his assured score, regardless of the other player’s actions. Game theory was the 
basis for extensive theoretical work and dominated academic thought on conflict 
throughout the Cold War.22
Gaming Political Confrontations
Some authorities considered game theory to be unsuitable for gaming pol-mil 
confrontations, particularly given the short time before a confrontation turned 
into all-out war. The American government’s answer in the 1950s was mainly to 
run strategic war games through the Joint War Games Agency of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. The agency was divided into three parts: the General War Division, 
which conducted annual games about World War III; the Limited War Division, 
which continually tested contingency plans for smaller conflicts, such as in the 
Middle East or Korea; and the Cold War Division, which was concerned with 
modeling high-level crises rather than actual hostilities.23
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Andrew Wilson outlined the standard methods of producing crisis games in 
America during the 1960s. A team of subject-matter experts (SMEs), includ-
ing diplomats, created a fact book covering the combat potential of the forces 
involved and the relevant geography, as well as other resources. On the basis of 
these sources, the scenario was generated and the game prepared.24
Such games normally involved a committee of five to ten players represent-
ing each country. The teams did not represent individuals, so there was no 
role-playing of individual positions, such as head of state. Each committee col-
lectively made decisions in the best interests of the country it was representing. 
The American teams were expected to pursue whatever policies best helped the 
United States pursue its national interest, but other teams were expected to act in 
a way that reflected the U.S. interpretation of the national interest or ideologies 
of the countries they were playing.25
Over the course of three days, the committees spent four hours discussing the 
options, then outlined to the game director their plans for the next two to seven 
days of game time. The game director, using his own experience and advice from 
specialists, then arbitrated the outcomes of the different plans.
Such games were criticized for a lack of focus. Was the objective to practice 
the procedures? To test the effectiveness of different force mixes? To serve as a 
creativity exercise that looked at outliers? To forecast future outcomes? Or to de-
velop optimal political strategies? Such committee games also tended to produce 
nonreplicable results, as the actual process by which decisions were made was 
difficult to record and the group dynamics within each committee were impos-
sible to model.
These games also have been criticized for allowing too much scope for un-
orthodox behavior—players would become bored and do things merely out of 
curiosity, just to see what would happen.26 A structure was needed that would 
produce more-plausible behavior in games, but also would allow political and 
other factors to be integrated into the games. In addition, a new type of game 
was needed that could be developed faster, was flexible enough to game whatever 
subject needed exploring, and could be run within a relatively short span of time.
During the 1970s and ’80s, the wargaming hobby industry, in particular 
through the board game company Simulations Publications Inc. (SPI) and its 
magazine Strategy & Tactics, pioneered innovation in political gaming.27 Early 
examples included the following:
• The Plot to Assassinate Hitler (1976) attempted to game the preparation for 
and staging of a coup in Nazi Germany during World War II.28
• Canadian “Civil War” (1977) modeled attitudes toward separatism versus 
federalism during a time of political conflict in Canada.29 
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• After the Holocaust (1977) was largely an economic game about reconstruc-
tion following a strategic nuclear war.30
Many ideas developed subsequently became widely adopted to represent po-
litical issues in gaming.31  However, one generic wargame methodology made the 
leap from the hobby to the professional communities.
MATRIX GAMES
Matrix game methodology was created in the United States by Chris Engle and 
was first published in 1992.32 Engle aimed to create a system by which it was 
possible for a player to role-play at any level, representing anything from a single 
person to an entire country. Subsequently the method was developed extensively 
and play tested in a variety of professional military educational contexts over the 
next fifteen years. By now matrix games have been used for professional military 
education in the United Kingdom, including to study current conflicts, such as 
those in Syria, Libya, and Iraq, as well as hypothetical conflicts in such hot spots 
as the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula.33 Those working in intelligence 
also have used them.34
Matrix games exist in the space between rules-based war games and online 
role-playing games. Many of the existing rules-based games take considerable 
time and effort to explain to those from a nonwargaming background. Rather 
than attempting to come up with rules to cover all possible actions, the matrix 
games are very light on rules. Players state what they want to do and what the 
impact of this would be, and give reasons supporting why their efforts would 
succeed. Other players then are allowed to suggest factors that would increase or 
decrease the chance of success. On this basis, the umpire normally assigns a prob-
ability to the chance of success of the players’ actions. This method encourages 
creative thinking but has a structure that uses the experiences of the group to help 
moderate the suggestions. Having a team represent and role-play each actor in 
EXAMPLE OF A MATRIX GAME ARGUMENT
Player A: “I will reassure the Baltic States of support by harassing enemy sub-
marines in the Baltic Sea. I am able to do this because: 
• I have three frigates deployed and available.
• The captains and crews are highly experienced in antisubmarine warfare.
• Electronic intelligence reveals the enemy deployment patterns.
• The weather is fine, so they can work uninterrupted.”
Player B: “But overt trailing guarantees that the submarines will detect the 
frigates and will take active counterdetection actions.”
Umpire: “I assess the balance of these arguments and I assign the follow-
ing probability of success that Player A has to achieve to obtain the desired 
outcome.”
The game world then moves on from that point and the next player pro-
poses an action.
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the game helps encourage analytical discussion; for each turn, the team is given 
a short time to agree on a course of action.
One of the strengths of matrix games is the ability to integrate pol-mil 
actions within a single game. Since players can make arguments about whether 
another player’s proposed actions would succeed, the game had some elements 
of both competition and cooperation. This method allows a situation to be 
explored quickly without the constraint of cumbersome game mechanics. Game 
designers developed many variations of matrix games, customizing them to 
their purposes.35
MATRIX GAME CASE STUDY: POSTURING IN THE BALTIC SEA
The scenario that follows was developed at the Military Operations Research 
Society (MORS) Emerging Techniques Special Meeting (METSM) in October 
2016.36 The intention of the effort was to examine the utility of matrix games for 
gaming an event of current interest. This formed part of MORS’s wider efforts to 
investigate the validity of professional war gaming.
The scenario subsequently has been played multiple times with different 
audiences, including members of the military, academics with relevant special-
ties, and wargaming hobbyists.37 Those in the last-named audience, if they are 
experienced in playing modern pol-mil games, can add value, as they sometimes 
think outside the box and propose original strategies that provide new insights.
Background to Tensions in the Baltic
While the United States often focuses on issues of sea power in the Pacific, the 
European countries of NATO focus more on the issues of the Baltic States and the 
threat from Russia. Russia’s agenda is to secure its place as a world power, and as 
such to be entitled to its own sphere of influence and the right to maintain buffer 
regions as part of its strategic defensive doctrine. Such a buffer would include 
adjacent states. Recent history demonstrates that Russia has the willingness and 
the ability to use military force, or the threat of it, to achieve its political objec-
tives, such as in Chechnya (1999–2009), Georgia (2008–14), and Ukraine (2014– 
present). Hence, the Baltic States of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania see themselves 
as being on the front line.38 To secure the republics, it is NATO policy to rely on 
the deterrent effect of trip-wire-size NATO forces that could be reinforced rap-
idly in the event of a crisis.
The region has the added complexity of the presence of the Russian exclave of 
Kaliningrad. Königsberg was an ancient medieval town and was the old capital 
of Prussia. At the end of World War II, Russia occupied the town and the local 
German inhabitants fled, were killed, or were expelled forcibly. The town was 
renamed Kaliningrad and became the year-round ice-free European port for the 
Russian Baltic Sea Fleet. Approximately four hundred thousand Russians live in 
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the area, largely providing the workforce to support the Baltic Sea Fleet and the 
two naval air bases. The area has staggering pollution problems, including by 
nuclear waste. Geopolitically, Kaliningrad is cut off from the rest of Russia by 
Lithuania and Poland, which are members of NATO. The strategic importance 
of the existence of the exclave is that the Baltic States are linked to Poland and the 
rest of NATO only by a sixty-five-kilometer land corridor to Lithuania.
The Scenario
One of the keys to a successful game is constructing an immersive narrative for 
the scenario.39 The starting point of the Baltic Challenge scenario is as follows: 
Russia has deployed nuclear-capable Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles 
to its Kaliningrad exclave. The Iskander missile is dual capable—able to carry a 
conventional warhead or a nuclear one. But development and deployment of such 
a missile constitute a breach of the Cold War–era Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty of 1987.40 The missile’s range, perhaps six hundred kilometers, 
makes all the Baltic States and two-thirds of Poland potential targets. The missile 
FIGURE 4
THE GAME MAP FOR THE BALTIC CHALLENGE 
The map is populated with counters as narrative devices—visual aide-mémoire rather than accurate representations of military units. The choice of map 
and counters influences the direction of the game, as they provide a visual focus and a potential psychological boundary on which players can focus. 
However, the players can ask for additional geographical areas or units to be represented if required.
Source: Reproduced from Curry and Price, Modern Crises Scenarios for Matrix Wargames.
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is mobile and, despite the huge size of its launcher, hard to detect. Finally, the 
missile’s mobility, combined with the short elapsed time from order to launch 
and the fast flight time, means that Russia has a first-strike nuclear capability in 
the region. It is unlikely that a target state would receive any warning of an attack 
before the first missiles exploded.
For the purposes of the scenario, the Baltic States are alarmed and they ask 
NATO for assistance. This raises tensions within NATO.
The expectation in the game is that the conflict will remain below the thresh-
old of a general war. However, miscalculation, perhaps by a third party, could 
bring the situation to the brink of a shooting war.
The Play
Players are told that the game outcomes will be reported only under the Chatham 
House Rule, under which the contribution of individuals may not be attributed.41 
Removing any concerns about postgame reporting is important; it helps remove 
organizational constraints that might discourage players from experimenting.
The players read their briefing handouts, which include a strategic overview 
of the initial situation and personalized aims and objectives. Sometimes after 
discussion (at least two people represent each faction) the players suggest revis-
ing the objectives. Any such revision is done in collaboration with the umpire, to 
prevent players from inadvertently “breaking the game.”42 The dynamic of intro-
ducing more players into each role is a useful one, but it needs strong moderation 
to keep up the game’s momentum.
The game proceeds with each team making an argument, starting with the fac-
tion deemed to have the initiative. The amount of time that each turn represents 
remains abstract, but players in this game generally understand it to be a few 
weeks. As the game progresses, the role of chance means that the game does not 
proceed necessarily in the most likely direction but rather generates a potential 
future scenario. Conflict incorporates a degree of chance by its very nature, and 
the game reflects this. In one case a team argued that an operator on the other 
side fired a surface-to-air missile without authorization, but it missed. The out-
come of such arguments usually changes the future direction of the game. The 
matrix game narrative methodology promotes the creation of plausible actions 
within the structure of the scenarios.
Postgame Discussion—the Hot Washup
The academic evidence is clear that a major part of the value of serious games is 
in a well-conducted after-action review. Games can be viewed as a prelude aimed 
at stimulating high engagement and valuable focused discussion.43
An issue with an unclassified game is that it may produce outputs that could 
be considered of value to decision makers (on either side). If players, through 
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the focused lens of the game, identify actual weaknesses or develop successful 
strategies (for either side), the game outputs should be considered confidential 
and their dissemination controlled. However, excluding from pol-mil games 
those who do not hold the appropriate security clearance restricts the intellectual 
power that can be brought to the exercise. An example might be academics who 
possess specific foreign policy knowledge.
After game play concludes there is an hour-long discussion among the play-
ers and the umpire about the realism of the scenario and the actions taken in 
the game, including a postmortem of player actions. The umpire provides only 
minimal moderation; the players take turns posing questions to one another and 
questioning individual moves.
The purpose of playing the game is to create a realistic representation of a live 
potential crisis and to react as the stakeholders would in the real world. Players 
with relevant experience of such confrontations note that the game includes 
many activities reminiscent of the real world. For example, it might be seen as a 
rational player strategy to focus on achieving only a few aims, but the NATO team 
actions always consist of hopping from crisis to crisis.
One recognition—which arose from all iterations of the game and with all 
types of players—was that the majority of NATO doctrine and foreign policy 
work was somewhat lacking when dealing with the “gray zone” that falls between 
a situation constituting normal deterrence and a situation that reaches to article 
5 of the Washington (NATO) Treaty (invoking collective defense—an attack on 
one is considered an attack on all).44 This has led to a dawning of understanding 
that the NATO players often are unsure of what they should be doing and how 
the opposition will interpret their actions. Of course, one must be careful of mak-
ing generalizations on the basis of anecdotal evidence, even from multiple game 
iterations; there certainly are policy makers in NATO who can deal with these 
issues. But the evidence from these games indicates that these experts’ under-
standing has not filtered down to those at the operational level.
Recently, some senior Western politicians have made comments along the 
line of “Treaties should not be straitjackets” and “Are we really considering go-
ing to war over a country with a population equivalent to two [U.K.] municipal 
boroughs?”45 Such comments have worried many professionals who had assumed 
that the Cold War certainties with regard to Russia still held firm. This particular 
uncertainty, coupled with the larger, manifest uncertainty about the actions the 
United States might take, has led to a number of iterations of the game by pro-
fessionals that mirrored the sort of radical alternative futures that recreational 
players have proposed.
The game has proved to be an extremely good way of ensuring that all con-
cerned develop a deeper understanding of the situation. Prior to the series of 
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games being played, one senior person (whose professional focus was not the 
Baltic States) looked at the proposed map for the first game and asked why some 
counters on the map showed the proportion of ethnic Russians in particular 
areas. This person then pointed to Kaliningrad and asked why so many Russians 
were living there—obviously completely unaware that Kaliningrad was part of 
Russia. Following the game, many of the participants remarked on aspects of the 
situation about which they were uninformed, despite intelligence briefings being 
disseminated on a regular basis. Games are effective devices for contributing to 
the learning process.
Another aspect of the situation was the vexed question of antiaccess/area-
denial (A2/AD) measures—powerful Russian weapon systems that threaten to 
deny easy access to the restricted waters of the Baltic.46 This subject has been 
written about extensively; but the game, operating in the gray zone, demonstrates 
that much of the rhetoric on the subject is flawed. As a player in one iteration of 
the game summarized, “A2/AD is a product of the imagination. We move into 
theater, and either they shoot us or they don’t. If they shoot, we are in an Article 
5 situation and we all know what to do; if they don’t, we just carry on. A2/AD 
doesn’t exist outside a shooting war.”
EMERGING THEMES FROM A GAME BASED IN NARRATIVE 
METHODOLOGY
Flexibility
Over many iterations of the Baltic Challenge game, the inherent focus on the 
narrative rather than the mechanics of war has led to the game play unfolding in 
a variety of ways.
• Realism was exhibited not only in the overall design of the scenarios but 
in how the players responded to the various crises. The reasoning exhib-
ited within the matrix game was natural in human terms, with models of 
negotiation focusing on the same type of variables that real-world deci-
sion makers would consider important in the crises and conflicts being 
simulated.
• Transparency of the game mechanics led to the logic of the game being un-
derstandable and humanlike in terms of the decision process and individual 
judgments.
• The narrative of the game allowed flexibility, with the overall conflict serving 
as a framework for a diversity of contexts representing alternative solutions 
to the conflict. It was possible to reflect diversity in larger strategies, value 
systems, perceptions, and competence.
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• There is an evolutionary potential to the narrative structure, using the initial 
setup as a highly simplified baseline for constructing more-sophisticated 
interactions.
• The ease of use designed into the game mechanics ensured that it was pos-
sible to review and adapt the game play without being proficient in specific 
modeling, programming, or game-design disciplines. 
Umpiring Challenges
Two umpiring challenges need further exploration. They involve the trade-offs 
involved in deciding whether to (1) keep a game on narrative track or let the 
narrative emerge organically, and (2) drive the game to a satisfactory narrative 
conclusion or encourage analytical discussion.
Player Inventiveness. The first challenge involves the need in matrix games to 
moderate player inventiveness. The essential trade-off is between allowing play-
ers to discover unconventional strategies that constitute so-called black swans 
and letting players explore the most likely options for each role.47 An example was 
the range of alternatives that the members of a Russian team explored for achiev-
ing their strategic direction of creating internal dissent within the Baltic States. 
At one end of the spectrum was the realistic, incremental approach: building up 
discontent over months with a carefully crafted social media campaign. But at 
the other end of the spectrum was the unlikely, but still feasible, idea of carrying 
out a surge, perhaps by disguising intelligence agents as tourists. In matrix game 
terms, an argument to achieve this would have needed a high score to succeed 
but would fall within the bounds of military possibility. However, such a success 
would alter the course of the rest of the game, with Russia having a strong body 
of controlled activists in the republics at the end of turn 1 instead of a number of 
turns later. If the game space is visualized as an ever-expanding branching tree 
network, occasional choices with a low chance of success can move the game state 
onto an entirely different branch.
When game play begins within a set construct, a series of tasks is assigned to 
each team and the members embody their roles within the session. To this point, 
the umpire retains control over the emerging story line, introducing new tracks 
as needed when situations arise. Conflict begins to occur when the narrative 
becomes a question of experience and opportunity, as occurred in the example 
above. When players of the Baltic Challenge game have had experience in war, 
politics, and government their experience skews the narrative, altering the nature 
of the game play in subtle and not-so-subtle ways.
Uneven teams provide an example. A team usually consists of two or three 
people, who may or may not have similar backgrounds. When the team has 
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representation from people of different expertise levels and dissimilar back-
grounds, the actions it takes tend to alter the nature of the narrative in big leaps 
rather than the small steps through which people with equal expertise would 
progress. In one instance, one team’s members argued that they would assert 
political control in a city in just one turn, whereas those with more experience in 
such matters countered with the suggestion that it would take multiple actions 
to achieve this outcome. Inexperience can underestimate the time and effort 
required to effect change in the real world. This led to the narrative refocusing 
the discussion as a means to explain game play rather than to move the scenario 
forward. In this instance the umpire had to intervene for the game to progress.
Alternatively, the umpire can create a narrative that is too constrained, where-
upon the game begins to break owing to a lack of player choice. For example, 
if the Russian player moves forces into a blockade position, NATO either must 
force the blockade and go to war or must concede defeat. If the teams in the con-
flict lack the means to create new actions, they are forced to rely on the umpire to 
introduce a new scenario that allows the teams to take action.
In sum, a balance needs to be struck between the organic growth of the game 
narrative and the immediacy of creating a playable game scenario in a realistic 
conflict.
Conclusion versus Discussion. The second challenge is deciding whether to 
drive the game to a satisfactory narrative conclusion or encourage analytical 
discussion. After players receive their initial briefings, the members of each 
team retire to a separate space to attempt to coalesce their understanding 
within the team and to speculate on the content of the other teams’ brief-
ings. In one instance, a team even started to map out the most likely path the 
game would follow by verbalizing a sort of miniature matrix game. One game-
management question is how long to allow this focused consideration of the 
situation to continue before bringing the teams back to the main event. By 
allowing the teams to confer beforehand the umpire creates space for dialogue 
not available during the actual game play; however, interchanges that include 
SMEs discussing ongoing real-world confrontations move from one topic to 
another, which may result in individual teams creating entire scenarios prior 
to the actual game play.
A review of the scenario is necessary when starting the game, but it can lead 
merely to more analytical discussion rather than to actually commencing the 
exercise. The game does not depend on the map being an exact representation 
of the daily movement of forces, but players who represent experts in the field 
want to ensure the authenticity of the experience by starting the game from the 
actual situation at the present time. When the game commences, engaged players 
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inevitably take the opportunity to question forces, geography, culture, and other 
salient factors. The umpire then has to judge at what point to intervene by mov-
ing the game narrative on and when to let the discussion continue because it is 
generating new and potentially useful insights. The narrative of a matrix game 
evolves constantly, and each scenario posed increases the number of actions the 
teams can take.
That is, unless a situation develops that brings a halt to most decision process-
es. In one Baltic Challenge game, the conflict situation developed until it became 
clear that there would be a major pause in the tempo of operations. Political op-
tions had been expended and some player teams were running out of ideas. An 
indication of this in some matrix games is when most teams are arguing for quite 
modest developments in their favor. An example of this would be the Nordic 
team having its civilian politicians carry out a political minitour to boost urban 
support for the government coalition. Such an action might be worth doing, but it 
is unlikely to move the narrative forward significantly. In such situations the um-
pire faces a choice: to halt the game and move into the hot washup / after-action 
review phase or to wait and see whether the pressure of inactivity will spur on a 
team’s creativity, leading to an unexpected strategic innovation that returns the 
game to a dynamic state.
Game play in matrix games requires a balance between analysis and narrative. 
The realistic nature of the Baltic Challenge, combined with the expertise play-
ers bring to the game, creates an atmosphere that spurs analysis of the situation 
more than action. This ongoing analysis makes it difficult to move the narrative 
forward. Teams often spend a large amount of time debating small actions, and 
the narrative stalls. While this may mirror the current situation in the Baltic, the 
purpose of the exercise is to game the situation realistically but at a quicker pace. 
One of the umpire’s greatest powers is the ability to end the game and move on to 
the hot washup. This option has to be wielded carefully, because calling a halt to 
all actions and declaring the situation complete concludes the narrative abruptly.
THE UTILITY OF NARRATIVE MATRIX GAMES FOR GAMING 
CURRENT POLITICAL CRISES
Matrix games serve an important role in gaming current and potential crises. By 
creating a space where key stakeholders can manage specific situations involved 
in controlling and predicting scenarios, there is room to learn about the thinking 
and maneuvering behind current world events.
While the matrix game methodology employs narrative to strengthen the game 
play, it also assumes a certain level of expertise in the subject being gamed. Pre-
paring a primer pack before the game is essential, and the effort involved in creat-
ing such a succinct summary can be a useful analytical exercise in itself. Further, it 
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is clear that issuing players a pregame narrative of background information helps 
provide the foundations onto which game play can be introduced. Players are not 
simply set to work on some prescribed aims and objectives; they possess a cultural 
overview that helps provide the basis for actions within the game.
However, it should be noted that there is some academic evidence to suggest 
that players from different cultures play in different ways. For example, Chinese 
players, and by implication Chinese decision makers, typically act in a more co-
operative way than their American equivalents.48 This implies that simply hand-
ing players a brief may be insufficient to replicate accurately the mind-set of those 
they are playing. Player recruitment may change game outputs, and each game’s 
lessons may be different depending on player backgrounds, even using the same 
scenario and ground rules.
Earlier players also noted the need for a practice session to allow those unfa-
miliar with the technique to practice the game methods, so this has been incor-
porated. Once everyone is familiar with the game methodology, the game clock 
is reset and the game itself commences.
Scenario design is critical, particularly with regard to the visualization, as 
represented by the maps and counters available at the start of the game. For 
example, adding refugee counters gives the game a more humanitarian focus, 
whereas introducing large numbers of military units tends to encourage the 
players to focus their play more on the kinetic aspects of the confrontation. In 
the Baltic Challenge game, Finland is only partially presented, as simply an area 
on the map, which limits the potential for players to conduct detailed play in the 
country. However, if the game starts to focus on Finland the inherent flexibility 
of the matrix game method allows the umpire to generate an inset sketch map 
of Finland on demand, thereby allowing the direction of the game to continue.
Certain types of scenario are more suited to matrix games than others. Would 
gaming a natural catastrophe work as well as gaming a counterinsurgency situ-
ation? Experience from the recreational use of matrix games seems to indicate 
that multisided games are more suitable than two-sided situations; the narrative 
of multisided games allows multiple stories to develop around the actions of the 
game. However, some apparently two-sided games might include multiple stake-
holders who are notionally on the same side but hold slightly different judgments 
about the value of certain aims and objectives.
The matrix game narrative methodology may prove to be a useful tool for 
examining complex scenario dynamics, in which strategies are not initially ap-
parent and the interplay of divergent multiple actors cannot be predetermined or 
reasoned out even with careful examination of the situation. Like all war games, a 
matrix game cannot predict the future, but it can lay out a narrative for a particular 
future scenario. Conducting multiple replays can generate more scenarios.
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However, it is clear that there are steps that can be taken to improve the poten-
tial utility of the method. Having an SME who is not participating in the game but 
who evaluates the plausibility of the options proposed in the game is important. 
Separating such SMEs from the efforts of any particular team helps to keep their 
judgments professional and objective, which can confer greater credibility on 
game outcomes.
Careful scenario design, with a clear idea of the purpose of a matrix game and the 
areas that the umpire wishes to explore, is critical. The game can be designed and 
used in the educational space, as a way of conveying to those less familiar with 
the topic essential truths about geography, stakeholders, and potential strategies.
However, matrix games also can be used to identify and analyze previously 
unanticipated potential future paths. The dynamic nature of these games seems 
to encourage the generation of unexpected insights. If analysts want to identify 
the most likely developments in a crisis, these can be reasoned out in a structured 
discussion; but if they want to explore other potential narrative routes, then a 
well-managed matrix game can be a useful tool.
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THE “INDO” IN THE “INDO-PACIFIC”
An Indian View
Yogendra Kumar and Probal K. Ghosh
 Like all strategic constructs, the expression Indo-Pacific evokes divergent, even contradictory, responses, depending on the strategic outlook of the responder. 
For the proponents of this construct, the challenge lies in allaying the sensitivities 
of those who consider the term to be an attempt to bolster the U.S.-led security 
architecture that is fraying under the challenge of China’s growing maritime 
power and the perceived unsteadiness of the Trump administration’s commit-
ment to that architecture.
On 1 June 2018, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi delivered what is 
referred to as his “Shangri-La Dialogue speech.” It was aimed at mitigating such 
sensitivities and articulating his vision of a constructive relationship for India 
with all countries of the Indo-Pacific region. He stated that India’s Indo-Pacific 
outlook is not directed against any country but instead stands for “a free, open, 
inclusive region, which embraces us all [including extraregional stakeholders] 
in a common pursuit of progress and prosperity.” Emphasizing India’s approach 
of promoting “a democratic and rules-based international order,” he placed re-
sponsibility on “both existing and rising powers” in the region not to return “to 
the age of great-power rivalries.” He defined the Indo-Pacific region as stretching 
from “the shores of Africa to that of the Americas”—an expansive definition the 
United States does not share.1
While the prime minister’s speech reflects India’s growing strategic engage-
ments across an expanding geographical space, commensurate with its current 
and potential international roles, India’s stated objectives leave open the ques-
tion of how to realize them, given the realities on the ground (so to speak) in 
both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. A common strategic framework embracing 
both the oceans is at an aspirational stage; the respective strategic perspectives, 
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instrumentalities, and capabilities have yet to crystallize, held hostage as they are 
to geopolitical currents and eddies and the attention spans of national leaders 
who mostly remain in a “firefighting mode,” internally and internationally, owing 
to pervasive uncertainties.
While some security architecture exists in the Pacific Ocean and force equi-
libriums characterize some regions of the Indian Ocean, there is no overall 
security architecture in the region. And in both of those situations, geopolitical 
headwinds are causing the existing arrangements to wobble. Loose groupings of 
countries are emerging either to strengthen or to weaken those arrangements, 
and it is inevitable that the group rivalries involved will spill over from one ocean 
to the other.
Common threats such as climate change, environmental degradation, piracy, 
and human trafficking could be addressed better through an interlocking of 
governance mechanisms throughout the Indo-Pacific continuum. However, the 
challenges to creating and strengthening maritime systems differ between the 
two oceans.
When India considers the Indo-Pacific strategic construct, it is the “Indo” por-
tion that is existential. However, India feels that its strategic stakes in the Pacific 
are growing, causing it to attempt to leverage its regional relationships to influ-
ence the maritime system in the Pacific to suit its interests. But in comparison 
with the United States and, to an extent, China, India faces capacity and capability 
issues that impose prioritization constraints as it attempts to contribute to the 
fleshing out of a true Indo-Pacific strategic continuum.
Attention now focuses on the entire Indian Ocean as a maritime system. This 
is in contrast to the Cold War period, when the U.S.-USSR naval rivalry focused 
attention on the western Indian Ocean choke points, targeted at the force equi-
librium prevailing in the hinterlands from Southwest Asia to the Middle East; 
and to the post–Cold War U.S. approach, which was limited by those hinterland 
requirements even as America’s attention shifted to a China-containment strat-
egy, causing its existing strategic framework for the Indian Ocean to reflect these 
“localized” strategic interests.
THE INDIAN OCEAN: A CHANGING STRATEGIC PICTURE
The changes that the broader strategic picture of the Indian Ocean has been 
undergoing challenge the Indian Ocean littoral countries, as well as others, to 
conceptualize a commensurate holistic Indian Ocean maritime system. While 
the challenges of maintaining the equilibriums on the Middle Eastern and South-
west Asian landmasses remain, the post–Cold War situations there have meta-
morphosed into a much more complex interplay among a bewildering range of 
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actors, even as the old Cold War rivalries are reemerging, albeit under radically 
changed circumstances. New actors have entered the fray even as the old actors 
soldier on. The challenge represented by growing state fragility—even the possi-
bility of state collapse—is perplexing national leaders and strategic analysts alike.
The challenges to the resilience of the existing force equilibrium in the Indian 
Ocean are complicated not just by the factors mentioned above but also by dif-
ferent countries’ growing concerns over issues of freedom of navigation, espe-
cially through oceanic choke points; the deepening naval competition among 
regional as well as extraregional navies; the nature of naval modernization; and 
the broader geopolitical flux. The existing Indian Ocean maritime system came 
into existence, or rather “accreted,” in a different era altogether, resulting from the 
ad hoc nature of the security challenges then faced, and suffers from multifari-
ous limitations for functioning in the current era. The various subregions of the 
Indian Ocean discussed below present a picture of growing maritime system– 
related instabilities.
The Western Indian Ocean
In the western Indian Ocean—as in the southern and eastern Indian Ocean—the 
threats are rooted in inadequate enforcement capabilities. This results in human 
trafficking, drug smuggling, terror financing, and the movement of terrorists and 
criminals both on land and at sea. This region is affected by illegal, unreported, 
and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities that deprive those countries in the 
region that have legitimate maritime claims of an important resource for their 
socioeconomic progress.
The region of the northwestern Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa is wit-
nessing a growing competition for opening naval bases, whose establishment 
will enable both regional and extraregional powers to exert greater control over 
both ingress to and egress from the Red Sea.2 The militarization of the Red Sea is 
expected to continue—witness the Houthi attacks on the Saudi, U.S., and United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) navies, as well as commercial vessels traveling between the 
Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden; on 1 June 2018, a spokesman for the Houthis stated 
that Abu Dhabi was now within range of their missiles.3
This trend raises wider concerns about securing navigation routes through the 
Bab el Mandeb into the Red Sea and through the Suez Canal into the Mediter-
ranean Sea. The problem is compounded by the intensifying conflict in Yemen, 
which has drawn in not only regional but extraregional powers. These naval 
port-building activities signify an intensifying contest among the protagonists to 
dominate this choke point during a diverse array of future precipitous contingen-
cies. These unfolding dynamics exacerbate the trend toward the fraying of the 
maritime system in this strategic subregion.
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Political instability in this region also is leading to the gradual reemergence 
of piracy, the acceleration of illegal migration along the East African seaboard, 
and the presence of and “rooting in” of al-Qaeda and the remnants of the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria.
The Persian Gulf
The Persian Gulf region is witnessing deepening tensions as an overflow from 
the ongoing conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq and the worsening of 
existing regional rivalries, primarily between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The new 
force alignment developing in this area involves growing activity by extraregional 
powers, including incipient revival of the Cold War tensions between Russia and 
the United States. The added element is the tension among the Gulf Arab states, 
contributions to which include deepening fissures between Qatar and the other 
Gulf states as well as the involvement of countries such as Turkey and Iran in 
intra-Gulf Arab rivalries. This is leading to exacerbated tensions in the region be-
tween the Iranian and U.S. navies, as evidenced by the frequent naval encounters 
between them. This poses a grave concern for freedom of navigation through the 
Strait of Hormuz—a critical artery for global trade.
Another dimension of the growing challenge is the rapid modernization of the 
Pakistan Navy, including its decision to acquire eight Yuan-class Type 041 diesel-
electric submarines from China. This development has the potential to upset the 
regional balance of power, leading to further power disequilibriums. The danger 
of “loose nukes at sea” also increases with the Pakistan Navy’s decision to deploy 
nuclear weapons on its naval platforms. Al-Qaeda’s September 2014 attempt to 
capture PNS Zulfikar at the Karachi naval base provides forewarning of the vul-
nerability of deployed nukes to terrorists.4
U.S. Naval War College analysts Peter Dombrowski and Andrew C. Winner 
have opined that China’s future capabilities and actions in the Indian Ocean rep-
resent the most obvious potential source of U.S. policy change. This is especially 
so given China’s closer naval alliance with Pakistan.5
Indian Ocean Island Countries
The ramifications of the growing challenges to the existing equilibrium in the 
wider Indian Ocean are being felt by Indian Ocean island countries as well. This 
is partly the result of their lack of capacity to exploit their respective maritime 
resources and to cope with the threats of piracy and the illegal trafficking of drugs 
and migrants. Many of the state systems already are vulnerable owing to their 
economic fragility (they mostly have single-factor economic systems), to which 
climate change adds a growing threat. Some of this state fragility manifests itself 
in deepening internal power struggles, which external powers then exploit, re-
sulting in the fragmentation and polarization of the island communities, which 
enhance their vulnerability to jihadi extremism.
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As elsewhere, the expanding Chinese footprint is visible in the growing 
frequency of Chinese naval patrols, including by submarines, as well as the 
expanding scope of China’s Maritime Silk Route (MSR) projects. The growing 
Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean has balance-of-power ramifications 
that may destabilize the maritime system, given the inadequacies of the existing 
governance mechanisms. Moreover, many of the MSR projects are being car-
ried out without regard to their true economic viability, leading the weak island 
economies into an inextricable debt trap. The resulting economic, then political, 
instability has the potential to destabilize the existing maritime system in this 
subregion.
The Eastern Indian Ocean
Problems related to human trafficking and drug trafficking are major concerns in 
the eastern Indian Ocean, as are instances of piracy. Jihadist militancy is on the 
rise, as are other forms of ethnic insurgency. The fragility of the littoral states on 
or in the Bay of Bengal contributes to these growing phenomena, and the region 
is prone to extreme weather events that can aggravate that state fragility. The 
eastern Indian Ocean also can expect certain potential disequilibriums, similar 
to those in other Indian Ocean subregions but for dissimilar reasons.
The force structure in the Bay of Bengal is changing, gradually. The littoral 
naval capabilities are growing, including in the development of submarine forces. 
The littoral countries are conscious of their maritime zones and are building 
the capability to look after them. In late 2016, the Bangladesh Navy acquired 
two Chinese Ming-class Type 035B diesel-electric submarines. In April 2017, 
Thailand, declaring its intention to better police its Bay of Bengal coastline, 
made the decision to acquire three Chinese Yuan-class S26T submarines. (So 
far a firm contract has been placed for only one of these, for delivery by 2023.)6 
The Myanmar government also has declared its intention to acquire a submarine 
capability.7
The Indian Navy has the strongest presence here, with system-defense and 
policing capabilities, and is developing additional infrastructure in the Andaman 
and Nicobar Islands to support these functions. It also carries out coordinated 
patrols with Myanmar, Indonesia, and Thailand in pursuit of effective surveil-
lance. Its deployment of a nuclear-missile-equipped submarine changes the stra-
tegic picture in this subregion, in that it draws the attention not only of China but 
of other major powers to the implications for their deterrence postures.
China’s naval footprint is limited but its commercial shipping activities are 
growing, as part of its Belt and Road Initiative projects. Assets include not only 
ports but gas and oil pipelines and road and railway infrastructure. The open-
ing of the Myanmar economy has meant a greater focus on the development of 
special economic zones around important ports in that country. Similar plans 
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are afoot with respect to Thailand and Malaysia, especially the latter, which has 
very ambitious plans for developing its port capacity and seaboard infrastructure.
The Strait of Malacca is an important choke point that necessitates serious 
international attention. Other choke points include the Sunda, Lombok, and 
Ombai Straits. As these choke points straddle the “Indo” and the “Pacific,” their 
strategic salience has increased in recent times.
MARITIME SYSTEM INSTABILITY CHALLENGES
Looming Disequilibriums
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Strategic Survey 2016 
begins by stating that “the underpinnings of geopolitics have splintered so 
much in the past year that the foundations of global order appear alarmingly 
weak. . . . Multiple strategic earthquakes have created a situation in which world 
leaders are in a constant state of crisis control.”8
The different challenges to the existing power equilibrium in the Indian Ocean 
have different sources, and the evolving trends need to be evaluated across the 
entire region. Similarly, ongoing subregional developments need to be evaluated 
for their region-wide ramifications.
Political fragility and the resultant economic disarray invite external powers to 
manipulate domestic political processes for their own agendas; they also intensify 
multiple regional power struggles. State fragility at key oceanic locations, as well 
as in the Middle Eastern heartland, compounds in at least three ways the threats 
to maritime system stability posed by climate change, extreme weather events, 
and the structural embedding of nonstate actors—be they extremists, pirates, 
or common criminals—within collapsing political structures. First, the growing 
phenomenon of state collapse or regional political collapse renders unfruit-
ful—even Sisyphean—any attempt to create a power structure across the region. 
Second, state or regional collapse would defeat any attempts by the international 
community to create a normative framework for the peaceful and sustainable 
use of the Indian Ocean. And third, such collapse also would militate against the 
overall vision of economic integration of the littoral economies to enable them 
to play their due role in the economic and technological globalization processes 
that are taking place in the rest of the Asian region.
Other Traditional and Nontraditional Challenges
Although the existing balance of power is tilted heavily in favor of the United 
States, the existing Indian Ocean maritime system faces serious challenges; its 
inadequacies to respond effectively to changing circumstances are numerous. 
The system was “designed” for different requirements, and several geopolitical 
factors, including changes in the power relations among the major littoral and 
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nonlittoral powers, have led to strategic distrust among them. Regional uncer-
tainty regarding whether China’s entry into the Indian Ocean would be “disrup-
tive” is compounded further by the emerging geostrategic rivalry in the Middle 
East and the Persian Gulf region, in addition to the rivalries already existing 
there.
The absence of any region-wide capability to protect fish stocks from IUU 
fishing, affecting a large part of the Indian Ocean littoral, means that several 
littoral countries have no stake in the creation of a more comprehensive, region-
wide maritime system. Various terrorist entities have tried to acquire—some 
successfully—a maritime capability, and they continue to seek to acquire increas-
ingly lethal capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction. The possibilities 
for destabilization arising from climate change are growing, both at sea and in 
coastal regions, affecting existing coping mechanisms for natural disasters and 
climate-mitigation efforts, and ultimately state stability.
MARITIME SYSTEM DEFENSE ISSUES AND  
INTEROPERABILITY CAPABILITIES
Force-Projection Infrastructure
In terms of existing military infrastructure, the most significant presence in the 
region is that of an extraregional power, the United States. Its bases in Diego Gar-
cia, Bahrain, Qatar, and Djibouti provide the skeleton for the power structure in 
the Indian Ocean, fleshed out with its air, space, and other military assets. It has 
formidable undersea capabilities in the eastern Indian Ocean, ship-basing rights 
at Singapore, and troop-rotation facilities at Darwin, Australia.
Regarding other powers, both regional and extraregional, Australia has fa-
cilities at the Cocos Islands and Christmas Island, covering the Sunda Strait; 
this array of forces represents a significant posture for maintaining the existing 
power equilibrium in both the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. France has 
naval and military capabilities in Réunion, Djibouti, and Abu Dhabi. The United 
Kingdom (U.K.), which “leased” the Diego Garcia base to the United States in 
1966, also has made a comeback after a gap of four decades by opening a naval 
base in Bahrain.9
Among regional navies, the Indian Navy is the strongest, with considerable 
infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and a developing one in the 
Lakshadweep Island chain. The Iranian navy has considerable presence in the 
Persian Gulf region, where its confrontations with the U.S. Navy reflect the tense 
relationship between the two countries.
The Chinese navy’s “logistics base” in Djibouti, ostensibly established to sup-
port antipiracy operations in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa, also serves as a 
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means of power projection in the region. This certainly was evident in November 
2017, when visiting Chinese president Xi Jinping, dressed in full military uni-
form, addressed the Chinese contingent there, exhorting its members to promote 
“international and regional peace and stability.”10
Information-Sharing Infrastructure
The existing infrastructure for information sharing and for maintaining mari-
time domain awareness (MDA) is patchy and oriented toward supporting the 
current force-projection missions. It remains quite inadequate for fulfilling the 
emerging requirements for maritime system defense, as it largely is geared toward 
coastal security. It currently is not able adequately to support action across the 
entire Indian Ocean region (IOR) to combat drug trafficking and other forms of 
transnational crime, such as IUU fishing.
Beyond the usual ways of gaining maritime domain awareness (e.g., regular 
joint patrolling with naval contingents of different countries, coverage by existing 
shore-based radar installations, and use of space assets), the Indian Navy, with 
the agreement of the host governments, has installed additional radar equipment 
in Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Madagascar. There also are maritime- 
information-sharing centers in the western Indian Ocean in Sanaa, Yemen; 
Mombasa, Kenya; and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, with communication links 
to various countries in the region for mounting search-and-rescue (SAR) 
operations. The Indian Information Management and Analysis Centre, near Delhi, 
aggregates information to provide maritime domain awareness over almost the 
entire Indian Ocean. The Singapore-based Information Sharing Centre also pro-
vides significant domain awareness in the Indian Ocean. In certain information 
segments, capabilities are available as well within the Indian Ocean Commission; 
its members are Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Réunion, and Seychelles.
Ongoing efforts envisage the interlinking of various of these capabilities to 
provide a comprehensive domain picture for the Indian Ocean. However, the 
complexity of these efforts should not be underestimated.
Maritime System Defense Mechanisms, Established and Incipient
A broad overview of current maritime system defense mechanism efforts serves 
to underline their ad hoc character. The maintenance of good order at sea (to 
use the universally accepted naval expression) includes a role for great powers as 
well as multilateral collaborative activities, both well organized and incipient. The 
roles of the Indian Navy and Coast Guard are touched on elsewhere in this article.
The uniqueness of the Indian Ocean in this respect is the considerable experi-
ence in interoperability shared among regional and extraregional navies, includ-
ing in carrying out specific missions. This may build sufficient confidence to 
diversify interoperability missions in the direction of system-defense functions. 
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Yet the creation of a holistic, resilient maritime system adequate to the full spec-
trum of challenges is a far more complex challenge.
Established Structures. The U.S. naval command system for the Indian Ocean 
presents a bit of a jigsaw puzzle. It consists of different naval commands for dif-
ferent subregions, without much intercommand coordination. The U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command (previously the Pacific Command [PACOM]) covers the area 
east of the imaginary maritime dividing line between India and Pakistan. West of 
that line the Central Command (CENTCOM) coverage extends over the remain-
ing part of the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the area close to the African 
seaboard, which the Africa Command covers. Still within the Indian Ocean, the 
Gulf of Aqaba (including Elat) is covered by the European Command, because 
Israel lies within its area of responsibility. The U.S. State Department divides 
the region into geographical bureaus whose boundaries do not correspond with 
those of the Department of Defense.11 Owing to this segmented combination of 
responsibilities for various government agencies, including the military’s theater 
commands, the United States does not have a single “mind” of its own as far as the 
defense of the entire Indian Ocean maritime system is concerned.
With regard to antipiracy missions, especially in the Horn of Africa region, 
the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction system (known as SHADE) provides a 
mechanism for sharing information among the various interested countries, in-
cluding with nongovernmental stakeholders. Discussions cover coordination of 
escorts for merchant shipping passing through the internationally recommended 
transit corridor, as well as aerial coverage of high-risk areas. These meetings take 
place at CENTCOM headquarters in Bahrain.
The European Union (EU) naval complement (EUNAVFOR) plans to conduct 
Operation ATALANTA through December 2020. Its purpose is to protect vessels 
of the World Food Programme and other shipping, deter and disrupt piracy and 
armed robbery at sea, monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia, and 
support other EU missions and international obligations to strengthen maritime 
security and capacity in the region. It covers the southern Red Sea, the Gulf of 
Aden, and a large part of the Indian Ocean, including the waters around Sey-
chelles, Mauritius, and Comoros. EUNAVFOR’s current deployments involve 
one Italian and one Spanish frigate and a Spanish P-3C Orion.12 The Maritime 
Security Centre–Horn of Africa, headquartered in Northwood, United Kingdom, 
provides twenty-four-hour manned monitoring of vessels transiting through the 
Gulf of Aden, including an interactive capability to provide current information 
to shippers and escorts. Non-EU members such as Ukraine, New Zealand, and 
South Korea also have joined EUNAVFOR.
The U.S. Navy operates three multinational combined task forces (CTFs) in 
the region. CTF 150 was set up in 2001 to fight the “global war on terrorism,” 
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including in the Horn of Africa area; CTF 151 was set up in 2009 to confront 
piracy off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden; and CTF 152 was set up in 
2004 to provide maritime security in the Persian Gulf. These assignments mean 
that these task forces also operate in the northern and northwestern Indian 
Ocean. Headquartered at the U.S. base in Bahrain, the relevant command is the 
U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet; a Royal Navy (U.K.) commodore assists. These different 
task forces incorporate units from NATO member states, non-NATO U.S. allies, 
and others.
Incipient Structures. Among the multilateral organizations that are still in the 
more formative stages are the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the 
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS).
IORA is beginning to engage its member countries to develop an extensive 
maritime-safety and -security cooperative enterprise with legal and regulatory 
underpinnings. Owing to the numerous dimensions involved in developing 
such a capability for the organization, the process is still in its infancy, and thus 
the organization’s and members’ capabilities mostly remain woefully limited.13 
However, this organization could be the main agency for providing many of 
the functions needed to sustain a transformed maritime system for the Indian 
Ocean.
The members of IONS are the heads of navies and coast guards of a large 
number of the littoral countries. While it is an important organization with con-
siderable potential for developing confidence-building measures (CBMs) and 
enhancing strategic trust among its members and observers, given those parties’ 
diversity (and, in some cases, their adversarial relationships) IONS has yet to 
develop the range of interoperability templates required to overcome the various 
threats and challenges found in the regional maritime arena.14
PERSPECTIVES ON THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION
India’s SAGAR Framework in the Indo-Pacific Context
Indian prime minister Narendra Modi articulated his vision for the IOR in a 
major speech at Port Louis, Mauritius, on 12 March 2015. In it he coined the acro-
nym SAGAR, standing for the motto “Security and growth for all in the region”; 
as a word, the expression means “sea” in Hindi.15
The concept consists of five elements.
• India has national responsibility to safeguard its mainland and islands. As-
sociated objectives include contributing to a safe, secure, and stable region 
and fulfilling a commitment to help others during natural disasters and SAR 
operations.
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• India seeks to deepen economic and security cooperation within the re- 
gion, including strengthening maritime-security capacities and maritime 
economies.
• India aims to achieve collective cooperation for peace and security, better  
preparedness for emergencies through multilateral mechanisms such as 
IONS, and bilateral maritime-security cooperation.
• India intends to contribute to greater regional integration on the basis of sus-
tainable development, including for combating climate change, and building 
the “blue economy,” using IORA as an instrument for this purpose.
• The primary responsibility for peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indian 
Ocean rests with the littoral states themselves. India seeks a climate of trust 
and transparency, respect for international maritime rules and norms by all 
countries while remaining sensitive to each other’s interests, peaceful resolu-
tion of maritime issues, and increased maritime cooperation. 
While Prime Minister Modi’s Shangri-La vision for the Indo-Pacific is philosoph-
ically consistent with the general concept of a free, open, and inclusive maritime 
order, it is the SAGAR vision that represents an actionable agenda to achieve a 
viable Indian Ocean maritime system.16
The Indian Navy’s 2015 articulation of India’s maritime-security strategy 
envisages an expanded role for the service as a “net security provider” in the 
country’s maritime neighborhood. It identifies primary areas of maritime inter-
est, which include India’s coastal maritime zones, the Arabian Sea, the Bay of 
Bengal, the Andaman Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Gulf of Aden, 
the Red Sea, the southwest Indian Ocean, the east coast of Africa, and the various 
IOR choke points and sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Secondary areas of 
interest are the southeastern Indian Ocean, the South and East China Seas, the 
western Pacific Ocean, the southern Indian Ocean region (including Antarctica), 
the Mediterranean Sea, and the west coast of Africa. Other areas may become of 
interest, depending on national considerations.17
The increasing tactical complexity of the MALABAR series of exercises, which 
involve India, the United States, and Japan, illustrates a shared perspective among 
those countries. The U.S. government has underlined this perspective further by 
renaming its Pacific Command the Indo-Pacific Command, even as the theater 
command’s area of responsibility remains unchanged; the rechristening denotes 
a greater salience of the Indian Ocean (and thus of India) in this perspective. 
Although enhanced interoperability can be useful for any type of joint mission, 
conduct of the MALABAR series, with exercise locations alternating between the 
Bay of Bengal and the western Pacific, does signify that all three countries have 
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stakes in the strategic equilibriums prevailing in the two subregions. This denotes 
that there is a certain “buy-in” by India of the U.S. perspective on the Indo- 
Pacific, as represented in the latter’s own geographical definition. Even so, all 
three countries maintain their own respective networks of relationships in South-
east and East Asia, particularly with China.
India also has shed an earlier inhibition in that it has agreed to deploy a naval 
liaison officer to the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, in Bahrain. The inten-
tion is to facilitate enhanced situational awareness.18
Even given that Indian and U.S. perspectives share considerable strategic 
convergence toward maintaining the current strategic equilibrium, developing 
a composite perspective on the Indian Ocean would be necessary for a closer 
sharing of these perspectives. Achieving this would require creation of an Ameri-
can “home” for the policy somewhere within the U.S. government: a policy- 
coordination unit that would be charged with creating and maintaining an of-
ficial, composite, strategic “picture.” This policy-coordination function would 
need to be mirrored at the think-tank level on both sides.19
Within the existing relationship, strong Indo-U.S. cooperation against terror-
ism is an ongoing process. India would expect and welcome the United States 
and the larger international community to weigh in—as strongly as possible—to 
assist in neutralizing that cross-border terrorism that has come to be identified 
with Pakistan.
Evolving U.S. Thinking
American thinking on the Indian Ocean continues to evolve past the Cold War 
era. The United States strives to respond, via both hard-power and diplomatic 
means, to ongoing regional developments. As regional stability increasingly 
becomes anchored in the Indian Ocean as a whole, the segmented nature of the 
U.S. approach to force engagement is exposed as inadequate. The overall U.S. 
force drawdown, as currently envisaged—unconnected as it seems to be to any 
holistic vision or grand strategy—only can aggravate the challenges to American 
interests and to those of others in the region. Even in terms of the country’s own 
national security perspective alone, there is no strong unanimity within the U.S. 
strategic community that the existing maritime system can be calibrated to meet 
these challenges effectively.
America’s existing national security perspective consists of bolstering the 
largely favorable political order in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf and 
managing the Chinese naval footprint. At the instance of the U.S. Secretary 
of Defense, an interagency review of the IOR was undertaken in early 2012; 
several high-profile American delegations visited India, Australia, and other re-
gional players. However, beyond the Obama administration’s announcement of 
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a “rebalancing” toward Asia in general, no new initiatives for the Indian Ocean 
were reported. The expectation has been that the U.S. approach would be one of 
“muddling through.”20
The unclassified summary of the U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS), which 
the Secretary of Defense released on 19 January 2018, states as follows: “A free 
and open Indo-Pacific region provides prosperity and security for all. We will 
strengthen our alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked 
security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and 
ensuring free access to common domains. With key countries in the region, we 
will bring together bilateral and multilateral security relationships to preserve the 
free and open international system.”21 Under the same broad theme of regional 
defense challenges, the strategy states its objective of fostering a stable and secure 
Middle East that denies safe havens to terrorists, is not dominated by any power 
hostile to the United States, and contributes to “stable global energy markets and 
secure trade routes.” It also aims to consolidate gains in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, 
and elsewhere and “to support the lasting defeat of terrorists as we sever their 
sources of strength and counterbalance Iran.”22
The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), which President Trump released 
in December 2017, distinguishes the “Indo-Pacific” from the “Middle East” and 
“South and Central Asia.” It describes the Indo-Pacific as stretching from the 
west coast of India to the western shores of the United States—precisely the area 
of responsibility of PACOM (now Indo-Pacific Command). The NSS is quite 
China-centric in its threat assessment, dwelling little on the situation in the 
IOR and its governance mechanisms. While the NSS reaffirms the U.S. military 
commitment to the security and stability of the Middle East, it states that “[f]or 
years, the interconnected problems of Iranian expansion, state collapse, jihadist 
ideology, socio-economic stagnation, and regional rivalries [have] convulsed the 
Middle East.” In its discussion of South and Central Asia, the NSS refers to the 
Indian Ocean only once, stating, “We will deepen our strategic partnership with 
India and support its leadership role in Indian Ocean security and throughout 
the broader region.”23
Manifestly, the NSS anticipates the NDS in terms of the operating U.S. per-
spective on the Indian Ocean maritime system. Specific factors impacting on 
that system’s resilience—such as balance-of-power considerations, state fragility, 
terrorism, and the safety of navigation routes—are highlighted, but largely within 
the context of different regions’ strategic milieus. These documents pay no at-
tention to the larger issue of the governance of the Indian Ocean as a maritime 
system. This signals a belief that the factors affecting the unified system’s resil-
ience can be addressed effectively by focusing on specific negative phenomena 
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in different regions and through the normal diplomatic engagements of a su-
perpower. In other words, the U.S. approach to the Indian Ocean, as currently 
constituted, lacks the attributes of a grand strategy.
Given the segmented nature of the American approach to IOR governance, 
that approach remains inherently reactive. By its nature it will be unlikely to 
shape proactively a new maritime system capable of coping with the threats that 
are emerging, including of the nontraditional variety, in the near-to-medium 
term. There is an ominous aspect to this approach, given the fast-paced develop-
ments in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, with their grave implications for 
the maritime system as a whole.
The Chinese Approach
The Chinese government does not have an officially articulated policy on the 
Indian Ocean. However, its 2015 white paper on military strategy represents a 
doctrinal shift from “offshore waters defense” to a combination of that objec-
tive with “open seas protection,” as well as the abandonment of the “traditional 
mentality that land outweighs sea,” so that “great importance has to be attached 
to managing the seas and oceans, and protecting maritime rights and interests.”24 
According to Ryan Martinson, in the Chinese text of the white paper, the relevant 
concept translates more accurately as “strategic management.”25
China clearly has come of age, in both its conception and its program (the 
latter covering 2016–20) to emerge as a maritime power in all dimensions. As its 
overseas assets multiply, expanding beyond the so-called first island chain, China 
also is developing its capacity to protect those islands—and indeed to fly its flag 
in any waters of interest to it.
An important aspect of this endeavor is to invest significantly—in a politi-
cal sense—in IOR littoral and island countries, especially in the form of mari-
time infrastructure projects carried out under its MSR program. Some of these 
projects, when executed in financially weak countries, have resulted in Chinese 
acquisition of equity participation, yielding greater control over their manage-
ment. Because of these projects’ strategic locations, there are apprehensions about 
them being used for military purposes, although China has not stated explicitly 
any intention to have naval bases in the Indian Ocean. However, given China’s 
tendency toward “changing the facts on the ground” in the South China Sea, such 
apprehensions are not groundless.
Djibouti offers an example worth considering. A July 2017 CNA study on Dji-
bouti offers citations from the Chinese ministry of defense website in 2010 to the 
effect that reports of Chinese overseas bases are groundless, then presents 2015 
quotations from a Chinese foreign office spokesperson that “the building of lo-
gistical facilities in Djibouti . . . will better guarantee Chinese troops to carry out 
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international peacekeeping operations, escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and 
the Somali waters, humanitarian relief, and other tasks.”26 As mentioned earlier, 
in November 2017 the Chinese president addressed the Chinese troops in Dji-
bouti, asking them to promote “international and regional peace and stability.”27 
In February 2018, a People’s Liberation Army Navy task force (consisting of at 
least one modern destroyer, a frigate, an amphibious assault ship, and a support 
tanker) then in the eastern Indian Ocean briefly entered the port. At least one 
observer believed that this port visit influenced the course of a political crisis 
then ongoing in the Maldives.28
The expanding Chinese activities, diplomatic as well as naval, cannot yet be 
considered to be shaping the Indian Ocean maritime system, but by their nature 
they certainly can be interpreted as a reflection of the country’s desire to shape 
it in the future. They also signify that the Chinese entry into the Indian Ocean 
can be expected to be disruptive of the existing maritime system—unless serious 
efforts are made to shape the maritime system to meet the growing challenges.
The Japanese Approach
The Japanese government, led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, has espoused a 
“Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”; the strategy was conceptualized in Abe’s 
speech in 2007 to India’s Parliament. It envisages improved connectivity between 
Asia and Africa and the promotion of stability in and prosperity for the region 
as a whole; the Japanese conception defines the region geographically more 
broadly than does the United States. The strategy seeks to realize its goals through 
strengthened strategic collaboration with India as well as with the United States 
and Australia.
The strategy lays stress on democracy, the rule of law, and market economics 
in Southeast and East Asia, and on “nation-building support in the area of devel-
opment as well as politics and governance” in Africa. In the maritime domain, the 
emphasis is on the “rule of law and freedom of navigation,” especially compliance 
with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Another important 
aspect is ensuring peace and stability, including cooperation in capacity building 
for maritime law enforcement and MDA.29
The strategy manifested itself in November 2017 in the convening of the 
Quadrilateral Dialogue among the United States, India, Japan, and Australia. 
Another manifestation was the scaled-up Exercise MALABAR that took place in 
July 2017 in the Bay of Bengal with participation by India, the United States, and 
Japan, which served to enhance naval interoperability within the U.S.-defined 
Indo-Pacific construct. According to Japanese media reports, enhancement of 
maritime-security capabilities is being achieved through greater Japanese in-
volvement with countries such as Djibouti (where the Japan Coast Guard has 
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provided training and has gifted patrol boats) and Sri Lanka (similarly, antipiracy 
drills and patrol boats).30
Japan’s strategy has the support of several countries, including India and the 
United States. Not yet a comprehensive approach toward shaping the Indian 
Ocean maritime order, the strategy still is unfolding, and so far lacks the visibility 
of the Chinese footprint in the Indian Ocean.
Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum
Indonesian president Joko Widodo announced in 2014 his vision of Indonesia’s 
role as the “Global Maritime Fulcrum” (GMF). The GMF concept comprises 
five core pillars: maritime culture, maritime infrastructure and connectivity, 
protection of maritime resources, maritime diplomacy, and maritime defense; 
two auxiliary pillars are maritime governance and the maritime environment.31
While this vision informs Indonesian initiatives in various international 
forums (especially the convening of the first-ever IORA summit in Jakarta in 
March 2017), its emphasis is more on economic aspects and less on hard-core 
military capabilities. Even as Indonesia continues to envisage cooperation with 
China on MSR projects, it concluded an agreement with India to develop port 
and related infrastructure projects in and around the Indonesian port of Sabang, 
on the northern tip of Sumatra.32
Since 2014, Indonesia has been conducting the KOMODO biennial multilateral 
naval exercise; the latest iteration occurred in May 2018 at Lombok Island and in 
nearby waters, with a focus on humanitarian and disaster-response operations. 
These exercises are well attended, including by the navies of India, China, and 
the United States.
The Iranian Approach
At the 2018 Munich Security Conference, the Iranian foreign minister advanced 
a proposal for a Persian Gulf version of the Helsinki process that would be based 
on the UN Charter and on “ticket principles” and “CBM baskets,” to which all 
Gulf countries purportedly should be able to subscribe. The process eventually 
was to lead to a regional nonaggression pact; it also envisaged a regional dialogue 
forum involving both intergovernmental and nongovernmental interactions.33
As chairman for the 2018 IONS, the commander of the Iranian navy used his 
inaugural speech before the symposium to stress that it should be the countries of 
a particular region that ensure the security of that region; he warned that a naval 
presence by outsiders could impose foreign security arrangements on the region. 
He also urged IONS to set up a combat group, and to formulate a “common tacti-
cal language for coordinated naval measures,” to contribute to stability.34 
The Iranian naval deterrence strategy of area denial is anchored on blocking 
the Strait of Hormuz by sea, air, and land should hostilities break out. Both the 
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Iranian navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) have 
parts to play under this strategy, but whereas the IRGCN concentrates its ac-
tivities inside the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman to conduct asymmetrical 
operations, the Iranian navy—the more professional, conventional, blue-water 
force—covers the Gulf of Oman, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of 
Aden, and the Red Sea. Occasionally the navy ventures even beyond that; it has 
participated actively in antipiracy operations off the Horn of Africa.
Iranian naval capabilities are to be deployed against both certain Gulf states, 
such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the United States, which has a significant 
presence in both the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Incidents of military 
confrontation between Iranian naval forces and those of the United States are 
not infrequent in the Persian Gulf region. Donald Trump, during his 2016 presi-
dential election campaign, even threatened that Iranian vessels harassing the U.S. 
Navy would be “shot out of the water.”35 Amid rising military tension in the re-
gion, one ramification of the hardening U.S. position vis-à-vis Iran is that current 
access to Afghanistan—vital for both Indian and American interests—through 
the Iranian port of Chabahar, only recently opened to India, appears to be in 
jeopardy owing to the reluctance, in a volatile environment, of Indian firms and 
others to work there lest they attract secondary U.S. sanctions.
THE WAY AHEAD
A Broader Approach
Strengthened pan-IOR governance mechanisms and bilateral maritime diplo-
macy can help develop normative templates and enforcement capabilities. The 
stakes that littoral countries, especially small island countries, have in a holistic 
maritime system can be nurtured through combating climate change and other 
nontraditional, system-destabilizing challenges. A holistic maritime system, of 
the type that Prime Minister Modi envisaged, would counter, to a considerable 
extent, the growing—and geographically expanding—gyre of state collapse and 
regional instability, with its attendant flourishing of jihadist groups.
The jihadist challenge, which has critical ramifications for India because of 
the movement’s extensive (especially diasporal) links, is a particularly complex 
phenomenon in the Gulf region, as well as the Horn of Africa. India’s strategic 
interests do not converge foursquare with those of the United States in this sub-
region, which is witnessing the hostility between the United States and Iran and 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with the added complication of a deepening rift 
between Qatar and the rest of the countries of the Cooperation Council for the 
Arab States of the Gulf (known as the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC]). Yet the 
United States, given its preeminence in the region, nonetheless can help shape a 
new maritime system, some elements of which are discussed below.
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Ground Rules for Freedom of Navigation and Use of Littoral Harbors by Extra-
regional Navies. There is an urgent need to devise ground rules for freedom of 
navigation and the use of littoral harbors by extraregional navies. Presently, these 
matters are left to the devices of the individual country or countries concerned—
and it is amply evident that the outcome so far has been to worsen the situation.
Although UNCLOS enjoins countries to respect freedom of navigation, 
certain countries base their grand strategies on closing choke points. A prime 
example is Iran with regard to the Strait of Hormuz; however, the same observa-
tion applies to the United States with regard to the Malacca Strait.36 Extralittoral 
navies are engaged in setting up bases in the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf, 
implicitly threatening closure of SLOCs in the Bab el Mandeb and the Suez Canal.
Actions such as these aggravate regional tensions, potentially leading to the 
unraveling of the entire Indian Ocean maritime system. While naval operations 
in pursuit of the security interests of individual countries are sovereign activities, 
ground rules for both freedom of navigation and the use of littoral harbors can 
be developed without constraining states’ security operations.
Raising Strategic Trust Levels among the Major Navies. Yet another important 
effort should be aimed at raising strategic trust levels among the major navies. 
The goal should be to stabilize their force levels so that the balance-of-power 
equilibrium is not disturbed.
Front-loading cooperative activities in various multilateral governance forums 
in the IOR and recognizing the legitimacy of relevant countries’ stakes in the IOR 
maritime system and its stability could build up such strategic trust. This could 
lead to a slowing, or even a reversal, of current trends of naval buildup.
Upholding the SAGAR National Security Priorities. In both the efforts men-
tioned immediately above, the SAGAR conceptual framework provides a strong 
basis on which to conduct national and multilateral diplomacy. India’s leadership 
believes that placing responsibility for the peace, stability, and prosperity of the 
Indian Ocean on the littoral states themselves will ensure that the country’s mari-
time security and larger maritime interests are well safeguarded. This approach 
is consistent with the nation’s sovereign right of national defense, which covers 
not only the mainland and the islands but also its efforts to “ensure a safe, secure, 
and stable Indian Ocean region that delivers . . . all to the shores of prosperity.”37 
The framework also lays out a basis for external navies to secure their legitimate 
national interests.
India’s policy toward the Gulf region and the Horn of Africa, at both the 
bilateral and the multilateral levels, seeks to persuade all the adversarial coun-
tries that they have stakes in regional stability, which is the key to economic 
progress and societal cohesion. All states should bear in mind that mass internal 
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or transborder migrations are in the interest of nobody—not countries in the 
region; not Europe; not other stakeholder countries, such as China, Japan, and 
Russia; and not countries in South Asia, Southeast Asia, or the Far East. A 
balance-of-power equation operates only when there are nation-states at both 
ends of the relationship; collapse of either triggers a very different kind of dy-
namic, as illustrated in the Afghanistan and Iraq experiences. As the recent U.S. 
moves in the Gulf region have shown, in the wake of the GCC rift over Qatar, 
America wants to ensure that the security architecture it has set up in that littoral 
region remains strong. Any instability there would make it impossible for the 
United States to sustain this security architecture. Instability in the Gulf region 
would imperil not only India’s energy supplies but also the lives and well-being 
of the millions of expatriate Indians who live there.
Bilateral capacity building through cultivation of relationships with countries 
in the region and the strengthening of pan-IOR governance mechanisms for 
developing the ground rules discussed above would mitigate to some extent the 
destabilizing effects of the hard-power pursuits of national interests revealed in 
the violent contestations taking place within the region. In this effort, India will 
find other influential countries willing to act in tandem with it, and it can lever-
age its own friendly relations with nearly all countries in the region. The United 
States would need to calibrate its regional approach according to its own sen-
sitivity toward the possibility that increased China-Pakistan naval cooperation 
would upset the regional balance of power, as well as the danger represented by 
the “loose nukes at sea” issue.38
Indian Ocean Maritime System Capacity Issues
IORA’s Charter Responsibilities. Because of its essentially pan-IOR character, 
IORA is uniquely suited to help shape a holistic maritime system for the Indian 
Ocean. Apart from economic and cultural cooperation, the organization aims 
to tackle maritime-security, disaster-response, and blue-economy challenges. Its 
action plan for 2017–21 spells out near-, medium-, and long-term initiatives.39 
While this has created a skeletal framework of the desired action, a stronger po-
litical will to drive the process is necessary, just as the creation of sufficient stakes 
for outside powers is necessary to further the organization’s institutional growth.
The IORA Summit Declaration of 7 March 2017, called the Jakarta Concord, 
describes the scope of the field of maritime safety and security as covering ac-
cidents and incidents at sea; the safety of vessels and the marine environment; 
transboundary challenges such as piracy and armed robbery at sea; terrorism; 
trafficking in persons and the smuggling of people, illicit drugs, and wildlife; 
crimes in the fisheries sector and environmental crimes; and freedom of navi-
gation and overflight, in accordance with international law and UNCLOS. The 
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action plan includes, as a long-term program, a regional surveillance network 
that would provide information on maritime transportation systems.40
As one of its initiatives, IORA has established the Maritime Safety and Security 
Working Group to build capacities, enhance cross-border cooperation and knowl-
edge sharing, and promote harmonized implementation across the region of the 
relevant international regulations. The working group’s terms of reference recently 
have been finalized as a first step toward the completion of its work plan. It needs 
to aim at geostrategic cooperation, capacity building for maritime awareness, hu-
man safety at sea, capacity building for law enforcement at sea, and the like.
Enhanced capacity for IORA as well as this working group is the desideratum 
for the organization to be able to monitor closely all security-related develop-
ments, have adequate analytical backup to draw appropriate lessons from ongoing 
developments, and disseminate the results to and coordinate discussions among 
stakeholders. It also would require the support of a mechanism analogous to the 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). Such an agency 
would be ideal for developing norms on freedom of navigation and overflight, 
especially at the various choke points, which are vulnerable to interdiction arising 
out of political instability in littoral countries or regional conflicts between them.
This agency also could contribute to developing wider norms to be applied to 
IOR waterways and oceanic resources; the SAGAR construct provides examples. 
At the levels of both the president and the prime minister, Sri Lanka has sug-
gested a legal framework to address drug trafficking and other criminal activity 
while maintaining freedom of navigation in accordance with international law. 
The prime minister went so far as to suggest a “Code on the Freedom of Naviga-
tion” that must have an effective dispute-resolution mechanism.41
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. As an organization representing the chiefs of 
the littoral navies and other stakeholder, extraregional navies, IONS can provide 
professional inputs to IORA as the latter engages in the important task of enhanc-
ing maritime safety and security in the Indian Ocean by developing the relevant 
norms. Through IONS’s own committees, interoperability procedures and capa-
bilities can be developed and habits of cooperation formalized. Maintaining this 
synergy between the two organizations is critical, given that the IONS member-
ship includes countries whose bilateral relations might be described as adver-
sarial. A communication channel also needs to be developed between IORA and 
IONS to function as an agenda interface, since maritime safety and security are 
matters of concern to both organizations.
Discussions can be encouraged within IONS on the subject of the ground rules 
for use of harbor facilities by extraregional navies sailing in the Indian Ocean. 
Alternatively, this theme can be discussed and developed within the relevant 
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think-tank networks. A CSCAP-like think-tank network, with a looser hierarchy 
and process for agenda formulation, also could provide a platform for discussion 
of security-related developments, both traditional and nontraditional, regarding 
their implications for the overall IORA security milieu.
The outcome of all this effort should be a strategic framework for the Indian 
Ocean. The development of habits of cooperation would lead to an element of 
strategic trust. Eventually, such strategic trust would result in the kind of force 
equilibrium envisaged in the SAGAR construct, one that recognizes the legiti-
mate interests of all stakeholder countries but posits that the primary responsi-
bility for peace, stability, and prosperity rests with the littoral states themselves.
IORA’s Institutional Linkages. IORA is ideally suited to create capacities, consid-
ered within the littoral collectively, to put together a strategic framework for the 
Indian Ocean, as envisaged in the SAGAR speech. In that role, it could reach out 
to other subregional groups in the Indian Ocean that share a maritime element. 
A well-known expert on maritime geopolitics, invoking the concept of a regime 
complex for the IOR, has argued that IORA should play the role of a “systems in-
tegrator, facilitator, interlocutor, and even translator” for the Indian Ocean mari-
time system, in partnership with other subregional littoral organizations.42 Even 
as IORA is still developing its own ideas and capacities in the area of maritime 
safety and security, institutional linkages with the other subregional organiza-
tions discussed below would be beneficial.
• There is a maritime dimension to the activities of the GCC.43 However, for 
the foreseeable future any well-coordinated and cohesive institutional naval 
cooperation is unlikely because of serious divisions among the key members 
of the council.
• The two African organizations covering the continent’s Indian Ocean 
seaboard are the Southern African Development Community and the East 
African Community. These entities have ambitions to create a political/secu-
rity capability, with a maritime dimension; India and IORA could help them 
in this.44
• The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic 
Cooperation (known as BIMSTEC) is an organization that can provide a 
framework for a degree of maritime governance in the Bay of Bengal region, 
as most of the littoral countries are members.45
Some gaps in the existing maritime picture can be filled in by IORA through 
dialogue between, coordination among, and partnership with other organiza-
tions having something to do with the Indian Ocean in the wider Indo-Pacific 
construct. These include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
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the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus, and 
the relevant UN bodies. To share best practices, IORA also can conduct periodic 
consultations with other regional groupings of littoral countries elsewhere, such 
as the Arctic Council.
India’s Naval Diplomacy and Thought Leadership
The Indian Navy is the second-most-powerful navy in the region and enjoys 
considerable convergence of strategic interests with the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy 
undergirds the current maritime order and is uniquely placed to seed and nurture 
the maritime system envisaged in the SAGAR construct.
Building such a system will require both bilateral and multilateral naval dip-
lomatic engagements. The Indian Navy and its affiliated think-tank participants 
can play a thought-leadership role. The diplomatic engagements involved need 
to be nuanced and light of touch; otherwise certain other elements—not all well-
disposed—may try to undermine the very diplomatic efforts attempting to create 
the envisaged maritime order. Certain recent developments, such as in Maldives, 
Seychelles, and elsewhere, suggest the need for a more nuanced Indian approach.
Naval Capacity Building
Multiple types of capability gaps in the existing maritime system—legislative, 
organizational, and operational—need to be closed. Judicious naval capacity 
building remains an important task. Accomplishing this is necessary to achieve 
a measure of stability by ensuring that the littoral navies themselves have the 
capacity to uphold the maritime system. These capacity-building efforts would 
need to involve and engage littoral navies, coast guards, coastal police forces, and 
any other maritime agencies active in the maintenance of good order at sea. Not 
only India but several other countries need to carry out this capacity building.
This effort would include building better capabilities to conduct maritime sur-
veillance, so as to help meet several of the challenges the maritime system faces. 
Implementation is ongoing pursuant to the Indian vice president’s announce-
ment on 7 March 2017 at the IORA summit in Jakarta regarding the setting up of 
an Information Fusion Centre. Such a center could help to coordinate on MDA 
and to institutionalize existing cooperative mechanisms and efforts, such as white 
shipping agreements and agreements related to hydrography.46 An important 
aspect of this capacity building would be to prepare state forces to neutralize the 
empowerment of nonstate actors by the so-called revolution in military affairs.
Closing the Capability Gaps, Including in Skills
Maritime Domain Awareness. MDA is the most relevant area of concern for the 
IOR. Better MDA can be achieved by combining the various facilities already 
existing in the region. This may entail capacity expansion for various entities to 
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enable them to fulfill multimission roles. This closing of domain-awareness gaps 
would involve not only building physical infrastructure but also developing the 
requisite protocols for information exchanges and finding a suitable platform on 
which to carry that out.
Think-Tank Capabilities. Musing over the current global geopolitical flux and 
the methodological conundrums that handicap analysis and scenario building, 
the authors of the U.S. National Intelligence Council report Global Trends 2030: 
Alternative Worlds spotlight numerous difficulties. Among others, they list the 
need for better identification of looming disequilibriums; better exploration of 
the relationship among trends, discontinuities, and crises; and correction of a 
tendency to underestimate the rate of change along trajectories of rise and decline 
for different states.47
Better think-tank capabilities would help to address the entire spectrum of 
issues listed above and to flesh out the concept of a pan–Indian Ocean maritime 
system. The think-tank infrastructure should include both transnational and 
internal (within India) networking. Capabilities should include scenario building 
in the current fluid Indian Ocean geopolitical context. This think-tank activity, 
both at the national and transnational network levels, would need to flesh out 
SAGAR’s normative framework. This activity should be coordinated so as to 
be consistent with SAGAR’s geopolitical construct, rather than proceeding in a 
segmented fashion.
The Indian Ocean maritime system is becoming increasingly fragile, and the U.S. 
Navy’s capacity to undergird it is diminishing perceptibly. Nonetheless, America 
retains significant national capabilities that can help shape a new maritime sys-
tem for the Indian Ocean, whereas China is not at present in a position to alter 
the balance of power in the Indian Ocean.
In contrast to those relating to other bodies of water in Southeast and East Asia 
within the Indo-Pacific construct, the Indian Ocean maritime system is fraying at 
the edges more than it is crumbling under intensifying great-power contestation. 
The Indian Ocean no longer serves as an instrument for naval force projection 
to achieve power equilibrium in the Middle Eastern hinterland, as was the case 
during the Cold War. A pan–Indian Ocean maritime system has to be devised 
to meet today’s context, in which the region faces multitudinous challenges to its 
political and economic stability.
The challenges in question are not only those that directly affect the littoral 
areas, with their huge populations and large proportions of global economic 
and resource wealth, but also those with effects felt much farther afield, in the 
hinterland. The stability of the Indian Ocean maritime system is critical to global 
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stability itself. The challenges inhere in the growing fragility of littoral states as 
well as the island nations. In addition, the rapidly accelerating naval rivalry in 
the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf negatively impacts any effort to create a 
stable Indian Ocean maritime system. Establishing a sturdy governance mecha-
nism would encourage the development of stakes on the part of regional as well 
as extraregional countries.
Given the rapid pace of events, the window of opportunity to build a holistic 
Indian Ocean maritime system may not remain open for long. The ramping up 
of maritime safety and security through capacity building, interoperability, and 
enhanced comfort levels, and thereby the successful addressing of nontraditional 
threats, remains the overriding priority. This effort is critical to maintaining 
regional stability, and therefore should receive support from all countries even 
as they retain their hard-power capabilities and options. Prime Minister Modi’s 
SAGAR perspective covers the entire spectrum of relevant challenges and offers 
Indian capabilities—in the form of both hard and soft power—to make a signal 
contribution to shaping such a maritime order.
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 On 3 October 2015, the U.S. Navy met an odd milestone when it decom-missioned USS Simpson—the last modern ship in its fleet to have sunk an 
enemy warship. Simpson had sunk the Iranian ship Joshan twenty-seven years 
earlier during an obscure deployment to the Persian Gulf from 1987 to 1989 to 
protect eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers and preserve freedom of navigation through 
the Strait of Hormuz.
In 1987, when the episode began, the Cold War was hot. Despite ongoing 
negotiations over conventional and intermediate nuclear forces, U.S. and Soviet 
proxies faced off in Nicaragua and Afghanistan. The Iran-Contra hearings were 
about to begin, and the Iran-Iraq War was starting its seventh year. Iraqi and 
Iranian forces were sinking neutral oil tankers and other merchant ships moving 
cargo through the Strait of Hormuz at an alarming rate.
It was in this environment that President Ron-
ald W. Reagan authorized the Kuwaiti tankers to 
be reflagged as American ships and given a sizable 
naval escort, including Simpson. The deployment, 
code-named Operation EARNEST WILL, stood out 
as the U.S. Navy’s largest and most complicated 
surface-warfare operation since World War II, and 
it was a rare example of the United States using 
force to protect access to crude oil. EARNEST WILL 
was a contentious deployment, and Congress de-
manded assurances that U.S. forces, if deployed, 
would be protected, to avoid friendly casualties.
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Participants and historians judge the operation to have been a success, al-
though there has been little counterfactual analysis to ascertain what would 
have happened had the United States done nothing.1 We should seek to under-
stand why we deploy forces abroad and evaluate each deployment on whether 
it succeeded in achieving its mission. Strategists use many criteria to determine 
whether deployments should occur, but minimally these missions should be 
moral efforts of last resort when diplomacy has failed (or used in conjunction 
with diplomacy) and tied to a nation’s grand strategy.
This grand strategy can take many forms, but generally constitutes “a nation-
state’s theory on how to produce security for itself,” or, as Cold War historian 
John Lewis Gaddis wrote, “how one uses whatever one has to get to wherever it 
is one wants to go.”2 A well-formed strategy must be feasible and have a decent 
probability of success. It must be suitable; that is, the strategy, if successful, actu-
ally will produce the desired policy goal. Finally, the strategy must be acceptable, 
meaning that the nation is willing to bear the cost of the strategy, as measured in 
lives, treasure, prestige, and leadership focus.
Given the stakes, one would think that grand strategies and the deployments 
that support them are well thought out. This does not seem to be so. Some re-
search suggests that much American strategy has been improvised on the fly.3 
Scholars such as Richard Neustadt, Ernest May, and Yuen Khong argue that indi-
vidual policy decisions, such as particular deployments, are driven by a series of 
messy analytic models that include poor analogical thinking instead of structured 
analytic techniques.4
The EARNEST WILL deployment is an example of an ad hoc improvisation in 
the context of two developed U.S. strategies: the policy of containment and the 
Carter Doctrine. As a deployment, it was anomalous because of its size, the fe-
rocity with which it was executed (the American joint task force [JTF] ultimately 
sank a large portion of the Iranian navy), and its adoption in the face of con-
gressional opposition. An outlier such as this invites examination. We therefore 
should try to understand what strategic forces drove EARNEST WILL. Analysis of 
this case study can help us examine what practical realities drive states’ foreign 
policies. When faced with multiple principles (such as containment and the 
Carter Doctrine), which are the more powerful influencers?
This article assesses two possible drivers. The first is that EARNEST WILL was 
executed as an extension of President Reagan’s Cold War strategy. The Soviet 
Union had offered to solve the security issues in the Gulf. Keeping the Soviet 
Union out meant keeping U.S. forces in, and it also meant pulling Kuwait into 
an American-provided security convoy regime. In this explanation, EARNEST 
WILL was a shrewd, neorealist example of offshore balancing. A second op-
tion is that oil economics was the main driver behind the deployment. The U.S. 
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State Department’s official policy rationale for EARNEST WILL stated that “the 
unimpeded flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz is a vital interest and criti-
cal to the economic health of the Western world.”5 The oil had to be protected, 
as it all went into the global spot and futures markets, which affected the price 
Americans paid at the gas pump. The Carter Doctrine was explicit that this was 
a national interest, and in the past, when oil supplies were disrupted, it sent 
the U.S. economy reeling. In this situation, the Persian Gulf was a critical piece 
of the economic global commons, and the United States was the protector of the 
global town green.
THE ROAD TO WAR: THE SHAH, THE HOSTAGES,  
AND THE IRAQI INVASION
On 22 September 1980, Iraq commenced a mechanized invasion of Iran with 
twenty-two divisions equipped with modern Soviet weapons. Iraqi president 
Saddam Hussein thought his force could seize oil fields and the Shatt al Arab 
waterway quickly from an Iranian army still in disorder from the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution. Hussein also feared that Iran might export its revolutionary brand of 
Islam to Iraq’s predominantly Shia population. The Iraqi invasion initially made 
good progress; Iran quickly rallied, however, drawing from a deep well of revolu-
tionary fervor and a population three times the size of Iraq’s. For years the ground 
war, while not exactly a stalemate, produced no decisive results.
America from the start tilted toward Iraq. Iran’s status in America had shifted 
from key strategic partner to terrorist menace. In the 1970s, relations between 
the United States and Iran’s monarch, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (the 
shah), were warm. The United Kingdom had been the Persian Gulf ’s traditional 
protector and offshore balancer for much of the twentieth century, but in 1971 
the United Kingdom withdrew from “east of the Suez,” closing its naval base in 
Bahrain. With the United States overextended at the time and trying to disengage 
from Vietnam, Britain presented the move as a fait accompli.6 Henry Kissinger 
recalled the dilemma: “[T]here was no possibility of assigning any American 
military forces to the Indian Ocean in the midst of the Vietnam war and its atten-
dant trauma.”7 America filled the void with the Nixon Doctrine, a stratagem that 
called for the two pillars of Iran and Saudi Arabia to provide security in the Gulf. 
Iran, well funded with petrodollars and well equipped with advanced American 
weapons, approached the task with zeal—until the shah’s overthrow in 1979.
America tried to work with the subsequent Ayatollah Khomeini regime, with 
the Pentagon announcing shipments of spare parts to the Iranian military as 
late as October 1979.8 But in November 1979, Iranian students seized fifty-four 
hostages in the U.S. embassy in Tehran in retaliation for the U.S. government 
allowing the shah into the United States for medical treatment. In April 1980, 
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President Jimmy Carter, perceived by many as overseeing a dovish foreign 
policy, launched U.S. special operations forces on an audacious rescue mission 
to recover the Americans. Aircraft malfunctions doomed the raid, and eight U.S. 
servicemembers died in a collision. The Iranians displayed their bodies and the 
destroyed aircraft for the world to see—a spectacle that added to the dual humili-
ations of deposed ally and captive diplomats. Tehran finally released the hostages 
on 20 January 1981, as part of a deal that netted the regime $2.8 billion in assets 
previously frozen by the United States.9 In a final affront to President Carter, the 
airplane bearing the hostages did not depart Iran until a few minutes after Ronald 
Reagan was sworn into office. They had been held captive for 444 days.
Although Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade was unilateral, Iran saw the 
attack, which occurred during the American hostage crisis, as part of a wider 
effort to bring harm to the country and end the Khomeini revolution. Bruce 
Riedel, a former intelligence analyst specializing in the Iran-Iraq War, explains 
the thinking:
Iranians call the war the “Imposed War” because they believe the United States 
subjected them to the conflict and orchestrated the global “tilt” toward Iraq. They 
note that the United Nations [UN] did not condemn Iraq for starting the war. In 
fact, the UN did not even discuss the war for weeks after it started, and it ultimately 
considered Iraq to be the aggressor only years later, as part of a deal orchestrated by 
President George H. W. Bush to free the remaining U.S. hostages held by pro-Iranian 
terrorists in Lebanon.10
WAR FOOTING
The “Imposed War” soon required full mobilization of both combatants’ citizen-
ries and economies. One analyst has estimated the total cost of the war to both 
economies at $1.097 trillion, and noted that the sum “exceeds by $678.5 billion 
the entire oil revenue received by both countries, ever since they started to sell 
their oil on the world market.”11
Much of this money went to weapons purchases. In 1980, Iraq imported $2.24 
billion worth of weapons, a figure that increased to $3.285 billion by 1982.12 Iran’s 
imports were anemic by comparison: $278 million in 1980, when it was in a state 
of revolution but still on a peacetime footing, increasing to $541 million by 1982. 
In 1983, the United States initiated Operation STAUNCH, an effort to stop the flow 
of arms, not to the aggressor but to Iran, on the grounds that the Iranian govern-
ment would not negotiate a cease-fire. During a hearing to justify EARNEST WILL, 
the State Department’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs described STAUNCH, 
then in its fourth year of existence, as “vigorous diplomatic efforts—through 
intelligence-sharing and strong demarches—to block or complicate Iranian arms 
resupply efforts on a worldwide basis.”13
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Oil exports were critical to fuel the war machines of both sides. The war cut off 
Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf, leaving more than seventy merchant ships stuck 
in the ports of Umm Qasr, Shatt, and Khorramshahr. Shells and bullets impacted 
them and their egress to the Gulf slowly silted up. Insurers eventually wrote off 
the trapped ships as constructive total losses and paid out more than $450 million 
to various policy holders.14
Baghdad adapted by exporting oil via pipeline and importing weapons and 
dry goods overland after off-loading at ports in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
and Kuwait. Since its navy was small, Iraq used its air force to strike military 
and economic targets in the Iranian littorals. Kharg Island, Iran’s major loading 
point for crude oil, was a frequent target, and Iran soon fortified the location 
with missiles, decoys, and antiaircraft guns in a mode reminiscent of European 
cities during World War II. In October 1981, Iraq began using French helicopters 
equipped with French Exocet antiship missiles to attack neutral ships heading 
for Iran. Tankers loading crude at Kharg were a favorite target, and Iranian oil 
revenue suffered.
Iran declared its territorial waters a war zone shortly after the invasion and 
stated it would blockade Iraq (both legal moves under the laws of armed con-
flict), but initially the government did not try to interdict shipping heading 
to Iraq. By September 1982, after months of Iraqi attacks on Iranian shipping, 
Tehran’s tone changed. That month, speaker of the Iranian parliament Ali Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani told the Japanese ambassador, “We care a lot about the secu-
rity of the Persian Gulf . . . but if others do not leave it safe and want to secure only 
their own interest and thereby use it against us, perhaps then we will not let it be 
safe for anyone.”15 Iranian rhetoric intensified, but it was not until 13 May 1984, 
after dozens of ships servicing Iran were hit, that the Iranian air force retaliated 
by putting an American-made Maverick missile into the side of Umm Casbah, a 
Kuwaiti oil tanker.16
Denied Iraqi targets, Iran felt justified in targeting third-party shipping, for 
two reasons. First, it deduced that Iraq was receiving commercial goods and war 
matériel via “neutral” ports, such as those in Kuwait and the UAE. Second, the 
Arab Gulf states had tilted openly against Persian (and Shiite-ruled) Iran. Dur-
ing the war, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states gave Iraq between 
twenty-five and fifty billion dollars in financial assistance.17 Eight days after the 
Umm Casbah attack, the GCC asked the UN Security Council (UNSC) to ad-
dress Iranian aggression. The UNSC condemned Iranian actions on 1 June 1984, 
in UNSC Resolution 552, a document that demanded that there “should be no 
interference with ships en route to and from States that are not parties to the 
hostilities.” UNSC Resolution 552 made no mention of Iraqi maritime attacks, 
which were allowed under the laws of armed conflict, nor did it address Iranian 
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grievances about the thin neutrality that GCC members such as Kuwait displayed 
during the conflict.
Stymied on the battlefield and geographically isolated in the Gulf, with only 
a short list of arms suppliers, Iran must have felt increasingly isolated politically 
at this point as well. Additionally, the world’s two superpowers had weighed in 
against Iran. The Soviet Union was, of course, Iraq’s number one arms supplier. 
By 1984, the United States tilted against Iran in at least two ways. The first was 
Operation STAUNCH, its arms-restriction effort. The second was a small deploy-
ment of U.S. Air Force jets called ELF-1.
The Iran-Iraq War alarmed Saudi Arabia, which moved most of its oil through 
the Persian Gulf. Shiite Iran was a traditional foe of Sunni Saudi Arabia, which 
backed Iraq. Saudi Aramco’s massive oil-processing facility and anchorage at 
Ras Tanura is 145 kilometers from an Iranian air force base at Bushehr—a mere 
fifteen-minute flight time for an Iranian F-4 Phantom. The Saudis requested and 
received deployment of American E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control 
System (AWACS) aircraft and refueling tankers. E-3s flown by the ELF-1 mission 
stood sentinel over Ras Tanura and the western Gulf from October 1980 until the 
end of the Iran-Iraq War. The E-3s’ mission was early warning, and the deploy-
ment was defensive, but it gave U.S. and Saudi air forces eyes over the battlefield 
over a four-hundred-kilometer radius from the aircraft’s orbit.
ESCALATION AND CONTINUED AMERICAN TILTING  
TOWARD IRAQ
Iran eventually retaliated by declaring large parts of the Gulf “free fire zones” 
and striking an increasing number of tankers and merchantmen with naval and 
air forces. In the 1980s, oil was cheap, and a glut of shipping meant crews vol-
unteered to sail the Strait of Hormuz even as the tally of damaged and destroyed 
ships grew. Still, economic pressure built with the tempo of the attacks. Fifty 
ships were hit in 1985, ninety-seven in 1986.18 During the summer of 1985, Iran 
started boarding ships transiting the Gulf as well. The Strait of Hormuz made an 
excellent choke point for these operations, as it narrowed to only twenty-three 
nautical miles, and most traffic used a much narrower set of shipping lanes. Iran 
also controlled the islands of Tunb and Abu Musa, located to the west of the strait, 
and observed or launched warships from bases there.
Boarding and inspection were legal under the laws of armed conflict for the 
purposes of seizing contraband, which third parties were funneling to Iraq. On 
12 January 1986, a crew from an Iranian frigate boarded SS President Taylor, 
a U.S. ship in the Gulf of Oman, east of the Strait of Hormuz and outside the 
Persian Gulf proper. Taylor was heading to the UAE port of Fujairah to pick up 
packaged food aid bound for India. U.S. policy makers initially considered the 
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incident “a matter of serious concern,” but later conceded that the search was 
legal. Warships escorted subsequent U.S. merchantmen. In May 1986, an Iranian 
frigate tried to stop SS President McKinley during a Gulf passage but backed off 
when McKinley’s destroyer escort, USS David R. Ray, requested that it do so.19 
The United States, long a proponent of freedom of navigation, clearly felt its 
ships’ rights to avoid inspection trumped that of Iran to interdict contraband 
cargo. Fujairah was known as a transshipment point for cargo heading to Iraq, so 
Iran’s inspection efforts in the Gulf of Oman were logical. However, the United 
States in 1986, with hostages held by Iranian-backed Shiite militants in Lebanon 
and its memory still seared by the detention and torment of the fifty-four dip-
lomats seized in 1979, naturally was reluctant to allow any detention, however 
brief, of its mariners by Iran.
During this time, hull insurance rates climbed fivefold for ships heading to 
Kuwait. It appeared that Iranian antishipping efforts, while threatening shipping 
heading to all GCC countries, were paying particular attention to Kuwait-bound 
traffic, including its supertankers. The U.S. defense intelligence establishment 
had concluded as much by the fall of 1986.20 The GCC met to discuss the prob-
lem and develop protective schemes on 1 November 1986, but it did not reach a 
consensus.
Kuwait proved more interested than the others in pursuing alternative solu-
tions to the Iranian antishipping attacks. Admiral William J. Crowe, USN, Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1985–89, suggested that Saudi Arabia’s hesitance 
to seek an armed solution came from a national culture that preferred quiet di-
plomacy to resolve disputes, as well as the sheer size of the Saudi oil trade, which 
could absorb the loss of the occasional oil tanker.21 In contrast, Crowe suggested 
that Kuwait’s oil industry, while rich, was more sensitive to the threat posed to 
the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (KOTC), which was owned by the Kuwaiti royal 
family.
David Crist, a historian who wrote an academic history of Operation 
EARNEST WILL, argues that Kuwait’s precarious geostrategic position drove it to 
seek a military solution to the Iranian threat. Kuwait’s existence as an independent 
nation-state was, in the words of a former U.S. ambassador to the country, “an ac-
cident of history.”22 Iraq resented Kuwait’s existence. The country had no national 
bureaucratic or technical class. Kuwait accepted thousands of Palestinian refu-
gees after 1948. The Palestinians and their children ran much of the nation, while 
native-born Kuwaiti Bedouins reaped the benefits of the country’s oil wealth. 
As a result, Kuwait felt constantly insecure—“a defenseless state surrounded by 
wolves.”23 This encouraged diplomatic hedging. Kuwait was the only Gulf country 
with full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. It bought both Western and 
Soviet weapons. It refused to close its embassy in Tehran even after Iran bombed 
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the country and marked its merchant shipping for destruction. Of course, 
Kuwait—even while this was happening—also was assisting Iraq’s war by trans-
ferring weapons from its war stocks to Baghdad, accepting foreign military car-
goes (contraband under the laws of armed conflict) and shipping them overland 
to Iraq, and extending loans and grants to the financially strapped regime. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that in the fall of 1986, the Kuwaiti government ap-
proached both the Soviet Union and the United States to see whether those na-
tions were interested in providing security for Kuwaiti tankers.
AMERICA’S ASSESSMENT AND POLICY FORMULATION
Soviet diplomats responded by saying that Kuwaiti tankers could be reflagged 
and would receive Soviet naval protection by doing little more than hoisting 
the hammer and sickle. The American request wended its way through the U.S. 
State Department slowly. After SS President McKinley avoided being boarded and 
searched, as Taylor had been in January 1986, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
must have felt that it had solved the Gulf ’s freedom-of-navigation problem, at 
least for itself. The hull insurance market was reeling, but, with most premiums 
backed by Lloyd’s of London, this was primarily a British business problem. Op-
eration STAUNCH continued, fitfully. AWACS radar planes of the ELF-1 mission 
continued their monotonous surveillance flights, and U.S. warships occasionally 
plied the Gulf and visited their tiny base in Bahrain. Certainly, the Iran-Iraq War 
was a tragedy, and the United States clearly had tilted (although not by official 
policy) toward Iraq, but there did not seem to be reason to intervene militarily 
over Gulf maritime traffic beyond escorting U.S.-flagged vessels.
In fact, the oil markets scarcely registered the uptick of shipping attacks in 
the Gulf. In one way, Iran helped depress the flight of oil. Most of its crude was 
exported through oil terminals on Kharg Island, a perennial favorite for Iraqi air 
strikes. Iran offered steep discounts for companies willing to fuel up at Kharg, 
and even self-insured tankers for the period that they were loading. Oil prices 
had plunged since the heady days of the 1970s, when the Gulf states posted 
record profits and the West, particularly America, feared the Arab “oil weapon” 
in the shape of an embargo. Market forces fueled investments in oil exploration 
and efficiency in the 1970s, and by the early 1980s prices dropped. By November 
1986, the world was less than a year away from the introduction of the Brent spot 
market, a benchmark created on the basis of crude oil extracted from the North 
Sea that was to compete with the industry standard of West Texas Intermediate 
(WTI). Brent’s arrival indicated new abundance and a shift in the world oil mar-
ket’s center of gravity. The futures market for WTI, a benchmark for crude oil, 
started 1986 at twenty-six dollars per barrel; by Monday, 3 November—the first 
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trading day after the GCC meeting and Kuwait’s failed attempt to hammer out a 
deal on tanker security—WTI had fallen to $14.71.24
After 3 November, the U.S. government had even fewer reasons to focus on 
the tanker war in the Gulf. On that day, As Shiraa (The Sail), a Lebanese news-
paper, published a story stating that the United States was shipping weapons to 
Iran despite having sanctions against that country.25 Further revelations showed 
that the proceeds from these sales were used to fund freedom fighters battling 
Nicaragua’s communist government, in circumvention of Congress’s Boland 
Amendment. The Iran-Contra scandal had broken, and its revelation harmed 
America’s standing worldwide, especially among Arab nations, who bridled at the 
superpower’s duplicity.26 Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, USN, commander of 
Middle East naval forces, learned of the scandal during a meeting with a Lebanese 
defense official: “When I walked in the door, I realized I was in trouble,” the ad-
miral recalled. In the course of a severe dressing-down, the official told Bernsen, 
“[Y]ou can tell all of your buddies that they might as well not come around here 
anymore.”27 Handling international and domestic blowback absorbed the atten-
tion of Reagan’s national security staff, ensuring that Kuwait’s request remained 
second-page news for a while.
In contrast to the Soviets’ quick and unequivocal response, the U.S. State De-
partment, after consulting with the U.S. Coast Guard, relayed a litany of require-
ments to the Kuwaitis. These included that (1) reflagged vessels must be owned 
by a U.S. person, via a company incorporated in the United States; (2) vessels 
must be inspected by the U.S. Coast Guard for safety, to ensure, for instance, 
that they had the proper number of fire extinguishers on board; (3) vessels must 
have an American master during operation; and (4) vessels must have American 
names. While initially cool to the prospect of reflagging, U.S. administration 
officials, particularly Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, came to like 
the idea, as it would counter Soviet and Iranian objectives simultaneously while 
protecting U.S. oil supplies.
Weinberger, an avowed anticommunist, took Kuwaiti overtures to the Soviets 
seriously. Given the free world’s dependence on the Gulf ’s oil, he considered an 
increased Soviet presence there threatening, later stating, “I was, and still am, 
convinced that it was not in our interest for Soviet forces to move into an area 
so vital to us. . . . We in the West need the Gulf ’s oil resources; the Soviets are 
more than self-sufficient in oil. Their position in the Gulf, should they achieve 
a vital presence there, could only be one of denial toward us. They would gain a 
tremendous strategic advantage I did not want them to have.”28 American defense 
planners did not want to open the Strait of Hormuz to the Soviet navy one inch. 
Weinberger dismissed claims that his enthusiasm for the reflagging constituted 
95
Naval War College: Spring 2020 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 9 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
the United States being “played” by the Soviets. Oil fueled the free world’s econ-
omy, and U.S. strategists loathed the thought of the Soviets being in a position to 
interdict its movement.
Admiral Crowe also concurred with the reflagging plan. While he agreed that 
Weinberger’s dual objectives were sound, the chairman thought that relationship 
building justified the action; “it seemed to me that reflagging would go a long way 
toward mending our fences in the region.”29 Crowe had experience working in the 
Middle East and had participated in negotiating basing rights for the U.S. Navy in 
Bahrain in the 1970s. Additionally, Crowe hinted in his memoirs that ideational 
factors—a visceral antipathy for Iran—may have affected his support. The USN 
ships already in the Gulf witnessed many of Iran’s attacks on neutral shipping. 
These captains did not see a blockaded Iran striking back at Arabs smuggling 
war matériel into Iraq; they only heard calls for help on the radio as Iranian ships 
attacked merchantmen and observed the aftermath of damaged ships bearing the 
flags and crews of U.S. allies. Historian Harold Wise captured the sentiment of 
USN sailors prior to EARNEST WILL.
One Iranian ship . . . named Sabalan, gained a notorious reputation for these activi-
ties. The captain of Sabalan, known as Captain Nasty to Americans, would board 
tankers bound for Kuwait, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia, and pretend to carry out a friendly 
inspection . . . then, once the charade was over, Captain Nasty would order an attack 
on his defenseless prey. Often, Captain Nasty would send a parting message by radio 
to his victim and say “Have a nice day.” . . . Many times, American ships watched 
helplessly as both sides [Iran and Iraq] left merchants and tankers in flames.30
Stories such as that of Captain Nasty would have been related to the Navy 
ships’ local commander, Admiral Bernsen, and likely upward in the chain of 
command to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Crowe. Crowe may have 
had Sabalan in mind when he recalled his feelings toward Iranian conduct in 
the Gulf: “During my recent Gulf visit I had heard firsthand from the Middle 
East Force’s commanders and men about the unprovoked and murderous attacks 
they were witnessing. They were a frustrated group of sailors; they hated to have 
to restrain themselves while atrocities were carried out in front of their eyes.”31 
Neither Crowe’s nor Weinberger’s memoirs comment on Iraq’s also-murderous 
and equally illegal use of chemical weapons against civilians. While offshore 
balancing, oil supply, and loyalty to local allies were important, subconsciously 
he may have viewed the Iranians’ real crimes as threefold. First, they had held 
Americans hostage—American diplomats in Tehran and other American citizens 
held by Hezbollah in Lebanon. Second, they gloated over America’s military fail-
ure during the hostage rescue mission. Third, by attacking neutral shipping with 
impunity, they made the Persian Gulf an area of lawlessness, and by extension 
made the American naval forces on hand look powerless.
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As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe was the highest- 
ranking military officer in the nation. He also was, by statute, the president’s mili-
tary adviser. However, he was outside the chain of command for military opera-
tions; those plans ran through Secretary Weinberger. So while Admiral Crowe’s 
recommendation carried considerable weight, Secretary Weinberger spoke with 
the official DoD voice on reflagging.
The reflagging proposal was debated within the U.S. National Security Coun-
cil (NSC) interagency process. DoD and the NSC were for reflagging, while the 
State Department was against it. President Reagan concurred with the DoD/NSC 
position. On 17 March 1987, Admiral Crowe delivered America’s formal offer 
to Kuwait’s emir, Sheikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah, to escort KOTC’s oil tankers, 
either under their Kuwaiti flags or as properly reflagged American ships.32
Around the same time, the administration alerted Congress to its intentions. 
The reflagging would not require extra appropriations. Although the actual 
exchange of flags would be done “by the book,” according to U.S. Coast Guard 
regulations, DoD tried to expedite certain steps. Administration lawyers felt they 
did not need legislation to authorize the escort. The 1973 War Powers Resolution 
had set tough notification and approval requirements on a president regarding 
the use of military forces, but Weinberger thought these approval procedures 
did not apply to the reflagging; and Reagan, like all presidents since its pass-
ing, considered the War Powers Resolution unconstitutional. Admiral Crowe 
recalled congressional opposition during hearings on the reflagging as intense. 
Weinberger, a career politician and former legislator, considered it desultory 
posturing by opposition Democrats. The Iran-Contra scandal was a much bigger 
deal for Congress. Senator John G. Tower had released a report on the scandal 
on 25 February 1987, identifying administration errors. The Tower Commission 
had settled nothing, however. Another congressional entity with a wider scope 
and subpoena power was authorized in January 1987, and it was preparing for 
hearings during the reflagging debate.33
On 15 May 1987, KOTC lawyers finished the paperwork that created Chesa-
peake Shipping Inc., a corporation based in Dover, Delaware, that had “no 
employees, with ‘offices’ consisting of a mail drop at another company that 
specialized in dummy corporations, and controlling assets (the tankers) valued 
at approximately $350 million.”34 At this point, Operation EARNEST WILL was 
ready to start.
However, two days later an Iraqi Mirage jet hit USS Stark, a frigate, with two 
missiles. Stark had been conducting routine patrolling activities in the central 
Persian Gulf when it was hit. Heroic crew efforts extinguished fires and saved the 
ship from sinking, but the impact and conflagration killed thirty-seven sailors. 
Congress was livid. On 22 May 1987, the Senate demanded more information on 
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EARNEST WILL, and by the next day a congressional delegation of investigators 
had arrived at the U.S. naval base in Bahrain to interview survivors. Iraq imme-
diately apologized. The Navy investigation assessed the incident to have been an 
accident—the Mirage had been looking for shipping bound for Iran.
Stark had missile countermeasures, but had not defended itself, because it 
did not see the Iraqi aircraft as a threat. The problem was as much cognitive as 
technological. Naval tacticians long had feared combat in the congested Persian 
Gulf; American ships were designed for combat in open oceans. Admiral Crowe, 
among others, noted that encounters in the Gulf ’s confines left little time for hu-
mans to interpret data, identify a threat, and take countermeasures. Because of 
this, America’s aircraft carriers remained in the open waters of the Indian Ocean 
for the duration of EARNEST WILL.
While the crew of USS Stark made mistakes, the Iraqi Mirage pilot was grossly 
negligent. He carried sophisticated radar and other sensors, yet did not identify 
that his target was a 4,100-ton Perry-class frigate instead of his desired prey: a 
two-hundred-thousand-ton very large crude carrier (i.e., a supertanker).
Despite this fact, America quickly blamed Iran for the tragedy. The day after 
the attack Reagan stated during a press conference that “the villain in this piece 
really is Iran.”35 On 20 May 1987, Secretary of State George P. Shultz wrote to 
Congress, “Quite apart from the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark, Iran continues 
publicly and privately to threaten shipping in the Gulf. It is this basic Iranian 
threat to the free flow of oil and to the principle of freedom of navigation which 
is unacceptable.”36 The anti-Iranian narrative continued.
Nothing had changed to tilt U.S. policy in the region away from supporting 
Iraq in strategy or narrative. On 16 June 1987, Michael Armacost, the Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, addressed the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee to justify EARNEST WILL. Regarding the Iran-Iraq War, he testified 
that “[w]e do not wish to see an Iranian victory in that terrible conflict.” Yet in the 
very next sentence he stressed, “Nevertheless, the United States remains formally 
neutral in the war.”37
Because of the Stark incident, America’s “neutral intervention” now grew in 
scope. Congress insisted that the Navy establish robust rules of engagement. The 
rules would, for instance, have allowed Stark to order the Mirage to change course 
as it approached or to open fire on it if it refused. The Navy now planned to send 
more ships to the Gulf as well. Weinberger told General George B. Crist, USMC, 
commander of the EARNEST WILL JTF, to ask for any asset he felt he needed to 
conduct the operation.38 In June, Weinberger convinced the Saudis to let the 
EARNEST WILL JTF connect the radar feeds from the ELF-1 surveillance aircraft 
to its naval ships, giving the United States better situational awareness.
98
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/1
 M A RV I N  9 3
The Reagan administration initiated a strategic communications campaign 
to address congressional opposition and political posturing. Under Secretary 
Armacost and Secretary Weinberger both delivered lengthy statements to con-
gressional committees on U.S. policy. In justifying EARNEST WILL and Stark’s 
sacrifice, the statements described strategic concerns of encroaching Soviet 
influence in the Gulf as well as economic ones regarding free flow of commerce.
Oil, of course, was the key element of this commerce. Armacost testified that 
“[t]he unimpeded flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz is a vital interest.”39 
Vital interests generally are understood to be those over which America is pre-
pared to fight. A subsequent national security document defined them as “those 
directly connected to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation.”40 Armacost 
reiterated the Carter Doctrine’s affirmation that “[a]n attempt by any outside 
force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on 
the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be 
repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”41 EARNEST WILL was 
the Carter Doctrine’s first explicit test.
In addition to the Soviets’ geopolitical threat, America had a collective psy-
chological fear of oil shortages. President Reagan addressed this concern during 
a 29 May 1987 radio address. In justifying EARNEST WILL, Reagan recalled the 
1970s oil shocks and their deleterious effects on the U.S. economy. He argued that 
“[t]his could happen again if Iran and the Soviet Union were able to impose their 
will upon the friendly Arab States of the Persian Gulf, and Iran was allowed to 
block the free passage of neutral shipping.”42
AN UNDECLARED WAR WITH IRAN
Iran did not acquiesce to the convoys’ presence when the larger and more ag-
gressive JTF started EARNEST WILL. The Iranians continued to strike neutral 
shipping with aircraft and ships. They directly challenged the United States by 
laying mines along convoy routes (while denying constantly that they were doing 
so). The Iranian navy acted aggressively toward U.S. forces supporting the convoy 
missions. Three distinct Iranian actions—the mining of SS Bridgeton, the attack 
on SS Sea Isle City, and the mining of USS Samuel B. Roberts—prompted the U.S. 
military to retaliate against Iran with military force.
The first EARNEST WILL convoy did not take place until 22 July 1987, when 
USS Kidd and USS Fox escorted SS Bridgeton, an ultralarge crude carrier that dis-
placed four hundred thousand tons. Bridgeton, nominally homeported in Phila-
delphia, had until shortly before this convoy been the Kuwaiti ship Al-Rekkah. In 
a bit of irony, Kidd, a state-of-the-art destroyer designed for work in the tropics, 
originally had been ordered and bought by prerevolutionary Iran. After the shah’s 
ousting and the cessation of weapons transfers, the U.S. Navy took the ship.
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The convoy started inauspiciously: Bridgeton hit a mine on 24 July 1987, while 
transiting the Gulf to pick up crude oil in Kuwait. The explosion punctured the 
tanker but did not stop it. As if it were not enough that its escorts could not pro-
tect it, Kidd and Fox escaped the minefield by having Bridgeton lead while the 
warships followed in its wake; sailors reckoned that a four-hundred-thousand-
ton supertanker in ballast is nearly impossible to sink with mines, while a 7,900-
ton destroyer loaded with fuel and ammunition was at considerable risk.
The Navy reacted to the Bridgeton mining by launching an offensive to find 
and destroy the Iranian minelayer. Washington reinforced the EARNEST WILL JTF 
with special operations forces (SOFs) and intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance assets that could find and track the civilian Iranian ships suspected of 
laying mines surreptitiously. On 21 September 1987, they succeeded. SOF heli-
copters, working at night, caught the fishing ship Iran Ajr in the act. U.S. SOFs 
captured Iran Ajr in a daring raid and the Navy videotaped its deadly cargo for 
the world to see.
On 16 October 1987, an Iranian Silkworm missile hit SS Sea Isle City. The 
United States responded by destroying an oil platform.
When Samuel B. Roberts hit a mine on 14 April 1988, the United States ratch-
eted up its response. Unlike Bridgeton, which survived with a small hole, “Sammy 
B” burned, flooded, and almost sank. In retaliation, Admiral Crowe ordered the 
JTF to destroy two oil platforms and a frigate: “sink the Sabalan,” Crowe cabled 
the commander; “put it on the bottom.”43 In a one-day offensive code-named 
Operation PRAYING MANTIS, the EARNEST WILL JTF destroyed the platforms, 
several speedboats, and damaged Sabalan. Unsatisfied with a partial victory, a 
surface task force located the frigate Joshan. USS Wainwright signaled the Joshan 
crew, “Stop and abandon ship, I intend to sink you.”44 Joshan responded with a 
missile that missed its target; USS Simpson responded with four that did not. 
Simpson’s salvo, along with a flurry of gunfire from other ships in the task force, 
destroyed Joshan and earned Simpson its rare distinction as a ship killer.
Amazingly, Iranian provocations continued until the Iran Air Flight 655 trag-
edy. On 3 July 1988, USS Vincennes, while under attack by Iranian speedboats, 
mistook a civilian Airbus airliner for an attacking fighter aircraft and shot it 
down. The United States paid sixty-one million dollars in compensation while 
denying guilt for the incident. Vice President George H. W. Bush summed up 
America’s position regarding the downing of the Airbus during a speech at the 
UNSC. “The critical issue confronting this body is not the how and why of Iran 
Air 655. It is the continuing refusal of the Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran to comply with Resolution 598, to negotiate an end to the war with Iraq, 
and to cease its acts of aggression against neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf.”45
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Iran garnered little sympathy at the United Nations. America’s unofficial war 
in the Persian Gulf was preceded by the United States blaming Iran for a mistaken 
attack launched by the Iraqis. The war then concluded, in a sense, with the United 
States blaming Iran for the mistaken attack against Iran Air 655. There were no 
more major engagements after Vincennes’s incident with the speedboats and the 
downing of Iran Air Flight 655. By July 1988, Iran was defeated thoroughly on 
the battlefield. The Vincennes episode and PRAYING MANTIS both coincided with 
Iraqi victories. An exhausted Iran sued for peace later in July—which Supreme 
Leader Ali Khamenei likened to “drinking hemlock for me.”46 EARNEST WILL 
continued escorting tankers quietly until December 1989.47
TWO FACTORS OF EXPLANATION
The Scourge of Communism and Reagan’s Response: Ideological Drivers Spark 
a Great-Power Competition
The threat of the Soviet Union involving itself in the Persian Gulf proved to be 
the most powerful driver of American foreign policy preceding EARNEST WILL. 
The fear that the Soviet Union would escort Kuwaiti oil tankers and thereby 
gain a foothold in the Persian Gulf—the fuel tank of the free world’s oil-based 
economy—motivated the United States to counter the Soviets’ offer. The Soviet 
threat mobilized Washington in a way that years of carnage, attacks on neutral 
shipping, including oil supplies, and deep-seated hatred of the Iranian govern-
ment could not. Public statements from DoD and the State Department as well 
as President Reagan’s own comments cited the centrality of the Soviet communist 
threat in justifying EARNEST WILL. There is little chance that this was posturing 
simply for public consumption; the fear of communism in the United States (and 
particularly in the Republican Party) was strong and long-standing, and anticom-
munism was a central tenet of the Reagan administration.
From the start, Marxist-Leninist Moscow and laissez-faire Washington had 
diametrically opposed worldviews. Lenin summed up the Manichaean struggle 
as follows: “As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace: in 
the end, one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung either over 
the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism.”48 Reagan was very much aware of 
and in agreement with Lenin’s view on the dichotomy; in 1983, during a speech 
to the National Association of Evangelicals, he likened the communist leadership 
to a demon depicted in the C. S. Lewis novel The Screwtape Letters, and called the 
USSR an “evil empire.”
After an alliance of convenience during World War II, this conflict morphed 
into great-power competition and solidified into the Cold War. The struggle’s 
early phases were marked by the Truman Doctrine and the policy of containment, 
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both of which sought to box in the Soviet Union and respond to provocations in 
countries such as Greece, Turkey, and South Korea. A rebuilt Europe and, espe-
cially, a unified Germany were great sources of potential power. Superpowers 
contended over them, as they did countries on the periphery such as Greece, 
Turkey, Israel, and Kuwait.
The Persian Gulf was an active Cold War theater. America’s first brush with 
oil shortage, the 1973 embargo, was driven by great-power politics. America’s 
support for Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War that so inflamed Arab senti-
ments was part of a balancing act against the Soviet client states of Egypt and 
Syria. During EARNEST WILL, America was in Bahrain, as a tenant at a small na-
val base, because it had subsumed Britain’s regional security responsibilities after 
British forces withdrew in 1971. Laissez-faire America could have relied on the 
free market to keep oil flowing, but it decided that it was important to prevent a 
hegemon from taking charge in the region. So it put in place its small naval pres-
ence and promoted the twin-pillar policies of supporting rivals Iran and Saudi 
Arabia to police the area.
Even the nation’s core strategy for the Middle East, the Carter Doctrine, is at its 
heart about great-power politics. The shah fled Iran in January 1979; the Carter 
Doctrine was not promulgated until the January 1980 State of the Union address. 
Iranian destabilization was a critical foreign policy problem, but the precipitating 
event for the speech was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. 
The Soviets are mentioned thirty-two times in Carter’s 1980 speech, Iran only six. 
America’s pledge to prevent Soviet hegemony in the Persian Gulf was consonant 
with its grand strategy of containment and its regional strategy of keeping the 
Soviets away from critical resources. John Mearsheimer offers Reagan’s execution 
of the Carter Doctrine / containment as a successful example of offshore balanc-
ing, as it relied primarily on proxies and, when needed, used expeditionary forces 
rather than those stationed at permanent forward bases.49
In this context, it should not be surprising that a threat of Soviet involvement 
in the Gulf, however slight, prompted an American response. Kuwait previously 
had been a British protectorate; although not a liberal nation, it previously had 
been in the American orbit. The Islamic Revolution shifted Iran to the neutral 
column, and this concerned the United States greatly. Also, while the United 
States faced (conventional) parity or (nuclear) mutually assured destruction on 
potential battlefields such as those in Korea or central Europe, it had the potential 
to exert hegemony in the Persian Gulf theater. Reagan greatly expanded the Navy, 
to nearly six hundred ships. It could support EARNEST WILL and more, without 
removing aircraft carrier battle groups from critical sea-lanes in the Atlantic and 
Pacific. In contrast, the Soviet navy’s strength was its submarines. Its surface craft 
were few and could not operate for long in the Gulf, since they lacked forward 
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operating bases. While the Soviets lacked staying power, America could use its 
bases in Bahrain and Diego Garcia (the latter in the Indian Ocean) to support its 
military escort strategy and political objectives of boxing out the Soviets.
Secretary of Defense Weinberger unequivocally identified Soviet involvement 
as a threat the United States must avoid, even if it played into Kuwait’s hands. The 
position of Secretary of State Shultz was less hard-line; he supported EARNEST 
WILL, but accepted the possibility of some minimal Soviet naval presence in the 
Gulf, to avoid giving the Kuwaitis what they wanted. Still, his position was clear. 
“The idea of the Soviets playing a key maritime role in the Gulf had no appeal to 
us.”50 He describes the reflagging as one of the few times he and Weinberger saw 
eye to eye on a military matter.
The Reagan administration’s official rationale on reflagging, delivered to Con-
gress by Under Secretary Armacost, listed protecting Kuwait from Iran first and 
prevention of Soviet influence second. Yet this ignores the fact that neither the 
United States nor the world oil markets cared one bit about Kuwait’s predicament 
until the country approached the Soviets—and let the United States know about 
it—in the fall of 1987.
EARNEST WILL was classic offensive realist offshore balancing. The United 
States kept the Soviet Union and Iran out, and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in, 
while avoiding a permanent large garrison in the Gulf (its base in Bahrain was 
tiny). Reagan’s desire to confront perceived Soviet expansion more aggressively 
does much to explain the foreign policy decision to engage in EARNEST WILL. 
Its explanatory power stands in contrast to the proximate reason for Kuwait’s 
predicament. Protection of oil flows, as shown in the next section, played little 
strategic role in EARNEST WILL, despite the strategic proclamations of the Carter 
Doctrine and the administration’s communication efforts to remind Congress of 
its importance to the U.S. economy.
The Global Commons and Protecting Oil Flow— 
a Mediocre Explanation of Events
In his memoir, Secretary of Defense Weinberger justified EARNEST WILL as an 
effort to keep Soviet influence out of the Gulf. However, while he mentioned the 
Soviet threat during his June 1987 testimony to Congress, in this public forum 
oil and economic arguments took center stage—he mentioned them at least six 
times. The Persian Gulf was a vital interest, he testified. “Our ability to continue 
to develop economically and to maintain the way of life we are accustomed to 
depends on our unimpeded access to this oil.”51
President Reagan’s messaging during a 29 May 1987 press briefing matched 
that of his Defense Secretary. Reagan’s remarks occurred shortly after the Iraqi 
missile hit USS Stark and one week after the Senate formally requested more 
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information on Operation EARNEST WILL. Reagan hits the domestic implications 
of the Gulf crisis hard and early.
It may be easy for some, after a near record 54-month economic recovery, to forget 
just how critical the Persian Gulf is to our national security. But I think everyone in 
this room and everyone hearing my voice now can remember the woeful impact of 
the Middle East oil crisis of a few years ago: the endless, demoralizing gas lines; the 
shortages; the rationing; the escalating energy prices; the double-digit inflation; and 
the enormous dislocation that shook our economy to its foundations.52
Yet while the public messaging around EARNEST WILL focused on the resource 
narrative, neither politicians’ memoirs nor military planning accounts show an 
immediate or quantifiable concern over oil access. Despite quotations of bar-
rels exported, forecasts of America’s future reliance on Gulf oil, and evocations 
(implicit and explicit) of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, oil was cheap in 1987, and 
concern—on the part of both policy makers and the public and congressmen they 
sought to influence—was ideational.
Domestic fears of oil shortages dated back to the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which 
Arab oil producers had imposed in retaliation for America’s steadfast support of 
Israel during the Yom Kippur War. Although the actual supply disruption was 
neither complete nor lengthy, it shocked the country. The 1979 Iranian Revolu-
tion brought a new series of oil shocks and spectacular price hikes—from four-
teen to thirty-five dollars per barrel by 1981.53 But the shocks also encouraged ex-
ploration and technology. By the time of Operation EARNEST WILL, oil was cheap 
despite the blockade of Umm Qasr and the occasional sinking of tankers bearing 
Kuwaiti, Saudi, or Iranian crude destined for the world market. Yet American 
consumers remained psychologically vulnerable to the threat of oil price spikes.
The Iran-Iraq War had little long-term effect on global oil prices. Iraq’s initial 
invasion did cause a price spike; a barrel of crude rose from fifty-three dollars in 
September 1980 to sixty-three dollars by February 1981, a 19 percent increase, 
as Iran and Iraq assiduously bombed and shelled each other’s oil infrastructure.54 
But the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (i.e., OPEC) replaced 
all crude oil taken off the market by the war within a few months of the war’s 
onset, and prices dropped to prewar levels by mid-1982. During this period, 
America’s concerns were geopolitical more than economic. Iran was an Islamic 
republic seeking to export revolution, and the United States tilted against Iran as 
a result. Iraq escaped censure in the UNSC even though it was the aggressor, and 
the United States launched Operation STAUNCH against Iran.
The expansion of the conflict into the tanker war likewise did not move the 
markets. Iranian and Iraqi oil exports actually expanded slightly when the tanker 
war began.55 The market situation was unchanged by 1986 the year Kuwait grew 
concerned about its fleet. Prices fluctuated quite a bit in 1986 (price fluctuations 
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on the futures market averaged forty cents per day, compared with a historical 
average of twenty cents per day from 1983 to 2015), but when Kuwait made its 
overtures to the superpowers in November, a futures contract for a barrel stood 
at $14.71—far below the price at the beginning of the year (2 January) of $25.56.56 
To be sure, insurance rates rose fivefold during this time. At one point, under-
writers judged the Gulf to be more dangerous than sea-lanes during World War 
II.57 At times it was impossible to insure a supertanker filling up at Iran’s Kharg 
Island; Iran had to self-insure. Yet this was a problem for the sailors. And for the 
insurance market; Lloyd’s of London controlled most of the premiums, but 10 
Downing Street made no offer to Kuwait to protect its tankers, nor did it call for 
an international escorting scheme. Once EARNEST WILL started, Secretary Wein-
berger asked the British whether they would like to participate, but America’s 
greatest ally demurred.58
Geography made Kuwait’s risks political and unique. The country sought a 
political solution to the risk, and America’s response, while tied to Kuwait’s oil 
wealth, was underpinned by geopolitical competition first and market funda-
mentals second. EARNEST WILL would not have happened without the oil, but 
the oil market did not drive American policy makers. An analysis of oil market 
fundamentals during the tanker war, reinforced by the silence on the oil situation 
in key memoirs, makes it clear that arguments about oil in front of Congress ad-
dressed theoretical concerns and amounted to debating points aimed at getting 
congressional approval.
Oil was a factor in EARNEST WILL, but it was a nested factor. If Kuwait chose 
the Soviet Union to escort all eleven of its tankers, it might spark a permanent 
Soviet presence in the Gulf. This might embolden the Soviets to seize control of 
the Gulf one day, even though doing so would require incorporating several large 
countries (in terms of both population and geography) in an opposed campaign. 
If this were successful, the Soviets—a net oil exporter already—might decide to 
keep the extra oil off the market (although it had exported oil throughout its 
history, even during the 1920s—when it was a pariah state). This would have a 
serious effect on the U.S. economy, as had previous regional disruptions in 1973, 
1978, and 1979. Still, it is critical to understand that this is a nested factor, as in a 
matryoshka doll. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Energy 
may have been paying close attention to the oil flow during the tanker war, but 
they did not raise an alarm. Oil security may have helped sell the deployment, but 
the rationale behind the deployment was power geopolitics.
Basil Liddell Hart wrote that the objective of war is to secure a better peace.59 In 
that sense, EARNEST WILL succeeded in this episode of offshore balancing during 
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the long Cold War. America kept the Soviets out; the Kuwaitis in; and the Iranians 
down, to the extent that they sued for peace within a year of the operation’s onset.
First, the JTF protected the KOTC’s reflagged (and therefore American) super-
tankers. While the Soviets did make a show of sending a few warships to the Gulf, 
they did not attempt to challenge U.S. regional hegemony.
Second, EARNEST WILL began to bring the mercurial Kuwaiti royal family into 
America’s orbit. This process would be complete three years later when, following 
DESERT STORM, the world’s most powerful democracy liberated the tiny country 
and reinstalled its royal family as rulers without a whisper about potential politi-
cal reforms, such as moving toward a representative government. Additionally, 
the reflagging effort improved U.S. standing with GCC members, particularly 
Saudi Arabia. GCC members previously had been disappointed with America’s 
inability to approve arms-transfer deals for sophisticated weapons its members 
demanded. Also, America’s strategic approach in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and 
Lebanon had given some nations the impression that the United States was a 
fickle ally, likely to cut and run. The fact that the United States stayed in the Gulf 
after the casualties of the USS Stark incident, and that its sailors obviously had 
no compunctions against closing with and destroying the Iranian navy, renewed 
the value of American military friendship in the region.
Third, EARNEST WILL contributed to defeating Iran. The second half of 
EARNEST WILL coincided with a spectacular series of Iraqi victories. Iran’s navy, 
with its missile-armed frigates and covert minelayers, was one of the country’s 
comparative advantages over Iraq. But EARNEST WILL neutralized it, along with 
any hope Tehran had that a maritime-interdiction campaign would isolate Iraq 
or convince GCC members to deny Baghdad vital financial support. The JTF’s 
largest operation against the Iranian navy, Operation PRAYING MANTIS, was by 
coincidence launched simultaneously with Iraq’s massive ground attack to retake 
the strategic al-Faw peninsula. This reinforced the existing attitude in Tehran 
that Washington and Baghdad were coordinating in their war against the Islamic 
republic. After Vincennes’s tragic downing of an Iranian civilian Airbus, Iran 
quickly sued for peace. In his letter to UN secretary general Javier Pérez de Cuél-
lar, Supreme Leader Khamenei identified the aircraft’s downing as an example of 
widening the war and a direct cause of his desire to offer peace terms.60
The EARNEST WILL episode suggests that the principles of strategy (such as 
containment) matter, but that specific foreign policy formulations will require 
improvisation within strategic confines. When the Kuwaitis approached the 
United States with the reflagging proposal, American policy makers did not 
respond from the Carter Doctrine playbook, and they did not approach the 
problem as rational actors strictly seeking the optimal response to the royal fam-
ily’s overture. They did, however, act within the framework of the decades-old 
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strategy of containment. America’s desire to stymie the Soviet Union and keep 
it from obtaining hegemony in the Persian Gulf proved a powerful catalyst to 
get the United States involved. Still, while the specific strategy framework was 
preexisting, the details of the American response were ad hoc. Policy makers 
improvised actions that were specific to the tanker threat’s time and place. Kuwait 
seized the initiative in the reflagging episode by making simultaneous overtures 
for assistance to both Washington and Moscow. When American leaders formed 
a policy to address this development, that policy was shaped by their notions of 
containment, their fear of Soviet influence, and their antipathy toward Iran. The 
United States responded forcefully to the threat of a few Soviet escorts in the Gulf 
even though it had done little regarding all the Iranian navy had done up to that 
point, including boarding a U.S. ship.
During any future inevitable policy improvisations, policy makers would do 
well to drill down into their key assumptions. For instance, oil is indeed critical to 
the world economy, but for all the success of EARNEST WILL there is no evidence 
the operation was necessary to secure the flow of crude oil through the Strait of 
Hormuz or a decent price for it on the world spot and futures markets; macro-
economic factors far outweighed the JTF’s efforts in this regard. EARNEST WILL 
was, in one sense, a subsidy for Kuwaiti crude—another point that policy makers 
should ponder when they determine future interventions in the Persian Gulf or 
other places rich in commodities.
However, in the greater context of containment, EARNEST WILL succeeded, 
and it did so without creating an open-ended military commitment. In an era 
of strained resources and multiple theaters vying for attention, policy makers 
should ensure that, given the uncertainty of any military action, capabilities are 
well matched to objective ends. As Richard Betts has observed, “strategy fails 
when means prove insufficient to the ends.”61 EARNEST WILL paid off because of 
military overmatch and America’s strong commitment to containing an existen-
tial threat—factors that are not always present.
N O T E S
 1. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger 
certainly called the operation a success in 
his memoir Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical 
Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner 
Books, 1990). Historians David Brainard 
Crist, in “Operation Earnest Will: The United 
States in the Persian Gulf, 1986–1989” (PhD 
dissertation, Florida State Univ., 1998), and 
Harold Lee Wise, in Inside the Danger Zone: 
The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987–
1988 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2007), also speak favorably of its outcome.
 2. Barry Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation 
for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
Univ. Press, 2014), p. 1; John Lewis Gaddis, 
“What Is Grand Strategy?” (keynote address 
presented at the Triangle Institute for Security 
107
Naval War College: Spring 2020 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 1 0 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Studies colloquium, Durham, NC, February 
2009).
 3. Ionut Popescu, “Design and Emergence in the 
Making of American Grand Strategy” (PhD 
dissertation, Duke Univ., 2013).
 4. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, 
Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for  
Decision-Makers (New York: Free Press, 
1986); Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at 
War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and 
the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992). Thinking 
in Time is the seminal work on the poten-
tial value of structured thinking in national 
security; Analogies at War contains powerful 
case studies on the consequences of poorly 
structured thinking—specifically, bad ana-
logical reasoning.
 5. Michael H. Armacost, “U.S. Policy in the 
Persian Gulf and Kuwaiti Reflagging,” DISAM 
Journal 10, no. 1 (Fall 1987). 
 6. Thomas Robb, “The ‘Limit of What Is Toler-
able’: British Defence Cuts and the ‘Special 
Relationship,’ 1974–1976,” Diplomacy and 
Statecraft 22, no. 2 (June 2011), pp. 321–37.
 7. Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power: Constancy 
and Change in United States Foreign Policy 
from Truman to Johnson (New York: Colum-
bia Univ. Press, 1983), p. 509.
 8. Steven A. Yetiv, The Absence of Grand Strat-
egy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 
1972–2005 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
Univ. Press, 2008), p. 44. This work explains 
the conciliatory efforts that the Carter admin-
istration employed after the departure of the 
shah and before the hostage crisis.
 9. Keith Coulter, “Operation Eagle Claw: 
Explaining a Foreign Policy Failure” (thesis, 
Carleton Univ., 1995), p. 393.
 10. Bruce Riedel, “Lessons from America’s First 
War with Iran,” Fletcher Forum of World Af-
fairs 37, no. 2 (Summer 2013), pp. 101–106.
 11. Kamran Mofid, The Economic Consequences 
of the Gulf War (London: Routledge, 1990),  
p. 147.
 12. “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database,” Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, www 
.sipri.org/.
 13. Armacost, “U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf 
and Kuwaiti Reflagging,” p. 15.
 14. Martin Navias and E. R. Hooton, Tanker 
Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping 
during the Iran-Iraq Crisis, 1980–1988 (New 
York: Tauris, 1996), p. 36.
 15. Ibid., p. 62.
 16. Ibid., p. 77.
 17. Crist, “Operation Earnest Will,” p. 43.
 18. Navias and Hooton, who had access to insur-
ance records from Lloyd’s of London, have 
multiple tables in Tanker Wars comprising the 
definitive list of commercial ships damaged 
during the tanker war.
 19. Crist, “Operation Earnest Will,” p. 62.
 20. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 387.
 21. William J. Crowe [Adm., USN], with David 
Chanoff, The Line of Fire: From Washington 
to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New 
Military (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 
p. 176.
 22. Crist, “Operation Earnest Will,” p. 62.
 23. Ibid., p. 68.
 24. “West Texas Intermediate Future Price Da-
tabase,” U.S. Energy Information Administra-
tion, 16 April 2016, www.eia.gov/.
 25. Malcolm Byrne, “Iran-Contra: Who Leaked 
Ronald Reagan’s 1985–1986 Arms-for-
Hostages Deals?,” Unredacted: The National 
Security Archives (blog), 4 November 2014, 
unredacted.com/.
 26. President Reagan’s efforts to roll back 
communist dictatorship in Nicaragua met 
resistance from an active Congress. Edward 
Boland, a Massachusetts representative and 
chairman of the House Intelligence Commit-
tee, authored the eponymous amendments to 
the annual national defense authorization acts 
that restricted the administration’s ability to 
render aid to rebels in Nicaragua. Actions by 
administration officials to circumvent these 
laws and escape congressional oversight on 
the issue led to the Iran-Contra scandal.
 27. Wise, Inside the Danger Zone, p. 5.
 28. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 389.
 29. Crowe, The Line of Fire, p. 181.
 30. Wise, Inside the Danger Zone, p. 9.
 31. Crowe, The Line of Fire, p. 179.
 32. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, pp. 396–97.
108
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/1
 M A RV I N  1 0 3
 33. H. Select Comm. to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran and S. Select Comm. 
on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and 
the Nicaraguan Opposition, Report of the 
Congressional Committees Investigating the 
Iran-Contra Affair, S. Rep. No. 100-216, H.R. 
Rep. No. 100-433 (1987).
 34. Wise, Inside the Danger Zone, p. 12.
 35. Ibid., p. 44.
 36. Ibid.
 37. Armacost, “U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf 
and Kuwaiti Reflagging,” p. 14.
 38. Crist, “Operation Earnest Will,” p. 104.
 39. Armacost, “U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf 
and Kuwaiti Reflagging,” p. 11.
 40. James F. Miskel, “National Interests: Grand 
Purposes or Catchphrases?,” Naval War Col-
lege Review 55, no. 4 (Autumn 2002), p. 99.
 41. Jimmy Carter, “The State of the Union 
Address Delivered before a Joint Session of 
the Congress,” 23 January 1980, American 
Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/.
 42. Ronald Reagan, “Remarks on United States 
Policy in the Persian Gulf,” 29 May 1987, 
American Presidency Project, www 
.presidency.ucsb.edu/.
 43. Crist, “Operation Earnest Will,” p. 213.
 44. Ibid., p. 222.
 45. Ibid., p. 240.
 46. James G. Blight et al., Becoming Enemies: 
US-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 
1979–1988 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Little-
field, 2012), p. 346.
 47. Wise, Inside the Danger Zone, p. 233.
 48. Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory A. Ray-
mond, The Global Future: A Brief Introduction 
to World Politics (Boston: Wadsworth, 2011), 
p. 90.
 49. John J. Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 
National Interest 111 (January/February 
2011), pp. 16–34.
 50. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: 
Diplomacy, Power, and the Victory of the 
American Deal (New York: Scribner’s, 1993), 
p. 926.
 51. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 2.
 52. Reagan, “Remarks on United States Policy.”
 53. “Crude Oil Prices, Monthly Historical Data,” 
Illinois Oil and Gas Association, www.ioga 
.com/.
 54. Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, “Protecting 
‘the Prize’: Oil and the U.S. National Interest,” 
Security Studies 19, no. 3 (July 2010), pp. 
453–85.
 55. Ibid., p. 468.
 56. “Analysis of EIA Data on Historical WTI 
Prices,” U.S. Energy Information Administra-
tion, www.eia.gov/.
 57. Richard Lapper, “Insurance: Foundering in 
the Gulf,” South 84 (October 1987), p. 75.
 58. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 398.
 59. Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: 
Praeger, 1967), p. 353.
 60. Blight et al., Becoming Enemies, p. 347.
 61. Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” 
International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000),  
p. 50.
109
Naval War College: Spring 2020 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
“IMPROBABLE ALLIES”
The North Korean Downing of a U.S. Navy EC-121 and U.S.-Soviet 
Cooperation during the Cold War
Bill Streifer and Irek Sabitov
A U.S. Navy reconnaissance plane with 31 men aboard is reported 
missing in the Sea of Japan. The North Koreans are boasting that they 
have “shot down an American spy plane.” The information triggers a 
unique, massive, multinational sea and air search for possible survi-
vors of the EC-121. The cast includes improbable rescuers—Russian 
warships which happen to be in the area and volunteer their services.
CAPTAIN RON MARLAR, USN, “THE THINGS THEY’LL DO . . . ,” 
AIR RESERVIST, JUNE 1969
Bill Streifer is a researcher and freelance journal-
ist, and the only American on the editorial board of 
Vostok (East): Journal of Oriental Studies, published 
by the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow.
Irek Sabitov is a journalist and former newspaper 
editor and a resident of Ufa, Bashkiria, Southern 
Urals (Russia).
© 2020 by Bill Streifer 
Naval War College Review, Spring 2020, Vol. 73, No. 2
 On 15 April 1969, North Koreans were engaged in celebrating the birthday of Kim Il-sung, the founder and leader of the so-called Hermit Kingdom. 
However, the cheers quickly were replaced by the familiar shouts of “Down with 
U.S. imperialism!” and “Liberate the South!” when it was announced that a pair 
of MiG fighters had shot down a U.S. Navy (USN) EC-121 reconnaissance plane, 
which North Korea claimed had intruded into its airspace.1 The celebration of Kim 
Il-sung’s birthday (in this case, his fifty-seventh) was the nation’s most important 
national holiday: a day filled with festivals, artistic performances, sports competi-
tions, and academic seminars and debates. Freed from their daily routines, workers 
and students were in a cheerful mood as they carried banners and placards bear-
ing the image and slogans of their leader in the numerous parades held during 
the day. But the festive mood changed radically when the crowds became aware 
of early-evening bulletins announcing a “brilliant 
battle success.”2
The doomed EC-121 was an electronic intel-
ligence (ELINT) version of the Lockheed Super 
Constellation, a four-engine, propeller-driven, three-
hundred-miles-per-hour, unarmed aircraft.3 A bul-
bous radar dome (radome) on the top of the fuselage 
housed a special antenna capable of determining the 
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frequency of an adversary’s air-defense radar.4 EC-121 Big Look aircraft were tasked 
with conducting ELINT to intercept, locate, and record radar and communications 
emissions.5 Operating under the umbrella of the National Security Agency (NSA), 
the specific aircraft in question had been assigned to take off from Atsugi, Japan, 
transit across the Sea of Japan to a point off the northern coast of North Korea, fly 
two and a half orbits, and land at Osan Air Force Base in South Korea.6
Following the attack, the United States put ships and planes en route to the 
site. But before they arrived, the Nixon administration requested foreign assis-
tance. Robert J. McCloskey, the chief State Department spokesman, stated that 
the United States had asked the Soviet Union, Japan, and South Korea for any 
assistance they might render in helping to locate the plane’s missing crewmen. 
The requests were made in the capitals of the three countries.7
Owing to the EC-121 crash site’s proximity (about 150 miles south) to Vladi-
vostok—the main Far East naval base of the Soviet Union’s Pacific Fleet—the first 
vessels on the scene were Soviet, not American. The first hard evidence that the 
EC-121 had gone down came the next morning when a USN P-3 rescue plane 
spotted debris two nautical miles northeast of the reported downing location; it 
consisted of such items as uninflated life rafts, paper, and dye markers.
A joint U.S.-Soviet search-and-rescue (SAR) operation began later that day 
when the rescue plane made contact with two Soviet ships in the vicinity of the 
downed plane. That afternoon, aided by American rescue-aircraft personnel who 
dropped identifying smoke bombs, the Soviet destroyers began to pick up debris 
from the downed aircraft.8
Although the ships at sea picked up pieces of the spy plane and assorted debris 
and the downed plane reportedly had carried enough life rafts to hold the entire 
crew, no survivors were spotted from the air.9 Despite the lack of confirmed 
reports of survivors, the size of the rescue operation was being “substantially 
expanded” at that time, the Pentagon said.10
Sometime after the shootdown, Captain Wayne Whitten, U.S. Marine Corps 
(USMC), who had flown several missions with EC-121 aircraft in the Gulf of 
Tonkin during the Vietnam War, took a phone call from Secretary of Defense 
Melvin R. Laird. At the time, Whitten was in Hawaii on a watch team at the Joint 
Reconnaissance Center (JRC) at the headquarters of the commander in chief, 
Pacific Fleet, at the time Admiral John S. McCain Jr.11 “It was really confusing[,] 
with reports first of Soviet ships going to the crash site and no one sure if they 
were going to help or hinder,” Whitten later recalled. Secretary Laird had heard, 
erroneously, that there were survivors. Whitten was the one who had to give the 
Secretary of Defense the sad news: all on board the EC-121 had perished.12
The joint U.S.-Soviet SAR operation that unfolded over four days became a 
rare example of cooperation between traditional Cold War adversaries. The June 
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1969 issue of Air Reservist magazine, the official publication of the Air National 
Guard and Air Force Reserve, described them as “improbable allies.”13
With the passage of over fifty years since the North Korean downing of this 
EC-121 in the Sea of Japan, much has been written on the topic, both in books 
and in academic journals. But no works previous to this article have relied so 
heavily on declassified congressional reports, documents obtained through the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), contemporaneous press reports, and the 
testimony of former Soviet participants, nor have others delved so deeply into the 
surprising role the Soviet navy played during this joint SAR operation.
This article tells the story of the EC-121 incident, with an emphasis on the par-
ticipation of the Soviet navy. Those whom the authors interviewed for this article 
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include three former members of the crew of Vdokhnovennyi, one of the three 
Soviet vessels that took part in the operation. Felix Gromov, the ship’s executive 
officer, also provided a handwritten response to the authors’ questions. Gromov, 
a lieutenant commander in 1969, later would be promoted to admiral and go on 
to become the commander in chief of the Russian navy (1992–97). Others inter-
viewed include Chief Petty Officer (CPO) Georgy Kondratiyev, the foreman of the 
mine command of Combat Unit–3 (mines/torpedoes), and Yuri Panachev, a se-
nior seaman. Also interviewed was Colonel Wayne Whitten, USMC (Ret.), who as 
a captain passed on to the Secretary of Defense the sad news of the EC-121 deaths.
THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION: THE COLD WAR
According to a declassified top secret UMBRA NSA report titled The National 
Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown, the North Korean MiGs that shot 
FIGURE 2
FELIX GROMOV, SOVIET NAVY, AS PACIFIC FLEET CRUISER COMMANDER, CIRCA 1970s 
(INSET), AND IN 1992
Sources: Yuri Panachev and Sputnik Image Archive, respectively.
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down the EC-121 “represented the military forces of a small, hostile Communist 
nation . . . that itself was a Cold War creation.”14
The forces that collided on 15 April 1969—the United States Navy reconnaissance 
plane and the MIG-21s of the North Korean Air Force—were symbols of the Cold 
War that had developed following World War II. The EC-121 was a part of the 
Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) conducted [jointly] by the 
United States Navy and Air Force [USAF]. These programs were developed in the 
early 1950s as a way of providing intelligence on the Soviet Union and its Communist 
neighbors.15
The Soviet Union
Richard M. Nixon was a renowned Cold Warrior and the Soviet Union was his 
particular focus. According to an NSA report titled American Cryptology during 
the Cold War, within the NSA’s production organization fully 50 percent of the 
staff worked “the Soviet problem.”16 Whenever anything happened between the 
West and a Communist entity, the ever-present question was what role, if any, 
were the Soviets playing in the matter.
The Soviet Pacific Fleet. The United States conducted aerial reconnaissance 
to learn what it could about the Soviet navy’s submarine and surface forces. 
One focus of such attention was Vladivostok. Known historically as the 
“pearl of Russia on the shores of the Pacific,” Vladivostok hosted the head-
quarters of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, one of the four Soviet navy flot (fleets).17 
According to a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE) published a decade after the EC-121 incident, the Soviet 
Pacific Fleet was a large force made up primarily of submarines, surface 
ships, and aircraft. The submarine force consisted of more than a hundred 
submarines, of which thirty-two were ballistic-missile and seventy-eight were 
cruise-missile or torpedo-attack units.18 The surface fleet, the report said, 
consisted of thirty-five cruisers, destroyers, and Krivak-class missile frig-
ates, in addition to numerous smaller naval craft. Nearly all units in the fleet 
were based in either Vladivostok or Petropavlovsk, the latter home to the nu-
clear submarine fleet at the secret Rybachiy base.19 An example of the Soviet 
Pacific Fleet’s activities: in 1972, it would send several cruise-missile-firing sub-
marines and between five and ten surface combatants and auxiliary ships to re-
spond to the U.S. mining of North Vietnamese ports during the Vietnam War.20
With more relevance to the 1969 EC-121 downing, Vdokhnovennyi, a Project 
56 Soviet navy destroyer, was part of a detachment of ships known as a “sea force.” 
Together with a missile cruiser, an antisubmarine ship, a submarine tender, one 
or two tankers, and a support vessel, Vdokhnovennyi sailed to the Indian Ocean 
for “operational service” (training) on 22 October 1968. Until then the ship had 
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remained at Vladivostok, its home port. When the sea force was directed to the In-
dian Ocean it became the second such detachment of Soviet ships to visit the area. 
According to Vladimir Dukel’sky, the former head of intelligence of the 10th Op-
erative Squadron of the Pacific Fleet (OPESK), this group of ships was formed and 
sent into the Indian Ocean to prevent the Americans from “privatizing” the area.21
Seaman Panachev reported that while aboard Vdokhnovennyi he often “met” 
Americans in the Indian Ocean—“We had neither grudge nor rage against them.” 
The Soviet navy, he said, was “quite powerful and diverse in those days.” Off 
Seychelles, an island nation in the Indian Ocean, Vdokhnovennyi also met Soviet 
ships from both the Black Sea and Northern Fleets, Panachev said. “Our cruis-
ers, destroyers, large anti-submarine ships, and submarines were everywhere and 
continuously watched [U.S.] aircraft carriers,” Panachev said.22
“We served this way, where they were, there we were. It’s not like before now.” 
By that Panachev meant that the situation today is not as it was during the Cold 
War. Back then, the Soviet navy opposed—and cursed—the American imperialists 
everywhere at sea, whereas today the sole superpower, America, does whatever it 
wants throughout the world. “I liked serving in the Navy,” Panachev said. “I was 
on a combat ship, constantly in motion; we seldom stood near the moorage wall.”23 
Following a period of training, but before Vdokhnovennyi arrived back at 
Vladivostok, its боевая служба (combat service) included several foreign port 
calls, including to Mombasa, Kenya; Aden, South Yemen; Al Hudaydah, North 
Yemen; Bandar ‘Abbas, Iran; and Umm Qasr, Iraq (and by land to Basra). For 
example, Vdokhnovennyi was docked in North Yemen in early January 1969; the 
EC-121 was shot down about three months later. Had Vdokhnovennyi sailed di-
rectly from there to the Sea of Japan at the ship’s top speed of thirty-eight knots, 
it would have taken a week or more.24
According to Alexandr Rozin, a Russian expert and writer on topics that in-
clude the Soviet fleet, Vdokhnovennyi, and the EC-121 incident, this detachment 
of ships was due to return to Vladivostok in mid-March 1969. Later, however, the 
order was changed to apply only to Vdokhnovennyi, with the other vessels ordered 
to remain in the region; no reason was given for this decision.25 So, on 15 March 
1969, Vdokhnovennyi began moving toward Vladivostok, while the other ships 
of the detachment continued to visit various foreign ports. After sailing a total 
of 25,600 nautical miles, Vdokhnovennyi arrived back at Vladivostok on 4 April 
1969—about ten days before the EC-121 incident.26
The Soviet Union versus Aerial Reconnaissance. Over the decades that the United 
States conducted its aerial reconnaissance to learn about Soviet naval forces and 
their activities, it was commonplace for Soviet fighters to react to these peripheral 
reconnaissance missions, particularly in the vicinity of Vladivostok. The Russians 
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often would send out fighters, in relays, that would pace the aircraft, staying be-
tween them and the Soviet coastline—usually without incident.27 But in thirteen 
cases between 8 April 1950 and 10 March 1964, Soviet retaliation turned deadly 
when the Soviet fighters shot down U.S. reconnaissance planes. On 6 November 
1951, for example, the U.S. Navy became the victim of Soviet aggression when a 
Lockheed P2V Neptune, with a crew of ten, was shot down over the Sea of Japan 
“somewhere off Vladivostok.”28
Given the Soviets’ long history of using deadly force in retaliation against 
what they saw as intrusion into their airspace, might others—the North Kore-
ans—have taken their cue, but not necessarily instructions, from the Soviets in 
the downing of an EC-121 reconnaissance plane?
Within this context of Cold War hostility and uncertainty, the joint Soviet-
American SAR operation conducted after the downing of the EC-121 constitutes 
a stark contrast. When the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) ordered the 
destroyer USS Henry W. Tucker (DD 875) to rendezvous with Vdokhnovennyi, 
this was the first cooperative meeting of Soviet and American warships since the 
Cold War began at the close of World War II. Later, during a press conference 
ashore in which the captain and executive officer of Tucker answered questions 
from representatives of the world’s media—including ABC, CBS, NBC, and U.S. 
FIGURE 3
VDOKHNOVENNYI IN NORTH YEMEN
Source: Yuri Panachev.
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wire services, as well as Life magazine and Pacific Stars & Stripes—the following 
“facts” came to light: Tucker was the first American ship under way to search for 
the EC-121, the first American ship to arrive on scene, the first to collect de-
bris, the only ship to recover bodies, the only ship chosen to deliver bodies and 
consolidated aircraft debris to Sasebo, Japan—and the only ship to rendezvous 
peacefully with a Soviet destroyer in over twenty-five years.29
North Korea
The Context: The Pueblo Incident. The EC-121 incident, which began in April 
1969, came on the heels of the release of the crew of USS Pueblo. The Pueblo crisis, 
centered on the North Korean seizure of a USN reconnaissance vessel, had begun 
on 23 January 1968. Not since the British boarded USS Chesapeake off the coast 
of Virginia in 1807 had an American naval commander surrendered his ship in 
peacetime, but with Pueblo it happened again. USS Pueblo (AGER 2) was a lightly 
armed, 177-foot, Banner-class technical research ship with a crew of eighty-three 
officers and men. The North Koreans seized it in international waters.
About a week after the seizure of Pueblo, Semyon Kozyrev, the deputy minister 
of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union, met Robert Ford, the Canadian ambassador 
to the Soviet Union, at Kozyrev’s office in Moscow; two of Kozyrev’s subordinates 
also were present.30 As recorded in a memorandum intended for distribution to 
Politburo members and candidates, Ford began by referring to their recent con-
versation concerning the North Korean seizure of Pueblo. According to Ford, the 
Soviet position vis-à-vis the Pueblo incident (if he understood it correctly) boiled 
down to four points: (1) the United States should not yield to emotion but instead 
should examine the issues associated with this incident in a calm, businesslike at-
mosphere; (2) the United States should abandon the threat to use force to settle the 
incident; (3) there should be direct talks about this issue between the Americans 
and North Koreans; and (4) it was necessary to eliminate the fever of propaganda 
and the campaign and uproar around discussion of the matter at the UN Security 
Council.31 Thus, representatives of the Soviet Union undertook to instruct the 
United States with regard to its interactions with North Korea.
After nearly a year of brutal internment, North Korea released the crew of 
Pueblo and the body of Petty Officer Duane Hodges, who as a twenty-one-year-
old fireman had died when North Korean gunboats opened fire on the ship. 
The release followed a U.S. apology—an apology the U.S. government quickly 
disavowed. In Washington, Secretary of State D. Dean Rusk issued the following 
statement regarding Pueblo: “The men were released after long and difficult nego-
tiations. The North Korean negotiator insisted from the beginning that the men 
would not be released unless the United States falsely confessed to espionage and 
to violations of North Korean territory and apologized for such alleged actions.”32
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During his 1968 presidential campaign, candidate Nixon described North 
Korea as a “fourth-rate power” and swore there never would be another “Pueblo 
incident.” Five months after his election, however, President Nixon faced his own 
North Korean crisis when the MiG-21s downed the EC-121 in the Sea of Japan. 
The shootdown of this Navy plane by one air-to-air missile (or perhaps two) took 
the lives of thirty-one Americans—thirty sailors and one Marine.33
North Korea versus Aerial Reconnaissance. Well before the April 1969 EC-121 in-
cident began, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) JRC in the Pentagon had decided that 
Asian Communist nations fell into a different category from those elsewhere—
including the Soviet Union, despite its history of shooting down U.S. aircraft. As 
Dr. Thomas R. Johnson, an NSA historian, put it, “When one of them launched a 
fighter in reaction, which was rare, they meant business.”34
By the middle of 1963, the JCS had implemented an elaborate White Wolf 
Advisory Warning Program to protect American aircraft flying reconnaissance 
missions, essentially worldwide. Then, in the mid-1960s, in response to what the 
JRC perceived as an elevated security threat, new conditions were inserted into 
the plan. Of these, Condition 3, which required a heightened state of alert aboard 
the aircraft and diversion to a fallback orbit farther off the coast, would be initi-
ated any time a hostile fighter was seen headed over water within one hundred 
nautical miles of the mission. Should a fighter come within fifty nautical miles, 
Condition 5 was initiated, which required an automatic abort.35
Following the institution of these new conditions the United States lost no mis-
sions to the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, or North Vietnam—until 
the April 1969 downing. At the time of the incident, USN and USAF signal intel-
ligence (SIGINT) reconnaissance missions were frequent occurrences off the North 
Korean coast; for example, from January 1969 through the April incident, nearly 
two hundred similar missions—averaging about two a day—were flown. EC-121 
missions were so commonplace, in fact, that they were categorized as “low risk.”36
However, not long before this particular EC-121 mission began, General 
Charles H. Bonesteel III, the commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, had warned 
of unusually vehement language and surly protests by the North Koreans at 
Panmunjom.37 The warning was passed on to the relevant squadron, which was 
advised to be extracautious. But the North Koreans appeared to suffer perpetually 
through profound mood swings at Armistice Commission meetings, so neither 
the Seventh Fleet nor CINCPAC changed the risk category from “hostile action 
unlikely.”38 Besides, it was thought that Conditions 3 and 5 would cover any po-
tential problems that might arise. Plus, there had been relatively few incidents 
since the White Wolf warning program was instituted in the early 1960s. How-
ever, according to a senior NSA official who was involved with White Wolf, the 
Navy had been an “unenthusiastic” player in the program.39
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The EC-121 was one of the most frequently used reconnaissance platforms 
in this area. While the aircraft’s original configuration was designed to haul pas-
sengers, the EC-121 variant incorporated nearly six tons of sophisticated ELINT 
equipment in addition to its radome.40 The EC-121 was larger than its sister col-
lector, the USN EA-3B Skywarrior jet aircraft, and normally carried two crews 
that worked in relays, enabling it to remain on station for approximately eight 
hours. So while the large, slow, lumbering aircraft had become the easiest target in 
the Navy’s aviation inventory, it remained the aircraft of choice for fleet support.41
Previous to the incident, both J. Strom Thurmond (R-SC), the ranking mem-
ber of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Robert Hotz, former editor of 
Aviation Week, had referred to the EC-121 as a “flying Pueblo”—vulnerable to 
hostile action. In the aftermath of the April 1969 loss, Hotz criticized that, once 
again, the only excuse the U.S. Navy could offer was that “it had never happened 
before,” and he described that response as “a tragic repeat of their pitiful wheeze 
after the Pueblo capture.”42
In any case, everything changed that day in April, when, for the second time in 
fifteen months, a small, isolated North Korea attacked the U.S. military, this time 
by shooting down an EC-121 aircraft.43
The Soviet Union and North Korea
At the authors’ request, a top secret portion of an NSA report on cryptology dur-
ing the Cold War was declassified recently, revealing new details on the EC-121’s 
flight path and the failure to issue an advisory warning. This new information 
shows, for example, that the EC-121 was illuminated by both Soviet and North 
Korean radars, but the North Korean detections were sporadic and, when com-
pared with Soviet tracking, inaccurate. Since Soviet radar was reflecting (track-
ing) the EC-121 prior to the disaster, the Russians must have seen the plane 
disappear from their radar screens.44
At the time of the incident, the USAF base at Osan, South Korea, was “flight-
following” the EC-121.45 The tracking of this USN spy plane, which the NSA 
report says began at 10:00 AM Korean local time, was “initially based on Soviet 
reflections.”46 Also according to this newly declassified information, the closest 
the EC-121 came to either North Korea or the Soviet Union was at 12:04 PM, 
when the So’ndo’k tracking facility showed it to be thirty-eight nautical miles off 
the North Korean coast. However, since the Soviet facilities showed it to be be-
tween eighty-five and one hundred nautical miles off the coast, Osan, the station 
that had primary advisory warning responsibility, declined to issue a Condition 
4, which would have been required had the EC-121 come within eighty nautical 
miles of the Soviet coast. Also newly released is the NSA version of the track of 
the EC-121, which clearly shows the plane over international waters when it was 
shot down.47
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Why did the NSA believe that North Korean radar was inferior to what the 
Soviets were using? According to William Hickey, a USN cryptologic veteran, 
although the North Koreans probably obtained most of their radar systems from 
the Chinese or the Russians, they would have represented an older technology 
than the Soviets were using at that time. “You don’t want to sell your best stuff to 
anyone, even your allies,” Hickey said. The North Korean radar was inferior to 
that of the Soviets in a number of factors, including its age and power stability, 
which would impact frequency stability, timing errors, and more. As a result, the 
North Korean signal might have been “jittery,” whereas the Soviet systems were 
known to be more reliable and accurate.48 Thus, while the North Koreans may 
have been operating on poor information, the Soviets knew better.
THE FLIGHT AND THE DOWNING
The EC-121M was from the fleet air reconnaissance squadron designated VQ-1. 
It was commanded by Lieutenant Commander James H. Overstreet, USN, and 
carried thirty-one men, comprising the two full working crews and some excess 
members in training status.49 According to Air Reservist, the flight (call sign Deep 
Sea 129) took off from Naval Air Station Atsugi, Japan, about thirty miles from 
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Tokyo, on 15 April 1969 at 6:50 AM (local time), on what should have been a rou-
tine BEGGAR SHADOW reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan.50 
New details of the EC-121 incident came to light only after the declassification 
in 2013 of an undated Naval Scientific and Tech Group, Far East (NSTFE) intelli-
gence report; meanwhile, other details, including the official track of the ill-fated 
spy plane, remained classified until more recently.51 However, it is established that 
at roughly 1:47 PM (local time) the plane was shot down by a pair of North Korean 
MiG-21 fighters off the North Korean coast. After the later recovery of the wreck-
age from the Sea of Japan, a joint USN-USAF investigative team would conclude 
that the EC-121 had sustained major structural damage from the detonation of a 
fragmenting warhead from one air-to-air missile, or possibly two.52
The pilot credited with the kill was Kim Gin-ok, recognized in North Korea as 
the nation’s top fighter ace; during the Korean War, Kim is said to have personally 
downed eleven American aircraft, including three B-29 Superfortress bombers.53 
North Korean defense minister General Choi Hyun hailed the downing of the 
EC-121 as a “heroic feat.”54
The first information concerning the possible plight of the EC-121 was ob-
tained by the duty officer of VQ-1 when that command intercepted and copied a 
friendly warning—its origin unidentified in the record—that hostile aircraft were 
approaching the EC-121. The commanding officer of VQ-1 contacted Fuchu Air 
Station, Japan, for any communications from the mission aircraft and requested 
that personnel at the base check all sources for any message that may have caused 
the EC-121 to abort its mission. VQ-1 made numerous calls for more than half 
an hour, with negative results.55
When VQ-1 lost all effective operational control over the EC-121, it appeared 
that Army, Air Force, and Navy units monitoring the flight must have assumed 
operational control of the aircraft—and if they did not, no one did. Thus, when 
these classified military units subsequently directed warning messages to the 
EC-121 aircraft, VQ-1 was never included as an addressee on any of those mes-
sages.56 So just before 1:00 AM (eastern standard time)—about an hour after 
the apparent downing of the EC-121—the commanding officer of VQ-1 sent a 
Flash message to all appropriate units in the area requesting information on the 
mission aircraft. Shortly thereafter, VQ-1 received a copy of a Critic message 
sent by the USAF Security Service that indicated the possible shootdown of the 
EC-121 over the Sea of Japan.57 The USN plane was listed as missing at 2:00 PM 
that afternoon.58
At NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland, the EC-121 downing caused 
a crisis situation. On the day of the shootdown, the NSA declared a SIGINT 
alert code-named BRAVO HANGAR, which it maintained for the remainder of the 
month.59
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Within seventeen minutes after receiving an alert, the 314th Air Division at 
Osan Air Base, South Korea, scrambled fighters. Yet no air unit initiated a SAR 
operation for over an hour after the shootdown.60 And when the first U.S. aircraft 
finally reached the scene, Soviet ships already were in the area. But instead of 
acting aggressively toward the arriving U.S. aircraft, these Soviet ships invited 
cooperation with their long-standing Cold War adversaries.
THE U.S.-SOVIET SAR OPERATION
Surface units of the U.S. Navy responded immediately to the downing of the 
American aircraft; the commander in chief of the Seventh Fleet ordered USS 
Tucker and USS Dale (DLG 19) to get under way as soon as possible and proceed 
to the Sea of Japan to search for the downed plane. However, both ships—which 
happened to be nested together in berth 6 at Sasebo, Japan—were delayed in 
getting under way. Tucker, which needed three hours to light off boilers and 
make sufficient steam to get under way, executed an emergency recall of its crew. 
Dale, with major equipment out for repair at the ship-repair facility at Sasebo, 
estimated it would need ten to twelve hours to get underway; however, it beat its 
projection, managing to get under way only an hour behind Tucker.61
In contrast, at the time of the incident a Soviet Ugra-class Project 1886 subma-
rine tender (hull number 945) and two Foxtrot-class submarines already were at 
sea and in the immediate area of the crash. Next, three large Soviet vessels moved 
in: Vdokhnovennyi (Inspiration), a Kotlin-class destroyer, hull number 429; Stere-
gushchiy (Vigilant), a large antisubmarine ship, No. 580; and later Dalnevostoch-
nyi Komsomolets (Far East Komsomol), No. 427.62 Seas in the area were described 
as moderate, running about four feet. The air temperature was estimated at 42 
to 48 degrees Fahrenheit (5–9 degrees Celsius), with the sea slightly warmer.63
Once the three large Soviet surface vessels were in the vicinity, Washington 
appealed to the Soviet government for them to help locate any survivors. When 
U.S. ambassador Jacob D. Beam in Moscow asked Georgy M. Korniyenko, head 
of the U.S. section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, for assistance, Korniyenko said 
he had no knowledge of the incident or the missing aircraft but would inform his 
government of the American request.64
In Washington, Secretary of State William P. Rogers called Soviet ambassador 
Anatoly F. Dobrynin into his office shortly after noon (local time) to discuss the 
shootdown. Rogers stated that the American plane had not violated North Ko-
rean airspace and that the United States was unsure, at that point, whether there 
were any survivors. Rogers then repeated the U.S. request, expressed earlier in 
Moscow, that the Soviet ships in the shootdown area assist in the search and res-
cue.65 At the time he was unaware that Soviet ships already had begun retrieving 
EC-121 debris from the sea.
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In line with the U.S. desire for Soviet aid, the JCS directed U.S. forces operating 
in the Sea of Japan not to interfere with rescue attempts by other ships, regardless 
of nationality. In addition, the Fifth Air Force was ordered not to interfere with 
any Soviet aircraft in the vicinity of the shootdown.66
Meanwhile, back at the crash scene, American aircraft established radio con-
tact with Steregushchiy. The ship revealed that it already had picked up pieces of 
the plane, but there was no sign of survivors. Steregushchiy personnel granted 
permission for an American plane to fly low over their ship to photograph the 
debris. U.S. aircraft located some additional debris and dropped a smoke signal 
to mark the spot, then guided one of the Soviet destroyers to the marker, where it 
put small boats in the water to recover some of the debris. Sadly, while these boats 
took aboard the only two bodies ever to be recovered, they found no survivors.67
To establish communications, a USAF survival radio—a URC-10—was 
dropped to the Soviet ships. In addition to the radio, a U.S. Army sergeant who 
was a Russian linguist was put aboard one of the aircraft dispatched to the search 
area.68
According to a later Pentagon statement, the air and sea search for survivors 
began in an area centered about seventy-five miles off North Korea in the Sea 
of Japan. A Navy search plane sighted debris that it said “could be associated 
with the missing aircraft” about 120 miles southeast of Ch’ŏngjin, North Korea; 
however, the crew of the search plane did not report any evidence of survivors. 
The Department of Defense report stated that a Navy “patrol plane” had guided 
two Soviet destroyers that already were on scene in the area where the debris was 
spotted. At the time, there was no report of the ships’ findings.69
In addition to the U.S. Air Force and Navy, the USAF Reserve figured promi-
nently in these SAR activities. The members of the 305th Aerospace Rescue 
and Recovery Service (ARRS) were reservists from Selfridge Air Force Base, 
Michigan; the unit had been mobilized during the 1968 Pueblo incident. In June 
1969, in a well-deserved expression of self-praise on behalf of the reserves, Air 
Reservist magazine would mention how the 305th had played a “key role” in the 
EC-121 matter, which it said had added “at least one instance of heroism to their 
record.” Flying Boeing HC-97 rescue aircraft, two aircrews of the 305th took off 
from Naha, Okinawa, in the early morning hours of 16 April. They flew to the 
area of the air-sea search, approximately eighty-three miles southeast of Ch’ŏngjin 
and seventy-two miles due east of the North Korean coast, where they relieved 
a C-130 Hercules (a medium-range transport plane) of the 36th ARRS, based in 
Tachikawa, Japan, about twenty miles west of Tokyo.70
On the morning of 17 April, two days after the shootdown, the waters of the 
Sea of Japan yielded the bodies of only two crewmen, that of Lieutenant (junior 
grade) Joseph R. Ribar and Aviation Electronics Technician First Class Richard E. 
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Sweeney. Their bodies were recovered seventeen nautical miles north of the gen-
eral incident area. Throughout the day, winds and currents continued to cause 
the debris to drift toward the North Korean and Soviet coasts. The Soviets again 
were requested to pick up any bodies or debris within twenty nautical miles of 
the coastlines—areas that were off-limits to American craft. Search operations by 
the two U.S. destroyers, a C-130, a P-3, and four F-106s from the Fifth Air Force 
continued throughout the day.71
At 10:02 PM (local) on 19 April, at the end of a fourth day of searching, the JCS 
terminated SAR operations, with twenty-nine of the thirty-one crewmen unac-
counted for.72 Combat air patrols continued over the USN surface units until the 
following day, when the ships passed south of the thirty-eighth parallel.73
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS
American Accounts
For the men of the 36th ARRS, a period of frantic activity began with the ring-
ing of the scramble alarm. According to an Associated Press (AP) report out of 
Tachikawa, the plane was reported missing at 2:00 PM. “At 3:25 the horn blew 
and at 3:41 we were airborne,” said the thirty-four-year-old pilot, Air Force major 
George W. Hillyer. First Lieutenant Roy B. Petit, who majored in Russian studies, 
the copilot of the first C-130 to take off, said he grabbed his oxygen mask and 
raced to his aircraft with other crewmembers. Moments later, Major Hillyer ar-
rived from a briefing in the control center.74
The crew of the C-130 knew only that an EC-121 was missing in the Sea of 
Japan. They were told that it had gone down approximately ninety nautical miles 
southeast of the North Korean port of Ch’ŏngjin; however, Major Hillyer later 
reported that when he spotted the wreckage it was perhaps another forty-five 
nautical miles east of that position. When Hillyer’s plane reached the EC-121’s 
last known position, the sun was about to set. There was no sign of survivors or 
aircraft debris.
At one point, however, Major Hillyer and Lieutenant Petit both thought they 
saw two or three dim, steady lights floating on the waves. At 12:30 the next morn-
ing, with their plane running low on fuel, they were about to head to Osan for rest 
and refueling when they again saw lights on the water and realized they were the 
searchlights of a ship. Hillyer had the feeling it was a Soviet ship but had no idea 
what it was doing or whether it considered his presence unfriendly. However, 
“They were very friendly,” Captain Thomas van Winkle, the pilot of a second 
C-130, said in an interview. “I was preoccupied with finding survivors. It never 
occurred to me that these people would be anything but friendly. They were ob-
viously trying to help us in this catastrophe.” Major Hillyer and Lieutenant Petit, 
also present in the interview, nodded in agreement with van Winkle’s words.
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The next day, Captain van Winkle positively identified and got in touch with 
the two Soviet destroyers in the search area. From the air, van Winkle saw orange 
and white debris scattered over a wide area, so he dropped smoke flares to guide 
the searching Soviet destroyers. He also dropped a survival radio to one of the 
Soviet ships, but they could not communicate satisfactorily with it. After drop-
ping the radio, van Winkle recalled that Lieutenant Petit, then still resting at Osan, 
spoke Russian, so he urged that a C-130 return with Petit aboard. 
When the press later interviewed Petit, he said he had been concentrating so 
heavily over the previous several months on learning to speak Japanese that at 
first only Japanese words came to mind when he was again on scene. From his 
C-130, Petit called down to the Soviet destroyer, in Russian: “Ship No. 580 [the 
large antisubmarine ship Steregushchiy]. This is No. 963. Do you understand?” He 
repeated that same message five or six times. Eventually an answer came in flat, 
expressionless Russian: “Greetings, I understand you.”
Then, in a voice expressing urgency, Petit asked, “Have you seen any survi-
vors? Have you seen any people?” This was followed by a disappointing response: 
“No, we have not seen any. Have you?” When Petit responded in the negative, 
the conversation turned to aircraft debris, which was seen floating all about the 
ship. When the Americans asked the Soviet destroyer whether it had taken any 
aircraft parts aboard, a Russian voice answered yes. When Petit asked the Rus-
sians whether they would mind if his plane dropped down to have a better look at 
the debris on deck, the Russian voice said it would be okay. “We will come down 
low over the ship. Please don’t fear,” Petit said. The reply came back: “That’s fine.” 
What the American pilot described as a “cordial” conversation followed. When 
Major Hillyer brought the plane down to three hundred feet and made two or 
three passes near the ship, the Americans sighted a wheel, a ladder, and other 
aircraft parts on the deck of the Soviet ship. He then flew on to the other Soviet 
ship, the destroyer Vdokhnovennyi, and after a similar conversation dropped a 
radio to that ship as well.
When an American pilot asked Vdokhnovennyi what parts of the EC-121 it had 
aboard, the ship answered with the following list: a rubber life raft (no size given), 
cigarette packs, imperial pencils, an aircraft seat, parts of wood, a man’s coat (no 
name), and parts of the aircraft. All answers from Vdokhnovennyi were given in 
Russian. “Looking up names of these articles in Russian dictionary (our aircraft 
doing this)—will pass [on] this information later,” the American pilot said. Mys-
teriously, when the American asked whether the ships in the crash area the night 
before had been theirs, the Russians broke off communications. “Up until that 
point, communications were clear; it was a definite break off.” (This note came 
from the “scratch” desk log of VQ-1, which recorded events as they unfolded.)75 
When the Soviet destroyer provided the list of items that had been picked out of 
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the water, the Americans were unaware that Vdokhnovennyi either soon would 
transfer a load of EC-121 debris to Vladivostok or had just done so.
When the 305th arrived, the HC-97 crew, commanded by Major Michael J. 
McLeod, took over as on-scene controllers, while another aircraft, flown by Cap-
tain Robert J. McClear, with Major Howard D. Coffman as backup pilot, began to 
fly a search pattern. At sundown, the searchers were joined by the U.S. destroyer 
Tucker. Both aircrews reported spotting pieces of debris. They remained in the 
vicinity throughout the night, controlling the efforts of other search aircraft and 
vessels while dropping flares to illuminate the area. After being out on the mis-
sion for more than fifteen hours, both aircrews were relieved by other rescue 
crews.76 The Fifth Air Force Joint Rescue Coordination Center stated that a total 
of twenty-six aircraft would be operating in the search area by daylight.77
On 19 April, at Tachikawa, Japan, Second Lieutenant Ronald Adinolfi of the 
36th ARRS told reporters he had flown a mission in which his C-130 photo-
graphed the transfer of EC-121 debris from Soviet to American warships. As 
Adinolfi explained, after Vdokhnovennyi gave Lieutenant Petit a list of the items 
it had picked up, Captain van Winkle and his crew received words of condolence 
from the Russians.78 Takashi Oka, the New York Times Tokyo bureau chief, and 
the AP added further details.
As the Americans’ C-130 circled overhead its pilot received a message in heavi-
ly accented but distinct English that said: “Soviet Destroyer 429 [Vdokhnovennyi], 
Red Banner Pacific Fleet, sends condolences in connection with the loss of your 
aircraft.” No explanation was given for the phrase “Red Banner.”79 The message 
was repeated several times as the Soviet destroyer steamed in the Sea of Japan, 
150 miles from its home port of Vladivostok, toward its rendezvous with Tucker.80
According to Adinolfi, at the time of the SAR operation, there initially were 
some nervous reactions, apparently because the Russians thought the USN men 
planned on coming aboard their ship. Eventually, however, the Americans got the 
Russians to understand that the transfer of EC-121 debris, from Vdokhnovennyi 
to Tucker, could be accomplished using only the ships’ small boats.
At 4:00 PM on 18 April, at the end of three days of search, Vdokhnovennyi 
transferred the debris its crew had accumulated to Tucker, which already had 
taken aboard the bodies of the two EC-121 crewmen. Included in the transfer was 
a twenty-man lifeboat, three leather jackets, a parachute, two exposure suits, and 
various aircraft parts. Adinolfi noted that the Russians even returned the small 
radios dropped to them that had enabled communications between Soviet ships 
and U.S. aircraft. The transfer via whaleboats required only eight minutes or so. 
Then the Soviet ship turned northward and disappeared over the horizon. When 
Vdokhnovennyi reappeared, it again rendezvoused with its American counter-
part, Tucker.
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When the SAR operation ended, Tucker proceeded to Sasebo, Japan, with the 
bodies of the two EC-121 crewmen, plus over five hundred pounds of debris. A 
gunner’s mate on Tucker still remembers the details of his ship’s participation in 
the operation. On the afternoon of the shootdown his ship had just pulled into 
Sasebo for liberty, but after crewmen had been on the beach for less than an hour 
the shore patrol ordered them back to the ship. “We got steam up and went all 
ahead flank for the crash site. Surface searches all the next day, the coldest watch 
I’ve ever stood. Recovered a lot of pieces of the plane, full of bullet holes. I helped 
bring the bodies aboard and carry them below, and I was in the dress honor guard 
as we brought the caskets ashore back in Sasebo.” Then he said that they “went 
back to swapping rounds with the shore batteries in Haiphong Harbor. It was just 
more of the war to us.”81
Soviet Accounts
Interesting and largely overlooked in the EC-121 incident are the details of this 
joint U.S.-Soviet SAR operation from the point of view of the Soviet sailors and 
officers who took part. The following is a rare look into this four-day-long co-
operative effort between traditional Cold War adversaries, including firsthand 
accounts by three former crewmen of the Soviet destroyer Vdokhnovennyi.
In August 1992, Admiral Felix Gromov would be made commander in chief of 
the Russian navy.82 But in 1969, as a lieutenant commander, Gromov was serving 
as executive officer of Vdokhnovennyi, and years later he provided handwritten 
answers (in Russian) to the authors’ questions on the events in question. Yuri 
Panachev, who served in the underwater weapons branch of the ship during 
Gromov’s tenure, recalls him fondly. “[I’ll] always remember the [ship’s] Execu-
tive Officer with great warmth . . . good man.”83
As Admiral Gromov explained (in his letter to one of the authors), the Soviet 
Pacific fleet command held Vdokhnovennyi’s operational service in high regard. 
The ship’s main task was surveillance over the “potential enemy,” a “show of flag,” 
and “friendship visits” to the ports of friendly countries. “Of course, we [also] 
closely monitored the world atmosphere in connection with the Pueblo situation,” 
Gromov wrote. After Vdokhnovennyi completed its mission pursuant to the down-
ing of the EC-121, the crew received a short rest before returning to home port.84
Panachev, a senior seaman, and Gromov, the ship’s executive officer, recall 
certain details of the incident differently. For example, was Vdokhnovennyi at 
sea when the EC-121 was shot down? Panachev and Kondratiyev said yes. Did 
Vdokhnovennyi’s crew recover classified materials from the wreckage of the EC-
121 but fail to return them to the Americans? Panachev was unsure; Gromov said 
yes. The following are Admiral Gromov’s closing remarks.
We were put on combat alert and, as the most combat-capable ship, ordered to be 
the first sent to the place of downing. The search task and approximate coordinates 
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were only assigned at sea. Arriving in the region, we started the search and found 
documents, body remains, and details of the plane’s internal parts. We brought 
aboard everything we could during daylight hours. Various documents were there. 
As night approached, we rapidly got to Vladivostok, turned the documents over at 
staff headquarters, and just as rapidly returned to the search zone. Yes, during [our 
prior] service, our ships confronted the Americans all the time—even collisions took 
place—but we, believing that relations had to be equal, couldn’t afford to have the 
Americans dominate. And the Soviet Navy succeeded in doing so. [Owing to the mis-
sion’s classified nature,] [l]ikely, it is all that I can say on your questions.85
In 2008, two sailors from the Soviet destroyer Vdokhnovennyi, CPO Georgy 
Kondratiyev and Yuri Panachev, described their roles in the U.S.-Soviet coopera-
tive salvage effort.86 Their comments came in response to a request from a naval 
club in Saint Petersburg, Russia’s second-largest city, which had received a letter 
from American navy veterans who were attempting to locate Russian sailors who 
had taken part in the search for EC-121 debris.
At the time of the EC-121 incident, Kondratiyev said, his ship was conducting 
combat training missions in the Sea of Japan. Then suddenly it was announced 
that Vdokhnovennyi was going to begin searching for a crashed American plane. 
As he recalled, the ship arrived in the search area during the morning hours. 
Since American ships were “absent nearby,” an agreement was reached between 
the Soviet and U.S. commands for the Soviet ships to assist in the search for plane 
debris while American planes—a Neptune (a Lockheed P-2) and an Orion (a 
Lockheed P-3)—flew over the area believed to be the crash site. According to a 
USN spokesman, it was a USN P-3 patrol plane that guided the Soviet destroyers 
to the area of the debris.87
Kondratiyev said that before the search began the Americans had dropped 
portable transmitters into the water for coordinating the search from the air. 
Meanwhile, Vdokhnovennyi put a motorboat and a rowboat in the water. Kon-
dratiyev, a rower on the ship’s rowboat crew, said he “participated personally in 
the search and gathering [of] plane remains.” Nearby, Steregushchiy also searched; 
Kondratiyev said he could not recall the name of the other ship since it was a mis-
sile antisubmarine ship and their naval units were stationed at different piers in 
the Vladivostok region.88
Kondratiyev then described the range of debris retrieved from the sea. “We 
picked up all floating debris [and placed it into our motorboat]: logbooks, 
clothes, an inflatable raft, lifejackets, spare radio parts wrapped in polyethylene, 
plastic bags with some [unknown] powder, [and] pieces of hull.” As Kondratiyev 
recalls, “Americans showed [us] the area where most of the debris gathered. Our 
command informed the Americans on search results. The search continued all 
day long.”89
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As Kondratiyev recalls, Tucker was to rendezvous with his ship to receive 
the debris. That evening, however, when Tucker arrived, an order was issued to 
return to Vladivostok, urgently. “The Americans followed us up to our territo-
rial waters,” Kondratiyev said, “not understanding our ‘getaway’ as we, ourselves, 
did not.” Only in Vladivostok, he said, was the crew told that North Korea had 
downed a reconnaissance aircraft with thirty-one men aboard. All the debris was 
taken out for examination at night; what they decided to hand over to the Ameri-
cans (to determine the cause of the “accident”) was delivered the next morning. 
Kondratiyev’s words, however, contradict what Panachev and Gromov have said; 
namely, that the crew was told about the incident before heading to the search 
area. Some fifty years after the event, Kondratiyev may have been confused about 
some details.90
Later that same day, Kondratiyev’s ship, the destroyer Vdokhnovennyi, returned 
to the search area, where the items of debris were to be passed to the Americans. 
“At the rendezvous point,” Kondratiyev said, “our ships stood board-and-board 
by right sides, [and the Soviet crewmen were] piped over the side, as motorboats 
were set into the water.” Kondratiyev said there were four or five sailors, plus an 
officer interpreter, in each whaleboat. The recovered items then were transferred 
to the American motorboat.91
Senior seaman Yuri Panachev, from Yuzhnoukrainsk, Ukraine, who also 
served in the crew of Vdokhnovennyi, later provided his firsthand recollections. 
After he left the service, Panachev said he studied medicine and became a phy-
sician. His medical training allowed him to identify later the body parts pulled 
from the water; at the time of the incident, however, Panachev said he only knew 
that they were human remains.92
Panachev said his battle station was located at the stern of the ship. Among 
his duties as a senior electrician, Panachev maintained the rocket-assisted bomb 
launcher’s electrical system. Regarding the North Korean downing of the EC-121, 
Panachev also recalled “picking up debris of an American plane.” He said that 
each iteration always began the same way: “With the shrill ring of the alarm bells, 
‘Stand by, General Quarters!!!’”93
At the time of the incident, Panachev said his ship had been at sea for a few 
weeks—“All was as usual: a watch, rest, maintenance work, cleaning. . . . It was 
boring, but necessary. The sea was growing stormy a bit, but no one worried too 
much about this fact; a long ocean voyage was behind us, stretching . . . from 
Vladivostok to Africa!”94
After supper, Panachev began standing watch at his battle station in the four-
teenth compartment, near the aft rocket launcher. After examining the equip-
ment, Panachev sat in his chair, put the earphone helmet on, and had just begun 
reporting readiness to the main control room when “the so-loved alarm gongs 
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rang.” Surely, it was a call to military service, he thought. “I assumed that a mili-
tary training exercise was starting, [so] I prepared to receive commands, but the 
earphone helmet kept silent. The ship stopped and then dashed forward.”95
After four hours the watch changed and Panachev went to bed. The next 
morning, he woke up to silence, not knowing where the destroyer had rushed to. 
Panachev recalled American planes dropping something red into the water by 
parachute, which turned out to be a portable transmitter. “It was brought to the 
[main control room] immediately,” he said.96
Panachev said his BCh-3 (Combat Unit–3) was responsible for the lowering 
of the working boat (located on the port side amidships) into the water.97 The 
crewmen then climbed down into the boat by storm ladder. “There were five of 
us and an officer,” he said. But the men were not given instructions until after 
the whaleboat had left the destroyer; at that point, the officer explained the tasks 
the men were to perform, which were to pick up everything floating on the sea 
surface and check attentively whether men were in the water.98
No debris was spotted at first. The men then heard an odd sound that sur-
prised them—a sound that appeared to come from tiny hammers striking the side 
of the boat. At first glance, it appeared the “hammers” were in fact a large mass 
of shattered glass bottles. But once the men began picking up the glass from the 
surface of the water with a skimmer, closer examination revealed that it actually 
consisted of the shattered remnants of radio vacuum tubes off the U.S. spy plane. 
The men placed the glass fragments into buckets.99
Nothing else was seen on the water until they spotted a piece of EC-121 fuse-
lage, which Panachev estimated to be approximately 2 by 1.5 meters in size; but 
he found it not to be too heavy, owing to its honeycomb construction. Later, a lot 
more debris began to pop up, including numerous thick books whose pages were 
filled with figures—presumably classified material. After the men loaded up their 
motorboat with debris they returned to their ship.100
When their boat got under way again, the men were ordered to pick up “jour-
nals”—entire publications—that had floated to the surface. Other items retrieved 
included aircraft covering (notably inner covering), greenish in color, that was 
said to resemble a passenger car seat cover. There was so much of it, Panachev 
said, that it filled half the motorboat. The boatswain, Warrant Officer Kolosov, 
whom Panachev described as a “practical person,” said everything picked up 
would be useful—and he was right; the covering, about 5 mm thick, later was 
used to line stools and cover lockers inside their ship.101
The men also pulled human remains out of the water, undoubtedly those of 
the crew of the EC-121—the inner organs of the abdomen (small bowel, a part of 
the large intestine, and a part of the liver with stomach)—which they placed in 
a small sack. Around lunchtime, a command was issued to hoist the motorboat 
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and rowboat into the ship, alarm bells rang, and Vdokhnovennyi rushed off (to 
Vladivostok, as the men found out later).102
When the ship arrived in port that evening, Panachev said his ship was 
moored stern to at a pier to which they never had been before. At daybreak, 
Combat Unit–3 began off-loading the debris. Before arriving at Vladivostok, 
with the debris already wrapped in polyethylene, the executive officer of Vdokh-
novennyi (Gromov) explained the next part of their mission to the crew over 
the intercom—with words to the effect that “we are going to a rendezvous with 
an American destroyer to pass the found plane fragments, so be vigilant.” Then 
the zampolit, the Communist Party official aboard the ship, added that “the 
enemy was crafty and very capable of provocation, but he didn’t clarify which 
one [i.e., specify the Americans]. Well, yes; we did not know this!” Panachev 
said sarcastically.103
FIGURE 5
USN SMALL BOATS APPROACH THE SOVIET RESCUE AND SALVAGE TEAM, WITH 
TUCKER IN THE BACKGROUND
Source: Yuri Panachev, via The Tin Can Sailor.
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When Vdokhnovennyi reached the rendezvous point, the American destroyer al-
ready was waiting around for them. “We stared at her severely,” Panachev said. “Here 
he is, the visible enemy!” The Soviets then set a motorboat back into the water and 
began loading the collected debris into it. When they got under way, they imagined 
passing the load to the Americans: “So rugged and toothless enemies will sail now.”104
Just then, Panachev said, “a motorboat popped out from behind the American 
destroyer’s aft and headed towards us. We moved slowly.” But instead of “the en-
emy,” he said that a light, swift motorboat with flag flying approached, with some 
“joyful Americans” aboard. “The Americans—young, smiling guys—were telling 
us something and waving. Our brains went numb, really. They were the same as 
us—tense anxiety disappeared immediately. I began taking photos, forgetting 
about the debris. Someone from their side gave the order. Stretching out their 
arms to take the load, we handed them all [over].”105
As CPO Kondratiyev recalls, salvage operations ended with a courteous part-
ing of the ways, when a USN officer thanked the Soviet command for assistance. 
After exchanging a few words, he handed a butane cigarette lighter in its case to 
the Russian interpreter, plus two more lighters to be passed along to the Soviet 
ship’s commanding and executive officers. Kondratiyev said he was presented 
with a bunch of Playboy magazines—which the zampolit confiscated immediately 
after Kondratiyev’s return to the ship. Kondratiyev also emphasized that no un-
toward incidents took place between the U.S. and Soviet motorboats.106
RESPONSES
During the immediate aftermath of the April 1969 downing of the EC-121 and 
what followed, the incident was viewed through the prism of the Cold War. The 
passage of time, however, brought additional information forward. In the years 
since, greater access to additional records and documents, as well as accounts by 
those who experienced the incident firsthand, has clarified some of the events; 
however, some questions remain—as do differing interpretations of those events.
North Korea
Suffice it to say, North Korea made no contribution to the SAR effort its actions 
had made necessary; on the other hand, neither did it interfere. Although no 
North Korean ships were sighted during the joint SAR operation, Soviet sailor 
Yuri Panachev recalls that two North Korean MiGs flew over at low altitude. 
“They dipped their wings [mockingly] and disappeared.” Someone shouted that 
they were Korean aircraft, Panachev said.107 What a shock it must have been for 
those North Korean pilots to witness their supposed friends (the Russians) work-
ing cooperatively with their sworn enemies (the Americans).
Four days after the search came to a halt, word reached Washington of a state-
ment from Pyongyang that suggested North Korea might shoot down additional 
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U.S. reconnaissance planes in the future.108 Would there continue to be such re-
connaissance flights? A 1969 article in Newsweek titled “An Exercise in Restraint” 
claimed that the downing of the EC-121 and crew in the frigid waters of the Sea 
of Japan had “immediately plunged the U.S. into a soul-searching examination of 
the parameters of its global power.”109
According to a Nixon administration source, “a lot of problems [had] to be 
sorted out” before EC-121 flights could be resumed on a regular basis—but 
flights continued nonetheless.110 According to United Press International, about 
a week after the downing, the Japanese press and television outlets reported from 
Tokyo that an EC-121 had taken off from an air base in Japan, and Japanese 
television filmed the plane as it took off from the base at Atsugi. A U.S. military 
spokesman declined to comment.111
North Korea’s official press agency responded by issuing a 2,300-word decla-
ration from Pyongyang. The message, monitored in Tokyo, castigated President 
Nixon for his decision to continue reconnaissance flights—now with fighter 
cover—and for forming a powerful USN task force (TF 71) in the Sea of Japan, 
which clearly was designed to intimidate Kim Il-sung’s regime.112 A segment of 
the message specifically concerning the EC-121 incident read as follows:
Even though the U.S. imperialists insist, in word, that their planes will fly over  
high seas, there is no ground to guarantee that they will not intrude into the territo-
rial air of our country again.
FIGURE 6
UGRA-CLASS SUB TENDER
Source: Smart Maritime Group website.
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. . . If the reconnaissance planes of the U.S. imperialists intrude into the territorial air 
of our country, we will not sit with folded arms, but will take resolute measures for 
safeguarding our sovereignty as ever. 
Then the U.S. imperialists will use this as a pretext to commit a full-scale armed at-
tack against us, which may only lead to another total war in Korea in the end.113
The Press
It was press coverage of the unfolding events that first brought to the world’s at-
tention the role the Soviet Union was playing in the aftermath of the downing. 
The fact that the Soviets indeed were participating in the EC-121 SAR operation 
became public once the Fifth Air Force, headquartered in Japan, released pho-
tographs of Soviet destroyers in the general search area. The photos were taken 
from a 36th ARRS C-130.114
When planes of the USAF Reserve first flew low over the crash scene, they 
photographed Steregushchiy, a large Soviet antisubmarine ship. One of those 
photos then was released to the AP wire service, in what is known as a handout. 
A few days after the attack, a high-resolution photo of Steregushchiy with one of 
its whaleboats nearby, searching for debris and possible survivors, accompanied 
a front-page-headline story in the New York Times. The caption under the photo 
read, “IN THE SEA OF JAPAN: A motor launch moves away from a Soviet de-
stroyer [sic] to pick up debris believed to be from the missing U.S. intelligence 
plane. Soviet ships are taking part in the search at the request of the United 
States.”115
Another photo shows whaleboats of USS Tucker and the Soviet destroyer 
Vdokhnovennyi approaching each other, with a C-130 circling overhead.116 A 
third photo, said to be of poor quality, bore the handwritten caption: “Destroyer 
picking up piece of yellow metal from area.”117 This photo, taken when debris 
had not yet been identified positively, shows a motor launch, apparently from a 
Soviet destroyer, with men leaning over the gunwales and possibly holding the 
yellow metal.118 As the operation was drawing to a close, the New York Times con-
cluded its detailed account of the incident with a front-page story entitled “U.S. 
Fliers Describe Soviet Aid on Plane” that ended with the words “Thus closed an 
extraordinary three days [sic; actually four] of Soviet-American cooperation.”119
However, not all press coverage took the opportunity to highlight the Soviet 
contribution. An article in Pacific Stars & Stripes (under the title “N. Koreans 
Down Navy Recon Plane”) mentioned how Tucker and the frigate USS Dale were 
expected to reach the search area, but it made hardly any mention of the Soviet 
ships that were first to arrive at the crash site, nor did an AP press release that 
appeared within that Pacific Stars & Stripes article make any mention of Soviet 
ships. The only other immediate mention, in fact, appeared in accounts of a press 
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conference held by Senator Everett M. Dirksen (R-IL). At a White House meet-
ing, Dirksen said the EC-121 had possible survivors and that legislative leaders 
were informed that two ships, “believed to be Russian, were moving toward the 
spot where the plane was downed.”120
Some of the later press coverage focused on questions, not answers. A June 
1969 article in Air Reservist magazine wondered why Soviet ships “happen[ed] 
to be in the area” and why they arrived at the crash site before American ships.121 
Part of the answer was simply the proximity of the last known position of the 
missing EC-121 to Vladivostok. In addition, we now know that the two U.S. 
ships involved in the SAR operation were delayed in getting under way, as noted 
previously. Whether there were any other reasons for the quick Soviet response 
remains a matter of speculation.
In 2004, Professor Narushige Michishita, now at the National Graduate In-
stitute for Policy Studies in Tokyo, referenced the North Korean downing of the 
USN EC-121 reconnaissance plane in an article in the Korean Journal of Defense 
Analysis. The article makes no mention, however, of the joint U.S.-Soviet SAR 
effort. Instead, Michishita explains how 1966–72 represented the “genesis” of 
North Korean military-diplomatic campaigns. At the time of the incident, North 
Korea employed MiG-21 fighters, which he writes were “newly introduced from 
the Soviet Union.” The April 1969 incident marked the first successful intercep-
tion, after failed attempts had been made in January 1954, February 1955, June 
1959, and April 1965—a clear sign that the “military balance had been gradually 
shifting in favor of North Korea,” Michishita wrote.122
In 2017, Van Jackson, an associate professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Se-
curity Studies, wrote an essay on the EC-121 downing for the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars. In accordance with what he describes as North 
Korea’s “coercive theory of victory,” Jackson states that the incident had “special 
meaning in the history of U.S.–North Korea relations.” Although the Soviets had 
exercised “little to no control” over North Korean foreign policy, Jackson avers 
that they had attempted to restrain North Korea on several occasions.123 Again, 
there was no mention of this rare joint SAR effort between the United States and 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
The Nixon Administration
The separate but related questions of what role, if any, the Soviet Union might 
have played in North Korea’s downing of the American plane and the role it might 
play, and in fact already had played, in the resultant SAR case were intertwined 
from the start. On the day of the downing, Secretary of State William P. Rogers 
had a fifteen-minute conversation with Soviet ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin 
that was not in any way a protest but rather an appeal for assistance.124 Behind 
the scenes, Rogers and Henry A. Kissinger, President Richard M. Nixon’s national 
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security advisor, had spoken on the telephone. According to a transcript of their 
conversation, Rogers said he was going to have Dobrynin in at noon. Kissinger 
said the president did not want any protests to anyone. In response, Rogers said 
he was not going to protest, he just wanted to talk to Dobrynin about helping to 
save the men. In a later telephone conversation, Nixon and Kissinger discussed 
the idea of a formal protest but “decided [it] should not be done with Soviets.”125
A few days after the attack, it was only in accompaniment to a headline story, 
entitled “U.S. to Emphasize Diplomatic Steps on Loss of Plane,” quoting U.S. 
government officials that “[d]iplomatic action rather than military retaliation 
will be the Nixon Administration’s essential response to North Korea’s shooting 
down of a United States reconnaissance plane” that the New York Times printed 
the front-page photo of Steregushchiy and its whaleboat. As noted previously, the 
caption accompanying that photo noted that the Soviet ships were taking part in 
the search at the request of the United States.126
During a press conference on 18 April, President Nixon addressed the down-
ing of the EC-121. “As was pointed out in the protest that was filed at Panmunjom 
yesterday, and also in the Defense Department statement,” the president said, “the 
plane involved was an unarmed Constellation, propeller driven.” Nixon said that 
the plane was conducting reconnaissance, but at no time had it come closer than 
forty miles to the coast of North Korea. “[A]ll of the evidence that we have,” the 
president said, “indicates that it was shot down approximately 90 miles from the 
shores of North Korea while it was moving outward, aborting the mission on orders 
that had been received.” He said they knew this because of U.S. radar; more impor-
tant was the fact that “the North Koreans knew it based on their radar.” Therefore, 
the attack was unprovoked, Nixon stated. “It was deliberate. It was without warn-
ing. The protest has been filed: The North Koreans have not responded.”127
Nixon also said that such missions were not uncommon. “This year [and it 
was only mid-April] we have had already 190 of these flights without incident, 
without threat, without warning, at all.” The president observed that, throughout 
the period of the Nixon administration, in response to an increasing number of 
North Korean incidents and threats of military action against South Korea and 
against the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea, “[w]e have had a policy of recon-
naissance flights in the Sea of Japan, similar to this flight.”128
When asked about North Korea’s motives and whether he saw any parallels or 
patterns between the attacks against the EC-121 and USS Pueblo, the president 
said the Pueblo incident was “quite different,” in two respects. As for Pueblo, there 
was some uncertainty for a time regarding the location of Pueblo at the moment 
of the attack. “Present indications are that the Pueblo was in international waters,” 
the president said; in contrast, regarding the EC-121 there was no uncertainty: the 
United States knew what North Korean radar showed. “We incidentally [also] know 
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what the Russian radar showed,” the president said. “And all three radars [including 
America’s] showed exactly the same thing.” Under the circumstances, Nixon called 
it “completely [a] surprise attack.”129 Subsequently, when North Korea asserted that 
the EC-121 had intruded into “the territorial air of our country,” the White House 
contradicted that contention, averring that the USN plane was over international 
waters and well off the coast of North Korea when the two MiG jets attacked it.130
When asked what role, if any, the Soviet Union may have played in the EC-121 
incident, Nixon replied as follows:
The Soviet role in the plane incident first is one of being of assistance to the United 
States in recovering the debris and looking for survivors. And we are most grateful 
to the Soviet Union for helping us in this respect. Our intelligence—and of course no 
one can be sure here—indicates that the Soviet Union was not aware that this attack 
was to be made. North Korea is not a nation that is predictable in terms of its actions. 
It is perhaps more than any other nation in the Communist bloc completely out of 
[the] control of either the Soviet Union or, for that matter, Communist China.131
While the U.S. government was appreciative of Soviet efforts to search for 
possible survivors of the EC-121 and remained uncertain about the degree of 
Soviet influence over North Korean actions, Ambassador Beam left the follow-
ing cautionary note with Soviet premier Aleksey Kosygin during a face-to-face 
meeting in Moscow on 22 April 1969. “The shootdown of our aircraft is only the 
most recent example of developments in the area which lead to increased tension 
and which must be a source of concern to the Soviet Government as well as to us. 
We hope the Soviet Union will do what it can to restrain the North Koreans from 
such irresponsible acts since we believe it to be in our mutual interest to avoid 
further exacerbation of tension in the area.”132
Pentagon analysts stated they believed that the Soviets “probably” had warned 
North Korea against a repetition of either the seizure of a ship such as Pueblo or 
the shooting down of an American plane. The Pentagon also believed the Soviets 
had warned the North Koreans that they would not support them with either war 
supplies or forces should a future attack lead to hostilities with the United States.133 
Fortunately, neither type of tragedy involving North Korea has occurred since.
In the short term, the U.S. Navy seems to have been less ambivalent regarding 
Soviet cooperation in the SAR operation than the rest of the government. Three 
months after the EC-121 incident, Fred S. Hoffman, a military writer for the AP in 
Washington, DC, noted a distinct thawing of the Cold War. He stated that Ameri-
can admirals, who had thundered for years about the growing Soviet naval chal-
lenge, were being “unusually restrained about a Russian squadron making a ‘show 
the flag’ voyage to Cuba.”134 This was the first mention of any warming since the 
U.S. and Soviet navies had conducted their joint SAR operation in the Sea of Japan.
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Critics
A few days after the joint SAR effort terminated on 19 April, the families of the 
crewmen who had perished, joined by fellow Navy pilots, gathered for simple, 
quiet memorial and prayer services. They were held under a “mild sun on the 
green, dandelion-speckled baseball field” of Naval Air Station Atsugi, Japan.135
Even before the services began, however, some Navy men began to voice anger 
over what they said was Washington’s failure to protect the crew of the recon-
naissance plane. Others expressed frustration over the Nixon administration’s 
decision to forgo a retaliatory strike against North Korea. President Nixon had 
castigated his predecessor for failing to retaliate after the North Korean seizure 
of USS Pueblo, yet Nixon did nothing more in retaliation following the EC-121 
downing than President Lyndon B. Johnson had done fifteen months earlier. Ac-
cording to a young naval officer interviewed by a reporter off base, “After it hap-
pened, every man in the [Air] Station wanted to go and zap the North Koreans 
with everything we had. . . . I suppose Nixon had his reasons, but we cannot help 
feeling badly that nothing was done.”136
As noted, when Nixon was asked whether the U.S. government believed the 
Soviets knew in advance of the North Korean plan to shoot down a U.S. recon-
naissance plane, he replied that U.S. intelligence indicated otherwise—but some 
Americans remained unconvinced. Soon after the EC-121 crisis began, the Rev-
erend Paul D. Lindstrom of Prospect Heights, Illinois, the national chairman of 
the Remember the Pueblo Committee, began making a number of extraordinary, 
unfounded claims. According to Lindstrom, “possibly seven” members of the 
EC-121 crew had survived and were picked up by North Korean gunboats, and 
a supposed four-hour delay in advising President Nixon of the shootdown had 
“brought about the failure to rescue the known survivors of the EC-121 who 
parachuted into the Sea of Japan.” Citing an unnamed U.S. government source, 
Reverend Lindstrom also claimed that the MiGs that shot down the EC-121 were 
based in the Soviet Union, not in North Korea—an accusation that Admiral Gro-
mov and others later denied.137
Any delay in responding to the incident, such as the one to which Lindstrom 
referred, might have been caused by Nixon being in a drunken state at the time. 
According to Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist Seymour M. Hersh, “Nixon had 
become violently drunk early in the crisis.”138
Other questions posed by those addressing the incident with a critical eye 
are more general in nature. Yes, after the Pueblo incident the Soviets allegedly 
warned the North Koreans to cease further acts of aggression against the United 
States; yes, when the EC-121 was brought down nonetheless, the Soviets assisted 
in the SAR operation. But when it came to their eagerness to help recover debris, 
was this entirely unselfish? When top secret documents, cryptologic equipment, 
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and secret codes off USS Pueblo fell into Russian hands, the NSA had said it was 
“everyone’s worst nightmare, surpassing in damage anything that had ever hap-
pened to the cryptologic community.”139 Fifteen months later, if similar material 
that Soviet sailors collected after the EC-121 crash was photographed before its 
return or never returned at all, the damage to American cryptology would have 
been no less catastrophic.
Tucker and Dale recovered a few pieces of classified material, among which 
were a radar antenna, a classified photograph, pages from a computer printout, 
and several pages of handwritten operator’s notes found in the personal effects 
of Richard E. Sweeney. Also recovered was “a piece of the bulkhead containing 
the crew’s positions”; presumably this was a chart (attached to a piece of EC-121 
bulkhead) that showed where each crewman aboard the spy plane worked.140
In contrast, according to a top secret NSA report on the incident, no classi-
fied material was in the debris exchanged between Vdokhnovennyi and Tucker. 
When Soviet seaman Yuri Panachev was asked whether all technical books from 
the EC-121 were returned to the U.S. Navy, he replied, “We threw thick books 
into plastic sacks as well; if they were returned, I am not aware.”141 Meanwhile, a 
complete list of the classified material aboard the EC-121 continues to be with-
held from the public.142
Congress
In addition to coverage in the press and statements and press releases issuing 
from the executive branch, the U.S.-Soviet cooperative effort also was discussed 
in Congress. A special subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services 
already had been established and was conducting a full and thorough inquiry 
arising from the capture and internment of USS Pueblo and its crew by the North 
Korean government; its scope was expanded to include the loss of the EC-121.143 
Thus, the parallels between the January 1968 Pueblo incident and the April 1969 
downing of the EC-121 led to an expansion of the subcommittee’s authority.
During an appearance before the subcommittee in connection with the loss of 
the EC-121, General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the JCS, provided a detailed 
account of the incident, including a fairly comprehensive discussion of the Soviet 
role in the SAR effort. General Wheeler noted to the subcommittee that “[t]he 
composition of the search and rescue force at various times subsequent to the loss 
of the EC-121 has been described in briefings and news releases.” He then went 
on to explain how two Soviet ships had joined the search, and that later a third 
ship, a destroyer, also was observed in the area. These three were the only Soviet 
ships known to have participated in the search. “Our search aircraft established 
contact with the Soviet ships,” Wheeler said.144
But whatever goodwill developed between the U.S. and Soviet navies during 
the joint operation was short-lived, and mutual suspicions between these Cold 
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War adversaries did not abate. Spurred by the Soviet Union’s expanding activities 
at sea, the U.S. Navy planned on stepping up and modernizing its intelligence 
operations around the world. Monies for an accelerated intelligence program 
were included in a large funding bill that was pending in the House and Senate 
in October 1969. Navy spokesmen stated that during their testimony behind 
closed doors they had urged that the sums be approved. Included in the Navy 
request was regular funding for “cloak-and-dagger intelligence and counter-
intelligence activities of nearly 1,000 agents operating around the world.” These 
activities ranged from sensitive espionage investigations to an increasing number 
of inquiries into Navy narcotics use. The proposed expansion was requested for 
surveillance on, over, and beneath the high seas; also involved were reports from 
visual sightings, as well as from radar, sound-sensitive sonobuoys, and other 
sophisticated sensors.145
Rear Admiral Frederick J. “Fritz” Harlfinger II, commander of Naval Intel-
ligence Command, told congressional committees that Russia’s new interest in 
sea power was largely responsible for the step-up in requests for congressional 
funding. Referring specifically to the penetration by the modern and expanding 
Soviet fleet into the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean over the preceding 
two years, Harlfinger said, “The urgent effort to improve Naval intelligence ca-
pabilities has been provoked primarily by the steady and continuing expansion 
of Soviet sea power.” The Soviets were showing “increasing competence” in using 
their modern ships and equipment, he said. “More Soviet ships and aircraft are 
going out to sea—going farther and staying out longer.”146
Over a decade later, an aspect of the incident again raised its head in con-
gressional debate. In 1983, Congress was debating a bill on national security; 
specifically, the House was debating further consideration of a bill (H.R. 3231) to 
revise the Export Administration Act of 1979.147 Although the MiG fighters that 
shot down the EC-121 were Soviet made, Representative Gerald B. H. Solomon 
(R-NY) claimed that the Atoll missiles that MiGs used were Soviet copies of 
American technology. An NSA report completed after the EC-121 incident had 
determined that the missiles that brought down the plane probably were of the 
infrared, heat-seeking, Atoll type—a Soviet reverse-engineered replica of the U.S. 
Sidewinder missile.148 Solomon, in his debate remarks, stated that he believed the 
Soviet practice of stealing Western technology that had led to the Atoll missile 
would continue unless the House passed the amendment to the bill currently un-
der debate. He was outraged that the House was being asked to vote on a bill that 
would make it easier for the Soviets to obtain U.S. missile technology. Solomon 
claimed there was a strong relationship between the national security sections of 
the bill and the recent “Korean airline massacre”—the September 1983 downing 
of Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight 007 over the Sea of Japan. “At the same time, 
140
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/1
 S T R E I F E R  &  S A B I T O V  1 3 5
we continue to search for the black box from the KAL destroyed by an Atoll mis-
sile. A Soviet missile which is an exact duplicate of the U.S. Sidewinder missile. 
The Soviet Atoll is a mirror image of U.S. technology and was built with Western 
methods, and Western know-how,” the congressman said.149
At the time of the attack, President Nixon was extremely grateful to the Soviet 
Union for helping in this SAR effort. However, we now know, on the basis of 
the recent testimony of Soviet participants, that the Soviets did not participate 
entirely unselfishly. Following the Pueblo seizure, the North Koreans had passed 
on to the Russians the state-of-the-art ELINT equipment on board that USN spy 
ship. Similarly, in the case of the EC-121 incident, the Russians transferred to 
Vladivostok a load of classified material—perhaps even before the first U.S. war-
ship had arrived on scene.
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 What we now call the Trafalgar campaign took place over the spring and summer of 1805. French, Spanish, and British fleets raced back 
and forth across the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Orders flew from London 
and Madrid, and especially from Boulogne, where Napoléon was camped with 
165,000 men preparing to invade Britain. Confusion was the order of the day. 
French admirals often executed one set of orders, only to learn later that other ad-
mirals were executing an entirely different set. The 
Spanish, recently coerced into the war, struggled to 
catch up with their French allies and prepare their 
fleets for sea. The British, stretched thin owing to 
mismanagement during the recent peace and the 
challenge of fighting two peer competitors at once, 
desperately searched for the French and Spanish 
fleets they had failed to blockade in port. Yet by the 
time Vice Admiral Lord Nelson stepped ashore in 
England for the last time in August 1805, having 
crossed the Atlantic twice, the chaos had resolved 
itself into a large British fleet blockading an even 
larger Franco-Spanish Combined Fleet in Cádiz. It 
was, in effect, the end of the Trafalgar campaign. 
The actual battle, which took place two months 
later, was something of an anticlimax, strategically 
speaking.
This article focuses on one little-noticed aspect 
of the Trafalgar campaign: the role of British vice 
147
Naval War College: Spring 2020 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 1 4 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
admiral Sir John Orde. It is not an obvious point of inquiry, as there is a well-
established historical consensus about Orde’s actions, which can be summarized 
as follows. Orde commanded a detached squadron of five ships of the line tasked 
with blockading a similarly sized force of Spanish ships in Cádiz. On 9 April 1805, 
Orde was surprised to see a fleet of eleven French ships of the line sail through 
the Strait of Gibraltar. The Toulon Fleet, commanded by Admiral Pierre-Charles 
de Villeneuve, had managed to escape Nelson’s watching frigates. As the French 
approached Cádiz, Orde was faced with odds of three to one and caught between 
the two enemy forces. He sensibly withdrew. Assessing the strategic situation, 
Orde knew that for Napoléon to launch an invasion flotilla, the French needed 
to gain control of the English Channel. To do that required the defeat of Britain’s 
largest fleet, which was positioned to guard against that very possibility, in the 
western approaches to the Channel. Whatever Napoléon’s plans were for the 
French and Spanish ships in Cádiz, the appropriate course of action was for Orde 
to concentrate British forces on the strategic point. He did so, arriving in the 
Channel a month later.
By withdrawing to the Channel, Orde had correctly ascertained Napoléon’s 
plans, which indeed did call for a concentration of naval forces in the western 
approaches. No less a luminary than Sir Julian Corbett claimed that Orde was 
the first Englishman to understand the pattern of what was to follow. Corbett 
credited Orde with “penetrating appreciation,” arguing that with the ships under 
his command he “did everything that the means available permitted.”1 Modern 
historians have followed Corbett’s lead. While the incident off Cádiz usually mer-
its just a few lines in the standard narrative, the most recent authoritative works 
have not seen fit to question Corbett’s account. They roundly praise Orde for his 
sound judgment and strategic insight.2
Interestingly, Orde’s contemporaries were less impressed with his actions. 
Corbett’s assessment (from 1910) cut against the previously established opinion 
of Orde and reversed more than a century of criticism and vitriol. The opening 
salvos were fired as soon as news of Orde’s actions reached London. Fellow naval 
officers were eager to second-guess his decisions. One officer bemoaned that 
Orde had been timid in the face of the enemy, implying that Orde should have 
stayed and fought Villeneuve.3 Others thought he should have sought to join the 
squadron under Sir Robert Calder off Ferrol, and still more argued that he should 
have shadowed Villeneuve to the West Indies.4 Orde was a notoriously unpopular 
officer, as this article will explore, but his personal qualities do not explain the 
ferocity of the attacks launched against him in the aftermath of the campaign. 
One letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty said that Orde should be fired, “and 
I hope broke, if not shot, for his disgraceful and cowardly conduct.”5 The echoes 
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of Admiral John Byng’s execution for cowardice in 1757 are unmistakable. Orde 
and his contemporaries were operating in an environment in which British of-
ficers were expected to lead their forces into heroic battle no matter the odds and 
no matter the strategic situation.6
The nineteenth-century criticism of Orde goes too far, and there is no need 
to revive it. We should not judge Orde as Byng was judged. However, Corbett’s 
influential argument is overdue for a critical reading. Corbett’s main thrust—that 
Orde was correct to bring his ships back to the Channel—holds up well. Given 
the balance of numbers and the state of Orde’s fleet, attempting to fight likely 
would have been catastrophic. Orde also demonstrated laudable insight into 
Napoléon’s ultimate purpose. Yet he did not do “everything that the means avail-
able permitted.” At the moment the French fleet appeared off Cádiz, Orde pos-
sessed more information than any other British flag officer. His knowledge of the 
whereabouts and strength of the Combined Fleet placed immense responsibility 
on him to share that information as widely and quickly as possible. He failed in 
this mission, which cost Nelson a good chance of bringing the campaign to a halt 
six months before Trafalgar.
The preceding is a summary of the initial goal of this article: to speak to naval 
historians and, by delving deeply into the archival record, revise the standard 
account of the Trafalgar campaign. But there is more to say. Ironically, the closer 
we examine a historical event, the more uncertainty we uncover. At some point, 
we reach the end of the available empirical evidence and enter a realm where 
individual thought processes are impossible to reconstruct. A fundamental chal-
lenge of empirical historical research is to put ourselves in someone else’s head: to 
empathize, while remaining detached; to use judiciously our knowledge of how 
the story ends; and to describe the known unknowns and retreat in the face of 
the unknown unknowns.
It is easy to become uncomfortable with these processes, and historians often 
are quick to step back from considering individual motivations and impose struc-
tures that seek to make sense of the human experience. This article attempts to do 
both: it asks what role human nature plays in the conduct of naval operations, and 
how we can connect the answer to that question to broader questions of strategy. 
Taking a microscope to one man’s role in a historical event uncovers the tension 
between organizations and their personnel—their fallible, jealous, self-interested, 
human personnel. Strategists behind the scenes must plan; commanders on the 
spot must act. A detailed, intensive examination of one commander’s actions 
raises broader questions of strategy and command structure. Under scrutiny, we 
find the uncertainties of human emotions and motivations. Stepping back, we 
see how the organization in which the man operated set him up for failure. Naval 
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officers are intimately familiar with the human element in naval operations, as 
they grapple with it daily. What follows provides a case study of strategic and 
operational failure in one of the most well-known campaigns in naval history.
Readers will be unsurprised to learn that Orde’s failure was not solely his own. 
The Admiralty set him up for failure by breaking with precedent, ignoring obvi-
ous sources of political and personal conflict, and creating problematic command 
boundaries. In today’s parlance, the Admiralty created a problem along the seams 
of areas of responsibility, leading to a failure of information sharing. Revisiting 
the messy details of the confusing Trafalgar campaign provides an opportunity 
to reassess the role that Orde played in it, and to call more attention to the role of 
Admiralty mismanagement in prolonging it. Orde’s failure to inform Nelson of 
the French fleet’s disposition is an example of a failure to achieve mission com-
mand. Demarcating command responsibilities requires senior commanders to 
communicate their intent; junior commanders to understand that intent; and 
everyone, throughout the system, to trust in commanders on the spot. The chal-
lenge is to choose the appropriate personnel and provide them with structures 
and instructions that help them succeed in rapidly changing tactical situations.7
SETTING THE STAGE
John Orde was born in 1751 to a family of landed gentry in Northumberland. His 
older brother Thomas was a politician who married the natural daughter of the 
Duke of Bolton. As a result, throughout his career John could rely on extensive 
connections with the great and the good. He joined the navy in 1766, was com-
missioned a lieutenant in 1773, and first experienced combat in the American 
Revolutionary War. His big break came when Lord Howe appointed him first 
lieutenant of his flagship in 1777. He then gave him command of a sloop, and in 
May 1778 made him post captain into the frigate Virginia.8
The date of his promotion to post captain is significant. Post captain was the 
highest rank to which an officer could be promoted on merit regardless of previ-
ous rank, seniority, or experience. From there, promotion proceeded by seniority 
alone (although employment depended on a mixture of talent and connections). 
The date of seniority for post captains influenced their seniority for the remain-
der of their careers. The sooner you were promoted to post captain, the sooner 
you would be promoted to rear admiral, although most officers had to wait about 
twenty years.9 Nelson, despite being seven years younger than Orde, was made 
post in June 1779.10 That thirteen-month difference in seniority would prove 
pivotal in later years.
When peace arrived in 1783, Orde was appointed governor of Dominica, an 
island newly acquired by the British in the peace settlement. Here he first came 
into contact with Nelson, who was stationed in Antigua during the peace. At 
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Dominica, Orde worked to improve the harbor and solidify British rule, and 
was successful enough to be rewarded with a baronetcy at the end of his tenure 
in 1790. Yet there were hints of trouble: Orde had clashed with the colonial as-
sembly in Dominica over funding for harbor improvements. Cuthbert Colling-
wood, who had served with both Nelson and Orde in the West Indies, thought 
Orde’s actions were justified. He wrote to Orde, “Men of honour and strict in-
tegrity in a high publick station will ever be obnoxious to a certain description 
of people. . . . I hope you will never return to them, and that the day will come 
when they lament your absence.”11 
Collingwood’s high opinion of Orde was not widely shared.12 Although Orde’s 
career up to 1790 had been successful, the clash with the Dominican colonial as-
sembly foreshadowed the problems that would plague him for the rest of his life. 
An Audit Office investigation of Orde later found that Collingwood’s praise was 
unwarranted: in fact, Orde had mismanaged public funds while governor, cost-
ing him £2,420 in penalty fees.13 Not only did Orde demonstrate repeatedly an 
unsavory enthusiasm for profiting off his public service, but he also lacked tact 
and judgment in dealing with fellow officers. The general consensus was that he 
was arrogant and officious, and few captains who served under him enjoyed the 
experience.14 One captain said that he was “a strange high and haughty man to 
all his Captains, who are all but myself at paper war with him; he has given out 
some curious regulations and signals; he works them from morning till night 
with signals.”15 
Orde was promoted to rear admiral in June 1795. Because of the thirteen-
month difference in seniority, Nelson was not high enough on the post captains 
list to join him, and remained a post captain until February 1797. In 1798, their 
paths crossed fatefully. Orde was serving as third in command of the Mediter-
ranean Fleet under the Earl of St. Vincent. A large French expedition was known 
to be preparing at Toulon for an unknown destination, and St. Vincent, stationed 
at the time off Cádiz, detached a small force to monitor it. Orde was in prime 
position to receive command of this detachment, which promised the possibility 
of a glorious battle. Instead, Nelson, fresh off shore leave to recover from the loss 
of his arm, swooped in and received the plum assignment. The appointment of 
the junior Nelson over Orde rankled: he wrote to St. Vincent, “I cannot conceal 
from your Lordship how much I feel hurt.”16 
Orde’s pain was compounded by interpersonal clashes with Sir Roger Curtis, 
who was both marginally senior to Orde and an officer who reasonably might 
claim to have been at least as disliked in the service.17 Orde made no friends 
in his squadron, either. When one of his captains missed or disobeyed his sig-
nals, he brought all the captains aboard his flagship and publicly reprimanded 
them on the quarterdeck. The episode made news in Britain. One captain 
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requested a court-martial to clear his name—hardly an indication of effective man 
management by his admiral.18 Not only was Orde struggling to get along with fel-
low officers, but the result of Nelson’s detachment was in fact a great fleet victory. 
The Battle of the Nile in August 1798 saw Nelson become the most famous naval 
officer of his generation, solidified his reputation as a daring tactician, and elevat-
ed him to the peerage as Baron Nelson of the Nile. Orde’s jealousy was palpable.
St. Vincent eventually became so fed up with Orde that he sent him home, call-
ing him “a vain ignorant supercilious creature.”19 Orde appealed to the Admiralty, 
requesting that St. Vincent be court-martialed. The Admiralty gently tapped St. 
Vincent on the wrist instead, so Orde waited until St. Vincent, who was in poor 
health after two years at sea, returned to England in June 1799. After granting 
him four months to recover, Orde challenged him to a duel. While dueling had 
long been essential to the maintenance of a gentleman’s honor, it was generally 
in decline in this period, especially in wartime. Orde—stalking an ailing, sixty-
four-year-old man around Essex—looked ridiculous. Lord Spencer, the First 
Lord of the Admiralty, was flabbergasted at Orde’s behavior and asked the king 
to intervene. St. Vincent was forbidden from fighting, which came as a relief to 
all, and Orde had to give a surety of £2,000 to keep the peace.20 
Orde’s disgraceful performance should have ended his career. For the next five 
years, it appeared to have done so. In 1801, St. Vincent became First Lord of the 
Admiralty under the Addington administration. That same year, Nelson—who 
nearly had ruined his career in Naples after the Nile—once again justified all the 
support he had received from St. Vincent and other senior officers by performing 
admirably at the Battle of Copenhagen. Orde languished ashore unemployed on 
half pay, secure in the knowledge that St. Vincent would never consider appoint-
ing him to an active command.
Two events rescued Orde from discreditable obscurity. First, the brief peace 
brought about with the 1802 Treaty of Amiens collapsed with the British declara-
tion of war in May 1803. War naturally increased employment chances for of-
ficers, although with St. Vincent still at the Admiralty Orde had no prospects. In 
the spring of 1804, rumors began to circulate that the Addington ministry was in 
trouble. Orde saw his chance, writing to the secretary of the Admiralty in March 
to request employment.21 The rumors were correct, and in May William Pitt 
returned as prime minister and St. Vincent resigned from the Admiralty. Orde’s 
brother Thomas, now Baron Bolton, had served as the chief secretary for Ireland 
in the 1780s and worked closely with Pitt on Irish affairs. The new First Lord, 
Viscount Melville, was a veteran politician and close associate of Pitt’s. Bolton 
had retired, but he still could advocate for his brother’s career with his former col-
leagues. Despite Orde’s general unpopularity, he did retain some friends among 
152
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/1
 DA N C Y  &  W I L S O N  1 4 7
naval officers who thought St. Vincent had treated him poorly. Admiral Sir Wil-
liam Cornwallis campaigned heavily on his behalf, keeping Orde informed of his 
progress throughout the summer of 1804. As commander in chief of the Channel 
Fleet—the navy’s most important active-duty command—Cornwallis was a pow-
erful ally.22 In August of that year, Sir John Colpoys, one of the members of the 
Board of Admiralty, hinted that Melville might be able to find Orde a position.23 
When the good news of his appointment officially arrived in October, Orde re-
ceived letters of congratulations from a number of prominent officers, including 
Sir James Saumarez and Sir Andrew Snape Hamond, former comptroller of the 
Royal Navy.24 Orde now had a chance to rescue not only his career but also his 
reputation among his peers.
ORDE IN COMMAND
Melville gave Orde command of a small squadron off Cádiz. In September 1804, 
British squadrons were responsible for blockading French squadrons in Toulon, 
Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest, not to mention maintaining superiority in the 
Channel and the North Sea to monitor Napoléon’s invasion preparations. Spain 
was not a belligerent, but the British admiral blockading the French squadron 
holed up in Ferrol was convinced that the Spanish would declare war once they 
received a shipment of treasure from South America. The cabinet acted on this 
intelligence by ordering four British frigates to seize that treasure in October. In 
an attack delivered without warning and without a declaration of war, three Span-
ish ships were captured and the fourth exploded, killing innocent passengers and 
inflaming international opinion against the British.
War with Spain may well have been inevitable, but the capture of the treasure 
ships certainly accelerated the timeline and made an already dangerous strategic 
situation significantly worse. Spain’s declaration of war doubled the number 
of ships of the line facing the British and necessitated additional blockades of 
Spanish ports. Nelson, commanding the Mediterranean Fleet, could spare no 
additional ships to watch Cartagena or Cádiz, so Orde’s squadron was sent from 
Portsmouth to blockade Cádiz.25 
A glance at a map will tell readers that Cádiz is on the Atlantic rather than the 
Mediterranean coast of Spain, and it is reasonable to wonder why the commander 
in chief of the Mediterranean might be held responsible for enemy forces there. 
According to the Admiralty, the Mediterranean Sea and the Mediterranean com-
mand were two different things. The sea, it was generally agreed, was bounded 
in the west by the Strait of Gibraltar; British Mediterranean fleets, however, fre-
quently needed to be stationed west of the strait. Some reasons were geostrategic: 
Cádiz was a major Spanish naval base, and the area between the strait and Cape 
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Saint Vincent was trafficked heavily by ships transiting between northwestern 
Europe and the Mediterranean. Other reasons were practical, as British forces 
could not always depend on well-stocked naval bases in the Mediterranean.
Still, stationing the Mediterranean Fleet outside the Mediterranean was less 
than ideal. From at least the middle of the seventeenth century, the British had 
made concerted efforts to obtain secure naval bases in the sea itself, or at least 
in locations more convenient to the sea than Lisbon. Tangier showed initial 
promise, even though it is on the Atlantic side of the strait; unfortunately, it 
lacked a safe harbor and was difficult to protect from land-based attacks. A bold 
assault was launched against Cádiz in 1702, not only because capturing it would 
sever the connection between Spain and its Atlantic empire, but also because it 
would make a suitable base for Mediterranean operations. The attack failed, but 
it demonstrates that Cádiz long had been thought of as being connected to the 
Mediterranean. Success finally came with the capture of Gibraltar in 1704, but 
little changed immediately; like Tangier, Gibraltar had no anchorage and only 
Cape Spartel
Cape Saint Vincent
Gibraltar
Tétouan
Cape Trafalgar
Tangier
Lisbon
Lagos
Cádiz
Portugal
Spain
Morocco
Atlantic Ocean
Mediterranean 
Sea
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limited dockyard facilities. The best port in the western Mediterranean—which, 
unlike Gibraltar and the Atlantic ports, could be used as a base for blockading 
Toulon—was Mahón, on Minorca, six hundred miles inside the strait. Captured 
by the British in 1708, it was robust enough to sustain a fleet in the Mediterra-
nean. It did not remain in British hands for the whole century, though, making it 
difficult to rely on as a permanent base.
Even when the British did control Minorca, Mediterranean commanders both 
took responsibility for and relied on Atlantic ports. When the fleet was tasked 
with monitoring Cádiz, it relied on the combination of major allied facilities at 
Lisbon, the developing naval base at Gibraltar, and the provisions available for 
purchase in Tangier. The 1798 dispute between Orde and St. Vincent had arisen 
in precisely these circumstances. Cádiz was, in Admiralty terms, under the au-
thority of the commander in chief of the Mediterranean—in 1804, Nelson.26 But, 
as we have seen, Nelson was junior to Orde; Orde’s command, no matter how 
small, could not be considered subordinate to Nelson’s.
This complication was entirely unnecessary. Both Nelson and Orde were high 
up on the seniority lists as vice admirals, and there were numerous qualified 
candidates for the Cádiz command who were junior to Nelson. The Admiralty 
had more admirals than it could employ; finding an eager rear admiral would 
not have been difficult. Orde’s appointment was not the first time Cádiz had 
been separated from the Mediterranean command, but it was the first time that 
the admiral off Cádiz had been senior to the commander in chief of the Mediter-
ranean.27 The political decision to appoint Orde—not only senior to Nelson but 
with a history of jealous conflict with him—created unnecessary and avoidable 
seams in the command structure and complicated information sharing across the 
Strait of Gibraltar.
Melville’s decision to give Orde an independent command off Cádiz therefore 
broke with long-standing precedent. The particular circumstances of the strate-
gic situation in 1804 make the decision even less explicable. Minorca had been 
returned to the Spanish under the terms of the Treaty of Amiens, meaning there 
was no base from which to watch Toulon. A promising new base at Malta—cap-
tured from the French in 1800—might have counterbalanced Minorca’s loss, but 
it was too far from Toulon to be of use to Nelson. For his blockade, he resorted 
to a hodgepodge of Sardinian harbors and out-of-the-way anchorages, but none 
were capable of supporting his fleet logistically. He had to rely, as many British 
admirals had before him, on long communication and supply lines to North Af-
rica and through Gibraltar to the Atlantic coast.28 
Orde took responsibility for Cádiz beginning 27 October 1804. The Spanish 
had six ships of the line preparing for sea, and there was a French ship of the 
line in port as well. Orde’s squadron of five ships of the line was not particularly 
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powerful. His flagship, Glory, was an imposing ninety-eight-gun three-decker, 
but Defence was an elderly seventy-four and the three others—Ruby, Agamem-
non, and Polyphemus—were mere sixty-fours, barely worthy of a position in the 
line of battle. Technically, the Spanish were not yet belligerents, but Orde’s orders 
were clear: he was to prevent French and Spanish ships from leaving port.29 The 
uncertainty in the diplomatic situation may have contributed to Melville’s failure 
to communicate his intent to Orde. In a personal note, separate from the official 
orders, Melville explained that the Admiralty wanted “to have a small cruising 
squadron outside of the Straits of Gibraltar for the protection of our trade and 
watching the enemy.”30 It was not immediately apparent at the time that the 
difference between the official orders (blockade Cádiz) and the personal note 
(protect trade and watch the enemy) would matter. Yet this seemingly innocuous 
discrepancy would feature prominently later in the competing stories about what 
happened when the French appeared in the strait. Melville’s letter and orders 
confused the intended responsibilities of the command.
For his part, Orde did not seek clarification. He finally had returned from the 
wilderness of half pay, and he knew that his new command was ripe with op-
portunities for glory and enrichment. Whether he was supposed to be protecting 
British trade or just blockading Cádiz, he was back at sea in an area he knew well.
Melville had succumbed to pressure from Orde’s relatives and friends—es-
pecially Cornwallis—in agreeing to appoint him, but he also must have thought 
that Orde’s knowledge of the Mediterranean station and Cádiz made him a 
strong candidate. He was wrong. Orde needed to be managed as Orde himself 
managed—that is, by the book, and with an unnecessary number of instructions. 
What was needed off Cádiz was a junior admiral instructed to communicate 
with Nelson—precisely the arrangement that had been in place in the recent past. 
In 1801, Admiral Lord Keith had taken the bulk of the Mediterranean Fleet to 
Egypt, and the Admiralty had sent Vice Admiral Charles Pole to Cádiz. Pole was 
not only junior to Keith but explicitly instructed to place himself under Keith’s 
command if he had to enter the Mediterranean.31 In 1804, Orde was senior to 
Nelson, and he was operating under muddled orders. The Admiralty had set 
Orde up for failure.
Some of Orde’s official orders were clear: he was instructed on arrival to 
send a frigate to Cartagena to check on Spanish preparations there, but from 
that point on he was “not thereafter to employ any of the ships or vessels under 
[his] command within the Mediterranean, except to procure supplies of stores 
or provisions.” The orders were explicit in limiting his ships to travel “occasion-
ally to Tetuan or Tangier to procure fresh beef.” Orde reinforced these orders in 
lengthy regulations issued to his squadron, telling his captains that even Gibraltar 
was off-limits. This particular regulation had more to do with the presence of 
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plague in the garrison there in late 1804 than it did with questions about his area 
of responsibility, but also it indicated that he was cognizant of the demarcation 
between his area and Nelson’s.32 
Seams of Command
It is easy in retrospect to see how the seam between Orde’s and Nelson’s com-
mands would create communication problems, but it was readily apparent at the 
time as well. Orde attempted to placate Nelson immediately on arrival, writing 
to him in November 1804 and offering to “[seize] every occasion of giving Your 
Lordship any material information” in the hopes that Nelson would do the same 
in return. Orde even went so far as to say that Nelson should “command [him] 
without ceremony,” though such an offer probably was never intended seriously.33 
At the same time, Orde ordered all Nelson’s ships to withdraw into the strait, away 
from the vicinity of Cádiz.34
Nelson was taken aback by the decision to slice Cádiz from his command, but 
he does not seem to have held Orde responsible. The personal conflict between 
Orde and Nelson should not be exaggerated. Nelson had not sought to offend 
Orde when Nelson was appointed to command the squadron off Toulon in 
1798, and he does not seem to have held any animosity toward him. Orde was 
unquestionably jealous of Nelson, but his anger was directed at St. Vincent and 
the Admiralty. Orde eventually served as a last-minute replacement pallbearer at 
Nelson’s funeral.35 
However, the structure of the two commands made friction between them un-
avoidable. Nelson spent much of his time as commander in chief in the Mediter-
ranean frustrated by slow and inconsistent instructions from London. He com-
plained to the Admiralty that he had not been informed of Orde’s appointment 
until Orde had announced it himself.36 Placing a senior admiral with a detached 
squadron squarely on his lines of communication promised to complicate, rather 
than simplify, matters. In February 1805, fully three months after Orde’s arrival, 
Orde attempted to clarify the boundary between the two commands. He sug-
gested to the Admiralty that a north–south line could be drawn through Cape 
Spartel, the southwestern edge of the strait. Orde hoped that drawing the bound-
ary on the Atlantic side of the strait would obviate him from being responsible for 
convoys in the strait. He wrote to Nelson, passive-aggressively: “It will therefore 
I presume, be incumbent on your Lordship to provide for this important duty.”37
Meanwhile, Nelson struggled to work around Orde. In March, Nelson told the 
Admiralty that “a report”—no details were given, but one suspects Orde—had 
reached him accusing him of frequently sending his ships out of the Mediter-
ranean. Nelson flatly denied having done so, “except the [frigate] Amazon which 
was sent to Lisbon with my dispatches.”38 Nelson was being disingenuous here. 
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To receive any communication from London, he had to send ships to Lisbon oc-
casionally. He had given secret orders to Amazon to sail well out to the west to 
avoid Orde’s squadron.39 Orde missed Amazon but intercepted another one of 
Nelson’s ships, the sloop Halcyon. Orde added his own dispatches to Nelson’s and 
required Halcyon to call at his squadron on its return. It was nearly impossible 
for Nelson to bypass Orde without violating the command structure arrangement 
or practicing deception.40 
Conflict over Prize Money
What really frustrated Nelson about Orde’s appointment was that Orde’s squad-
ron was in perfect position to profit from the declaration of war against Spain. 
Prize money was the lifeblood of naval warfare, and most officers thought that 
there was no better time to make a fortune than at the beginning of a war, when 
the enemy’s merchant ships were likely to be at sea. Admirals claimed an eighth of 
the value of every prize captured by ships under their command, but since Orde 
did not report to Nelson, Nelson had no claim on prizes captured by Orde’s ships. 
Nelson’s friends commiserated with him: “I have never felt more indignant than 
as Your Lordship’s account of the Admiralty’s treatment of you,” wrote Alexander 
Ball.41 Another correspondent expressed similar sentiments, damning Melville 
(“the Scotch Lord”) and writing, “I am very sorry to hear . . . that Sir John Orde is 
come to skim the cream of the first of the Spanish War off Cadiz.”42 
The cream was very rich, in the end. By mid-December, Orde was already re-
questing Admiralty instructions about what to do with all the money he had on 
board the ships in his squadron. The frigate Lively captured a single ship worth 
£180,000, only to be topped by Polyphemus capturing a Spanish frigate carrying 
1,215,000 Spanish dollars plus bark and cocoa. Collectively, the squadron cap-
tured somewhere between 2.5 and 4 million Spanish dollars, which Orde eventu-
ally sent back to England in Lively.43 If the command off Cádiz had remained a 
part of Nelson’s Mediterranean Fleet, then a share of the bounty would have been 
Nelson’s; instead, it was Orde’s. If Orde congratulated himself on having balanced 
his karmic ledger with Nelson, the evidence has not survived. We can be certain 
that he was immensely pleased with the haul, even if there were significant legal 
battles still to be fought about whether the Spanish ships had been captured be-
fore the official declaration of war.44 
Orde’s enthusiasm for prizes soon got the better of him, however. The routine 
he established while blockading Cádiz was more relaxed than that of his arch-
enemy, St. Vincent. In 1798, in the wake of the great mutinies at Spithead and the 
Nore, St. Vincent had enforced a close blockade to keep his squadron occupied 
and disciplined. The ships were so close to Cádiz that officers had their laundry 
done in town and individuals in the city could be discerned easily from the 
decks.45 Orde took a more reasonable approach, generally staying ten to fifteen 
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miles offshore.46 Such a distance provided flexibility, as he was close enough to 
monitor enemy preparations from his flagship. Orde deployed most of his frig-
ates and sloops elsewhere, and did so aggressively. Lively, Amphion, and Wasp 
received regular two-week cruises intended to capture prizes, while Polyphemus’s 
capture of the valuable Spanish frigate suggests that Orde was even willing to de-
tach ships of the line from his squadron. The more ships cruising, the more likely 
he would be to get an eighth of the value of a prize.47 
The Admiralty was not impressed. On 11 January 1805, their lordships re-
minded Orde of his duty. In a public letter, they accused him of being jealous of 
Nelson’s allocation of frigates because they increased his chances at prize money. 
This was unacceptable: “Their Lordships are unwilling to believe that any officer 
in His Majesty’s Service would consider prize money as an object to which any 
part of the force under his command be primarily appropriated.” They expressed 
their “dissatisfaction” that Orde had wasted their time with “correspondence in 
which competition for prize money seems to be the chief if not the only subject of 
discussion.”48 This was strong language indeed. To reprimand a serving admiral 
for greed in an official letter was both shocking and exceedingly rare.
Orde clearly was stung. From his perspective, he had behaved exactly as any-
one in his situation would have. And furthermore he had not failed in his core 
mission: the Spanish were still in Cádiz, after all. The prize money dispute was 
ancillary to that (although he was very disappointed when subsequent rumors 
reached him that Nelson had been given a prize agent in Gibraltar with permis-
sion to lay claim to the prizes captured by Orde’s frigates).
But in any case, the real issue was that his orders had been written poorly. 
While the personal note from Melville had told him that his squadron was in-
tended to protect British trade from Cape Saint Vincent to Gibraltar, his official 
orders said nothing about that; his mission was to blockade Cádiz. His squadron 
was big enough to do one mission or the other, but not both.49
It is easy to imagine Orde keeping himself awake in the middle of the night by 
composing bitter, biting replies to the Admiralty. Nevertheless, the fact remained 
that he once again had managed to annoy his superiors. This time, presumably, 
he did not contemplate challenging one of them to a duel. Instead, in a letter 
written in his own hand and dated 27 March 1805, he resigned.50 The same day, 
Villeneuve sailed from Toulon.
THE FRENCH ARE OUT
Nelson anticipated that, when Villeneuve sortied, he would head east toward 
Egypt. Setting up a long-range blockade, Nelson kept his frigates off Toulon to 
keep an eye on French movements and deployed his fleet in the close waters 
among Sicily, Sardinia, and Tunisia. If the French went east, they would have to 
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pass through these waters, and Nelson hoped to bring them to battle. From 27 to 
30 March, Nelson was south of Sardinia.
Villeneuve left Toulon and initially made his way south to avoid the British, 
who he thought were off Barcelona.51 On 31 March, the French fleet was observed 
at sea by two frigates under Nelson’s command. Active remained to shadow 
Villeneuve, while Phoebe sailed south in search of Nelson. Active, however, lost 
contact with the French that night, and so also went in search of Nelson in the 
morning.52 For Villeneuve the timing was perfect. On 1 April, he learned from a 
Sicilian merchantman that Nelson was not waiting off Barcelona, and he decided 
to turn west.
News that the French fleet was out reached Nelson on 3 April, first from Phoe-
be and a few hours later from Active, but the frigates told him the French were 
sailing south-southwest, indicating a likely destination to the east.53 Nelson spent 
the next two weeks sailing between the south coast of Sardinia and the northwest 
coast of Sicily, waiting to pounce on the French fleet. He spread his frigates across 
the area, hoping to renew contact with Villeneuve.54
Meanwhile, on 7 April, Villeneuve stopped briefly at Cartagena to collect 
the six Spanish ships of the line anchored there. However, on learning that they 
would not be able to sail for thirty-six to forty-eight hours, and probably expect-
ing the British to be close behind him, he raised anchor late on the night of 7 April 
and set a course for the Strait of Gibraltar.55 
At Gibraltar, the early morning of 9 April did not appear to be much different 
from any other. Fisgard, a frigate from Nelson’s fleet, was anchored behind the 
protective mole where it had been for almost four weeks making major repairs. 
Fisgard’s captain, Lord Mark Kerr, busied his crew loading provisions.56 Twenty-
four hours earlier, a convoy of forty-six merchant ships had left Gibraltar for Eng-
land, escorted by one of Orde’s frigates, Mercury, and a sloop. A seventy-four-gun 
ship of the line from Nelson’s fleet, Renown, commanded by Sir Richard Strachan, 
also was refitting at Gibraltar. Strachan sailed with the convoy to provide extra 
protection through the Strait of Gibraltar, known as the Gut.57 Spanish gunboats 
and privateers often took advantage of the fourteen-mile-wide choke point, pick-
ing off merchantmen that strayed too far from Royal Navy protection. Strachan 
parted with the westbound convoy just off Cape Trafalgar at noon on 8 April, 
and by first light on 9 April he had positioned Renown at the southwestern end of 
the Gut, about five or six miles northeast of Cape Spartel, preparing to fight the 
fresh easterly headwind and beat his way back to Gibraltar. Strachan could see the 
Rock rising slowly above the horizon in the early morning light, as Renown made 
headway back through the Gut.
The calmness of the morning was shattered when sails began to appear over 
the eastern horizon. By 10 AM, it was clear that these sails belonged to a large fleet. 
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Kerr signaled Strachan about the strange fleet, then hastily set about making his 
ship ready for sea.58 Strachan also had spotted the ships and was using the fresh 
easterly wind to make all possible speed to the northwest to warn Orde’s squad-
ron off Cádiz, collecting the sloop Sophie en route. By 11 AM, Kerr, still making 
ready for sea at Gibraltar, counted eleven French ships of the line, five or six 
frigates, and two brigs passing through the Gut—no doubt an impressive sight. 
Kerr quickly issued orders to send a recently captured brig east with dispatches 
to warn Nelson.59 By 2 PM, Fisgard’s crew had completed the herculean effort 
of readying their ship for sea. Kerr gave orders to haul Fisgard out of the mole 
at Gibraltar, making all sail westward to take advantage of the easterly wind to 
pass well south of the last known French position. Kerr raced back to England to 
notify the Admiralty that the French were out, but all he knew was that they had 
passed through the strait—nothing more.60 
At 2 PM, Orde and his flag captain both observed a strange ship of the line 
approaching, firing guns, but it was 2:20 PM before they could make out the sig-
nal for “enemy approaching,” and 2:45 PM before they could identify the ship as 
Renown. Orde’s squadron was in a precarious position at anchor nine miles off 
Cádiz. Included in the convoy that had sailed through the Strait of Gibraltar on 
the previous day were six transport ships filled with supplies, and Orde’s ships 
were badly in need of water and provisions. The transports were currently along-
side, and the ships’ yards were employed hoisting provisions on board. When 
Renown made contact, decks were littered with supplies waiting to be lowered 
into the hold, and the squadron was not in a position to set sail quickly, much less 
clear the decks and prepare for action.61 
At that time, Orde could not have known Villeneuve’s mission. There was 
a very real possibility that it was to catch and overpower Orde’s squadron off 
Cádiz, and since the wind was coming from the east, Villeneuve had the weather 
gauge. Accordingly, Orde’s squadron began casting off the transports, throwing 
overboard the casks and staves that had yet to be stored in the hold, and clearing 
for action. Orde busied himself sending dozens of signals, annoying his captains. 
Even working at a frantic pace, it was 4 PM before the ships of the squadron were 
ready to weigh anchor, which they did in company with the transports, and made 
sail to the west, joined by Renown and Sophie. At this point, Villeneuve’s squad-
ron was within sight of Orde’s flagship and was observed to be sailing along the 
coast toward Cádiz. By 7 PM, Orde’s squadron had lost sight of the French fleet 
in the fading light. The immediate threat of action with a superior enemy force 
to windward had passed.62 
After recognizing that his squadron was outnumbered, Orde quickly decided 
to sail west and retreat to the Channel. Whatever plans the Combined Fleet might 
have, Orde could not force it into Cádiz, fight it on equal terms, or (as he later 
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claimed) shadow it without risking disastrous battle. It was also at this time—on 
the evening of 9 April—that Orde first had an opportunity to relay information 
of the French presence to the surrounding British forces and the Admiralty. Orde 
had no way of knowing that Kerr had sent a ship in search of Nelson, nor that 
he had sailed to England. Regardless, Kerr’s intelligence did not include what 
the French had done once they passed through the strait. At that moment, Orde 
knew more about the French disposition and intentions than any other officer 
in the Royal Navy. It was essential to share that information with the Admiralty 
and the commanding officers of other British fleets. Only hours after getting his 
squadron safely under way, Orde gave dispatches to Commander Philip Rosen- 
hagen aboard Sophie and ordered him to “inform [the Channel Fleet] of the Con-
voy sailing and of the French Fleet having passed the Gutt, also the Spaniards hav-
ing 9 or 10 sail of the line ready for Sea.”63 Orde also stated that he did not know 
the Combined Fleet’s intentions, but he was “of opinion it must be westward.”64
Orde correctly gauged that his first action should be to inform the Admiralty. 
However, once Sophie had departed, Orde also had responsibility to spread this 
information across the seams of the surrounding commands. One problem he 
immediately faced was that the wind changed. The easterly wind, which had 
been favorable to his quick departure from the waters off Cádiz and the French 
fleet’s push through the strait, shifted over the course of 10 April to a strong wind 
blowing from the west-southwest. Orde’s squadron therefore made little progress 
toward the west over the next two days, not arriving off Cape Saint Vincent until 
late on 12 April, when the wind shifted again and blew strongly from the north-
northwest. This prevented the squadron from making any northern progress 
until the 19th.65 
During his slow passage, Orde had plenty of opportunities to think carefully 
about how to arrange his forces and communicate his intelligence. On 11 April, 
he ordered the frigate Amphion and two sloops, Wasp and Beagle, to cruise off 
Cape Saint Vincent until they received further orders. Captain Sutton of Amphion 
was directed to inform any British ships passing of the presence of the French 
fleet and to order warships to return to the Channel or, if the French returned 
through the strait, to head to the Mediterranean. Along with these orders were 
dispatches that Sutton was to have delivered to Lisbon.66 On 12 April, Orde 
dispatched the frigate Mercury to Barbados and Jamaica, warning that the Com-
bined Fleet was at large and possibly sailing for the West Indies.67 Orde ordered 
Mercury to call at Madeira en route, “without anchoring,” and forward a letter to 
the East Indies with similar information.68 
At no point after making contact with the French fleet did Orde attempt to 
send any information east to Nelson; instead, he left a letter for Nelson at Lis-
bon, where the chances of Nelson receiving it were low. The Mediterranean is, 
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admittedly, large, and Nelson’s fleet could have been anywhere from Egypt to 
Spain; furthermore, the areas of responsibility as laid out by the Admiralty clearly 
separated Orde from the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, given that his ships were 
allowed to resupply at Gibraltar, it would have been reasonable to leave a letter 
for Nelson there.
Strachan clearly thought that was the correct course of action. In the week 
after joining Orde’s squadron, he sent him five letters, first suggesting, and then 
pleading, that contact needed to be made with Nelson. On 9 April, Strachan told 
Orde that he thought Fisgard was still fitting out at Gibraltar and unlikely to sail 
until the next day, with unknown intentions, but possibly east to find Nelson. 
He also stressed that he did not know where Nelson was, and feared he had gone 
east to Egypt. The following day, seemingly aware that Orde had no intentions of 
going east or sending news east, Strachan claimed that he may have misspoken 
about Nelson’s location. Nelson was probably somewhere between Sardinia and 
Malta, and would not sail toward Egypt if the French were out with an easterly 
wind. He also said that he thought it likely that Nelson was in pursuit of the 
French, possibly a couple of days behind. In his third letter, Strachan reinforced 
this guess, and also stressed that Renown was critically low on water—a clear 
hint that he thought Orde should let him return to Gibraltar. In his fourth and 
fifth letters, written as Orde’s squadron struggled to make northern progress, he 
doubled down on the poor condition of Renown, which he said was leaking more 
every day, and with masts and rigging in such poor condition that he feared they 
would be carried away in a strong wind. From his tone, it is clear that Strachan 
did not wish to leave the vicinity of the strait or to be detached from Nelson’s 
fleet. He grew increasingly desperate to return to Gibraltar, although once the 
squadron began making progress north he resigned himself to his fate.69 
In a personal letter to Nelson written two weeks later, Strachan expressed his 
frustration with Orde’s decision-making. Strachan said he had planned to return 
to Gibraltar once he had warned Orde of the French fleet, but Orde forced him 
to join his squadron. Moreover, Orde had taken “Renown from her station at a 
time he had determined to leave Cadiz without entertaining whether the enemy 
proceeded from Cadiz to the westward, or returned up the Mediterranean, or 
whether your Lordship followed them.”70 Strachan and Orde had a fraught re-
lationship even before the incident off Cádiz. In December, Orde had accused 
Strachan of lingering in the strait in pursuit of a prize, disobeying direct orders 
from Orde to return to the Mediterranean—here again, the seams of the area 
of responsibility created unnecessary conflicts. Orde had taken his complaint 
all the way to the Admiralty, which responded (the day after rebuking him for 
pursuing prizes) that it hoped “from the character which Sir Richard holds in the 
Service, that he will be able to assign such reasons as will remove any unfavorable 
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impression which may have been formed.”71 The Admiralty agreed to investigate 
the complaint, but said in so many words that they highly doubted Strachan had 
misbehaved. Orde’s greed and grating personality compounded the confusion of 
communicating among commands.
Meanwhile, on 16 April, as Orde fought adverse winds off Cape Saint Vincent, 
Nelson first learned the French fleet had been seen off Cartagena. Two days later, 
stationed off Sardinia, he learned that the French had passed the strait—but not 
from Orde or Kerr. Instead, Amazon arrived with intelligence from a Ragusan brig, 
which had seen the French in transit. Nelson had a hard time believing it was not 
a feint, convinced as he was that the Toulon Fleet was destined for Egypt. He de-
tached his frigates and smaller vessels to cover the Barbary Coast in case the French 
sent a secondary expedition east.72 On 19 April, he reluctantly decided to sail west, 
into the teeth of the wind. It was a long and slow fifteen-day passage to Gibraltar.73 
Back in London, the Admiralty was in crisis. On 8 April, Melville had been 
forced to resign following a financial mismanagement scandal dating from his 
time as treasurer of the Royal Navy. His replacement, Admiral Charles Middle-
ton, now ennobled as Baron Barham, did not assume office until 29 April. It was 
not a moment too soon: on his first day news arrived from Fisgard of the French 
escape from Toulon and passage through the Strait of Gibraltar. Pitt came to 
Barham’s office at 2 AM on the 30th to find him hard at work at his desk. They 
ordered Collingwood to take fourteen ships of the line from the Channel Fleet 
and sail to Cádiz.74 
On 4 May, Nelson finally reached Tétouan bay, at the eastern approaches to 
the strait, and took on water and provisions.75 He was surprised to have no new 
news of the French. In a letter to the Admiralty, he expressed his frustration with 
the situation: “I believe my ill luck is to go on for a longer time, and I now much 
fear that Sir John Orde has not sent his small ships to watch the Enemy’s fleet, 
and ordered them to return to the Straits’ mouth, to give me information, that 
I might know how to direct my proceedings.” The key question for Nelson was 
whether to try to guess Villeneuve’s destination. The West Indies seemed likely, 
but, as Nelson put it, he could not sail the Mediterranean Fleet to the West Indies 
“without something beyond mere surmise.” In any case, the Combined Fleet had 
a month’s head start.76 Clearly, Nelson expected up-to-date information, primar-
ily from Orde, when he arrived at the strait. The news that he received—that 
the French had passed Gibraltar and had not returned—was almost four weeks 
old. Ideally, what he needed was word from ships that had shadowed the French 
and determined their destination. Orde had not dispatched any of his frigates or 
cruisers in this capacity. Like Nelson, Orde thought the West Indies were a likely 
destination, and had told the Admiralty and the commanders in the West Indies 
were a likely destination, and had told the Admiralty and the commanders in 
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the West Indies as much. But he had not told Nelson, the admiral most directly 
concerned with the Toulon Fleet.77 
Without fresh information, Nelson passed through the Strait of Gibraltar on 
6 May and arrived at Lagos Bay two days later, where Orde’s supply ships were 
anchored.78 Amphion, Wasp, and Beagle were nearby off Cape Saint Vincent, but 
they had no new information. The only intelligence Nelson gathered was that 
the French had not sailed north and had not been seen in over three weeks.79 
That increased the chances that the French had gone west, but it was only after 
he met Rear Admiral George Campbell, a Scot in Portuguese service, that he had 
any positive intelligence to support that guess.80 On 11 May, a week after he had 
arrived in the strait, he finally made the decision to commit to the West Indies—
thirty-two days behind Villeneuve.81 Orde’s failure to leave any information for 
Nelson cost valuable time and confused the intelligence situation.
Nelson arrived at Barbados on the evening of 4 June, after a twenty-six-day 
passage. This was fast by fleet standards, and certainly better than the thirty-
five-day passage Villeneuve had made a few weeks earlier.82 Nelson immediately 
met with Lieutenant General Sir William Myers, the commanding officer in 
Barbados and the Leeward Islands, and Rear Admiral Alexander Cochrane, who 
had arrived two months earlier in pursuit of a French squadron out of Rochefort. 
Myers had received a letter the day before from the commanding officer at Saint 
Lucia reporting that the Combined Fleet had been spotted sailing south toward 
Barbados or Trinidad. It obviously was not Barbados, so Myers offered Nelson 
two thousand troops from Barbados to help defend, or possibly retake, Trinidad. 
Nelson harbored doubts about the intelligence, but the added need to take ad-
ditional troops to Trinidad convinced him to go south.
The following morning at 9:30 AM, Nelson’s fleet was making sail to the south. 
As Nelson approached Tobago, he received news from a brig sent ahead that an 
American merchantman had reported being boarded by the French off the island 
of Saint Vincent, and that they were sailing south. On the morning of 7 June, Nel-
son’s fleet prepared for battle, expecting the Combined Fleet to be in the channel 
between Trinidad and mainland South America. However, on arriving, Nelson 
found only empty sea. The lookouts who had spotted the French from Saint Lucia 
had mistaken three French frigates for the Combined Fleet, and the information 
the American merchant had provided was deliberately false. As Nelson pondered 
his next move, news arrived that the Combined Fleet had taken Diamond Rock, a 
small, fortified British outpost situated on a tiny rocky island (and commissioned 
as a sloop) about a mile and a half off the southwestern coast of Martinique.83 
Villeneuve had been at Martinique all along—only 140 miles away from Nel-
son when he arrived in Barbados. Only a couple of hours before Nelson sailed 
south toward Trinidad, Villeneuve had sailed north to Guadeloupe, where he 
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embarked troops, and then continued north past Antigua. On 8 June, he captured 
fifteen of the sixteen merchant ships in a homeward-bound British convoy, worth 
five million francs. After interrogating the prisoners, Villeneuve learned of Nel-
son’s presence in the West Indies and decided to return across the Atlantic. On 
11 June, the Combined Fleet set sail for Ferrol.84 
On 8 June, Nelson frantically sailed north from Trinidad, frustrated that he 
had turned the wrong way. At Dominica, he learned that the Combined Fleet 
was heading north, and at Antigua on 12 June he learned that it was returning 
to Europe, although among his captains opinion on its destination was divided. 
Nelson thought Cádiz or Toulon was the likely destination, in part because he 
still thought that the true target was Egypt.85 He set a more southerly course for 
the Strait of Gibraltar—only two days behind his adversary. A few days later, he 
sent a frigate and a sloop ahead to Ferrol to warn the British squadron there in 
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case Villeneuve appeared. Both fleets crossed the Atlantic, initially only a couple 
of hundred miles apart but sailing courses for different destinations. Nelson ar-
rived at Gibraltar on 19 July, where he was disappointed at receiving no news of 
the French.86 
Villeneuve’s luck ran out when he arrived back in European waters. Curieux, the 
brig Nelson had sent ahead, had spotted the Combined Fleet at sea on the passage 
and realized that its course would take it north of the Azores, toward Ferrol. This 
news reached the Admiralty in the early hours of 9 July, and Barham dispatched im-
mediate orders for the Rochefort squadron of five ships of the line to combine with 
the ten ships of the line off Cape Finisterre under the command of Vice Admiral 
Sir Robert Calder. Calder’s fifteen ships of the line intercepted the Combined Fleet 
of twenty ships of the line on 22 July in light winds with a heavy swell and patchy 
fog. After an indecisive battle that evening, both fleets spent several days maneu-
vering for position before Villeneuve, demoralized, sailed southeast for the port of 
Vigo. Although Calder was later court-martialed for not bringing the Combined 
Fleet to battle on the 23rd or 24th, his actions proved to be the strategic victory that 
thwarted Napoléon’s plans for combining the naval power of France and Spain in 
the Channel to cover an invasion of England.87 
It is impossible to say whether Nelson would have caught Villeneuve in the 
West Indies had he received proper intelligence from Orde. However, we can say 
that the near miss was a matter of hours. Had Nelson departed European waters a 
few days earlier, it is unlikely that he would have sailed to Trinidad after arriving 
at Barbados. The bad intelligence that caused him to do so was received in Bar-
bados only a few hours before his fleet arrived on 4 June. Rather, Nelson would 
have considered Martinique, France’s stronghold in the Windward Islands, a logi-
cal point to have begun his search. Nelson also might have been able to prevent 
the French capture of the West India convoy. While this is all speculation, we 
can say that the margins in the Trafalgar campaign were small—matters of hours 
and days. Orde leaving Nelson in the dark was significant, even if the alternative 
outcomes are impossible to know.
ORDE’S DEFENSE
Nelson’s near miss in the West Indies, combined with Calder’s action, resulted in 
the Combined Fleet being shut up, ironically, back in Cádiz, now watched by the 
entire Mediterranean Fleet under Collingwood. Orde had returned to England, 
but his passage had been slow and ridden with angst. After arriving at Spithead 
on 11 May, he was sent into quarantine, stemming from his squadron’s proximity 
to the plague-ridden Gibraltar garrison.88 While awaiting release, he received let-
ters (one of which was quoted earlier in this article) that questioned his actions 
and attacked his character.
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Accused of cowardice, and of failing to do as Nelson would have done, Orde 
proceeded as soon as he could to the Admiralty for an interview with Barham. 
Orde asked whether the Admiralty approved of his bringing his fleet back to the 
Channel; Barham said yes, and then asked whether Orde was interested in being 
employed again. Orde, who clearly had expected to have to defend his actions 
and was eager to do so, was taken aback. He said he would consider employment 
again, but could he please explain his actions anyway? Barham pointed to a stack 
of unopened letters on his desk; Orde got the hint and left.89 Orde never was em-
ployed again. Barham likely asked the question as a courtesy and to avoid being 
accused of treating Orde unfairly. He probably did legitimately approve of Orde’s 
decision to bring his squadron back, but Orde’s behavior in the months—and 
years—prior had disqualified him from future consideration.
Even as early as his retreat from Cádiz, Orde seems to have become increas-
ingly uncomfortable with his own actions. While on the passage from Cádiz to 
Spithead he had written nearly daily to the Admiralty, and each letter contained 
a new justification. In early January 1806, Orde participated in Nelson’s funeral, 
but he was still frustrated by how his active career had ended. Sometime after 
the funeral, he wrote a four-thousand-word defense of his actions, followed by a 
second, six-thousand-word additional defense. Neither is dated, and he claimed 
later that the documents were written confidentially for his friends. Their tone 
is that of a proud, wounded animal. When combined with the letters he wrote 
in April 1805, they create a comprehensive but internally incoherent picture of 
Orde’s thinking.90 
His best defense, as laid out primarily in the letters written on his way back 
to the Channel, comes in his reasonable assessment of the likely plans of the 
French and Spanish. In January 1805, he noted, the Toulon Fleet had sortied and 
attempted to link up with the Rochefort squadron before being forced back by 
poor weather. Orde suggested that the French would not squander the chance 
presented by freedom of movement in the Atlantic. It seemed reasonably unlikely 
that they would return to the Mediterranean if they had the chance to leave.91 
This is the analysis that Corbett rightly praises as insightful, and Orde deserves 
credit for having guessed the outline of Napoléon’s invasion plans—even if Orde’s 
guesses conveniently justified his decision to desert Cádiz.
Less persuasively, Orde claimed he could not have given the Admiralty or 
Nelson any more information about the destination of the Combined Fleet be-
cause he could not track it at sea. He gave many reasons why this was impossible, 
each of varying degrees of legitimacy. Initially, he claimed that his squadron was 
too weak to shadow the Combined Fleet. Glory, Agamemnon, and Renown were 
poor sailors, and Orde correctly pointed out that if he had tried to stay in con-
tact with the Combined Fleet he might have been forced into a disadvantageous 
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battle. At the very least, deploying his full squadron in such a way would have cost 
the Admiralty the use of his ships of the line for an extended period. Tracking an 
enemy fleet with an unknown destination was indeed challenging, and in his later 
defense Orde pointed to Nelson’s own difficulties in having his frigates track the 
Toulon Fleet in the last days of March.
Orde also argued, strangely, that it was impossible to know an enemy’s destina-
tion. He noted that the expedition led by General Lazare Hoche had left Brest in 
1796 and “proceeded for the sake of deception so far to the westward as to strike 
soundings in the Banks of Newfoundland, before they steered for Ireland.”92 Not 
only did targeting the West Indies fit the pattern of Napoléon’s deployments that 
Orde had identified, but there were well-known routes from Cádiz to the West 
Indies, and it beggars belief that a frigate trailing Villeneuve’s ships could not have 
made an educated guess about their destination after a few days at sea. Curieux 
did precisely this when encountering Villeneuve in the middle of the Atlantic in 
June on the return leg.93 
Another strand of Orde’s defense is that Nelson would have been, or perhaps 
should have been, in a better position to act than Orde. Guessing that Villeneuve 
had gone west conveniently made Orde’s decision to go north the correct one. 
Had Villeneuve gone east, he wrote, “I should not have hesitated one moment to 
risk passing the Strait.” How he would have known that Villeneuve had done so 
is not clear, since he had sailed well to the west by the time Villeneuve departed 
Cádiz. He did not let such practicalities impede spinning out hypotheticals. He 
worried in the same letter that entering the Mediterranean would have been met 
with disapproval—recall that his orders strictly prohibited him from doing so. 
In that scenario, as the senior officer, he would have had to assume command 
of the Mediterranean station. He was quick to say that he had no desire to be in 
high command.94 It was Nelson’s burden to bear, and Orde was happy to let him 
carry it. While on the passage back from Cádiz, he expressed confidence that, if 
the French had gone east, “Nelson will be found in condition, with his 12 ships 
of the line and numerous frigates, to act on the defensive without loss, and even 
to hang heavily on the skirts of the enemy’s fleet.”95 Orde wanted it both ways—to 
claim to have been willing to enter the Mediterranean in pursuit of Villeneuve, 
but without having to determine Villeneuve’s course. He went on to argue that 
the Toulon Fleet was Nelson’s responsibility, not his, so he need not have tracked 
it when it appeared off Cádiz.96 Nelson’s fleet was stronger than Orde’s, and the 
Toulon Fleet had been Nelson’s responsibility originally, but the stakes were too 
high to abdicate responsibility in this way, on a technicality.
Orde defended his failure to communicate with Nelson on the grounds that he 
could not have known where Nelson was, nor predict where Nelson might go. Yet 
he simultaneously claimed that he and Strachan worked out where Nelson was 
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likely to be, and where he was likely to go: “Lord Nelson on being informed of 
[the Toulon Fleet’s] escape from Port, even were it reported as steering westward, 
would proceed with his Squadron to the Coast of Egypt, or at least to some posi-
tion whence he might interrupt an attack on that Country, the Morea at Naples.”97 
Why not give that educated guess to an intrepid frigate captain, or at least to a 
ship at Gibraltar, with instructions to attempt to find Nelson? Strachan clearly 
thought this was the correct course of action. The Admiralty’s poor command 
design is partly to blame, but Orde’s lack of imagination and confidence contrib-
uted significantly. Orde also knew that Nelson was likely to come west as quickly 
as possible once news of the French transit of the strait reached him, but Orde 
downplayed the significance of this move by claiming that Nelson might be stuck 
in the Mediterranean for “five or six weeks, nay more,” while waiting for a favor-
able wind.98 In other words, Nelson was too far away and too unlikely to influence 
events in the Atlantic to be worth any effort to contact him—yet Orde thought 
it was worthwhile to send news to the East Indies Station, six months’ sail away.
On 1 May, Orde expressed surprise that his letters with news of Villeneuve’s 
escape were “unaccountably . . . preceded by account from Lord Mark Kerr who I 
trusted had gone in quest of Lord Nelson.”99 It was unaccountable because of the 
seam along the areas of responsibility at Gibraltar. Orde later claimed that both 
he and Kerr had intelligence that the Spanish ships were not prepared for a long 
voyage. Furthermore, “so confident were they at Gibraltar that the Toulon Fleet 
when seen passing the Straits were bound to Ireland” that Kerr sailed directly 
for Ireland, “instead of apprising Lord Nelson or Sir John Orde, as it would have 
been his duty in case of uncertainty.”100 We know that Kerr did attempt to apprise 
Nelson, and we also know that Kerr did not sail directly for Ireland. Instead, he 
landed at Portsmouth, and it was his news that first informed the Admiralty of 
the French passage of the strait.101 Orde knew more than Kerr—he knew that the 
French had combined with the Spanish in Cádiz, and he guessed that they were 
headed west. Orde’s strategic insight and educated guesses justified his own ac-
tions, but in failing to share those insights with Nelson he wasted much of their 
potency.
Among the more curious decisions that Orde made was to station Amphion, 
Wasp, and Beagle together off Cape Saint Vincent, rather than scattering them. 
One of the three should have gone to Gibraltar with the latest intelligence and to 
await Nelson. It did not require more than one cruiser to warn British shipping 
in the area about the presence of the French fleet. In his defense, Orde claimed 
that he left them “on [his] Station” with orders “to ascertain and counteract . . . 
the movements of the enemy.”102 They did no such thing, in the end, except for 
one nearly disastrous investigation of Cádiz’s harbor. A lieutenant from Wasp 
took a Portuguese fishing boat to Cádiz and reported that the entire Combined 
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Fleet was still there on 22 April—almost two weeks after it had left for the West 
Indies.103 Rather than relay this intelligence to Gibraltar, the senior captain sent 
it to Lisbon, where the British consul forwarded it on to the foreign secretary.104 
If a frigate or sloop had been stationed off Cádiz, such a mistake would not have 
been made; Orde’s claim that the frigates were “on [his] Station” may be techni-
cally true—his station included Cape Saint Vincent—but they were not optimally 
placed for intelligence-gathering purposes, nor were they given instructions 
about communicating with Nelson. Why this curious deployment? The archival 
record provides hints, but nothing definitive. By stationing three small ships on 
the western fringe of his station, Orde could claim that he had not abandoned it 
entirely; perhaps he thought they might capture prizes. We cannot know for sure, 
but Orde’s orders to his cruisers stand alongside his botched communication with 
Nelson as significant failures.
Orde also claimed that standing and fighting Villeneuve, or even hanging on 
his skirts as he thought Nelson might do, “would have led to the gratification of 
every wish of my heart, to superior command, to increased patronage and emolu-
ment, and possibly to great distinction.” Orde wanted credit for, in his words, “the 
sacrifice I have made” in forgoing the chance of bringing about a fleet action.105 
Even before he reached Spithead, he realized that running from the Combined 
Fleet exposed him to accusations of cowardice. This article’s analysis does not 
seek to accuse Orde of cowardice—he faced odds of three to one—but his plead-
ing is an indication of the pressure he and other British naval officers were under 
to fight no matter the odds.
Orde’s defense collapses amid internal inconsistences and obscures his true mo-
tives. He was fed up with his station off Cádiz, from which he had just requested 
to be allowed to resign. The rebuke by the Admiralty in January, coupled with 
the ongoing friction between his command and Nelson’s, had shattered his mo-
rale. Personal disputes with respected officers such as Strachan undermined his 
authority. He had made money from prizes, but those winnings were now under 
threat from the appointment of Nelson’s prize agent in Gibraltar and the legal 
battles over the legitimacy of Spanish prizes taken before the declaration of war. 
He thought his responsibilities were to blockade the Spanish (and capture prizes); 
the Admiralty thought he was there to blockade the Spanish (and protect British 
trade). When the French appeared, he was caught in a precarious situation with 
transports alongside and decks covered in stores. Outnumbered three to one, he 
sensibly retreated, but in doing so he neglected his most important duty: to put 
aside personal history and communicate across the boundaries of his area of re-
sponsibility. Orde’s failure cost Nelson a good chance of bringing the Combined 
Fleet to action in the West Indies.
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What-if history has limited value; of more importance, both for our under-
standing of the Trafalgar campaign and for navies today, are the preventable 
mistakes that both the Admiralty and Orde made. Some of the contributing 
factors are beyond the scope of this article: St. Vincent’s disastrously timed dock-
yard reforms had destroyed the fleet’s readiness during the recent peace, and the 
decision to strike the Spanish preemptively was morally dubious and strategically 
disastrous.106 But once a squadron was needed off Cádiz, there was no reason to 
appoint Orde to that post. He was senior to Nelson, with a history of conflict 
between them well-known to the public and certainly to Melville. Compounding 
this mistake were Orde’s strict instructions not to encroach on Nelson’s territory, 
even though Gibraltar is one of the world’s great choke points—all information in 
and out of the Mediterranean must past through it. Drawing a line across it was 
only likely to result in confusion and delay. Today, the United States organizes 
its combatant commands geographically. If it continues to operate this way, it is 
important to understand how geopolitics can warp traditional boundaries. For 
the British in the age of sail, bases in the Mediterranean itself were unreliable, 
poorly located, or underequipped; adverse winds easily could make the Strait of 
Gibraltar impassable; and the Spanish had major bases on both sides of the strait. 
Cádiz therefore should not have been separated from the Mediterranean com-
mand by placing it under a senior admiral.
The Admiralty bears responsibility for this mistake, although that is not suf-
ficient to explain what happened off Cádiz. It is easy to play armchair admiral 
about Orde’s actions in the face of an overwhelming enemy force. Orde handled 
the surprise on the afternoon of 9 April well, all things considered. He protected 
his transports, organized his forces, and prepared for action. Corbett’s assess-
ment of Orde’s subsequent retreat is sound. Orde helped concentrate British 
naval forces (which otherwise were spread dangerously thinly) on the Channel, 
lessening the chances of Napoléon’s fleets gaining control of the invasion route. 
Orde did not know much about Calder’s squadron off Finisterre, so subsequent 
accusations that he should have joined Calder do not stand up to scrutiny.107 
Indeed, it raises further questions about the Admiralty’s ability to coordinate its 
various commands.
Orde also communicated efficiently to the West Indies and the Admiralty. 
His failure was to the east, to Nelson. The actions of the officers on the spot sup-
port this judgment: Kerr tried to communicate with Nelson; Strachan tried to 
convince Orde to communicate with Nelson; and Nelson complained that Orde 
had not communicated with him. The Lords of the Admiralty had demarcated 
the command areas poorly and had given conflicting orders to their chosen com-
mander. Even if they did not grasp fully the problem presented by stationing a 
senior admiral off Cádiz, they trusted that such an experienced officer, familiar 
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BOOK REVIEWS
“WHATEVER IS WORTH DOING AT ALL, IS WORTH DOING WELL”
Just War Thinkers: From Cicero to the 21st Century, ed. Daniel R. Brunstetter and Cian O’Driscoll. 
London: Routledge, 2018. 282 pages. $128.
In his foreword to Just War Thinkers, Joel H. 
Rosenthal, president of the Carnegie Coun-
cil for Ethics in International Affairs, refers 
to war as humanity’s oldest story and draws 
attention to how Homer reasoned from 
the Iliad that warfare is beyond the control 
of mere mortals and transpires within the 
provenance of the gods alone. Contrary 
to that reference to Greek mythology and 
ancient literature, Rosenthal hastens to 
assert that the just war tradition represents 
the noble attempt to impose moral limits 
on the conduct of warfare, as guided by the 
most cherished ideals in human civilization.
Informed by the time-honored wisdom 
of past sages and dynamic developments 
in modern statecraft, Daniel Brunstetter, 
associate professor of political science at 
the University of California–Irvine, and 
Cian O’Driscoll, senior lecturer in politics 
at the University of Glasgow, have compiled 
nineteen chapters on widely acclaimed 
authorities in the just war tradition. 
Written by some of the foremost experts on 
the subject, these collected essays furnish 
profound insights on the moral parameters 
of warfare for the profession of arms.
In the helpful introduction, Brunstetter 
and O’Driscoll identify four challenges 
encountered in attempting to assemble 
a set of central figures in the history of 
the just war tradition over a span of two 
thousand years. The first challenge is that 
the case easily can be made for any of a 
number of philosophers to be founder of 
the just war tradition, such as Aristotle, Au-
gustine, or Aquinas. Both editors concede 
that the arguments for other philosophers 
are persuasive; nonetheless, they present 
strong evidence for accepting Marcus 
Tullius Cicero as the beginning point for 
exploration of the just war tradition. Those 
who study the thoughts of the Roman 
statesman in general will not be disap-
pointed in the particularly keen intellect 
and admirable sense of integrity he displays 
as one among the first just war advocates.
Second, the editors lament that space does 
not allow the inclusion of all noteworthy 
contributors to the just war discussion. 
However, they strive to provide a varied 
assortment of authors, endeavoring to 
sustain an equitable balance between 
mainline and marginal just war theorists. 
Although they incorporate both extraor-
dinary philosophers and theologians 
(Augustine, analyzed by James Turner 
Johnson; Thomas Aquinas, by Gregory 
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M. Reichberg; and Immanuel Kant, by 
Brian Orend), the editors also include less 
prominent thinkers (Gratian, by Rory Cox; 
Christine de Pisan, by Cian O’Driscoll; 
and Francis Lieber, by Stephanie Carvin) 
whose ideas inspire and enrich the heritage 
of human flourishing in war and peace 
no less than those first mentioned but 
without receiving the fanfare they deserve.
Third, Brunstetter and O’Driscoll caveat 
their choice of authors with the acknowl-
edgment that they confined their consid-
eration of political analysts to the Western 
tradition, even though they recognize the 
influence of other religious and cultural 
traditions outside Europe and Christen-
dom. The discovery of the New World in 
the Americas, the recovery of texts and 
translations by Jewish and Islamic scholars 
from classical antiquity, and the trade 
of goods and ideas along the legendary 
Silk Road generated an indelible imprint 
on the philosophy and practice of war.
Fourth, the chapter authors are aware 
that the twin perils of anachronism and 
antiquarianism easily might undermine 
the credibility and the timely importance of 
their project, so they aspire to avoid those 
problems. Whereas anachronism sacrifices 
the authenticity of the historical record for 
the sake of contemporary pragmatism, an-
tiquarianism reduces the just war tradition 
to historical obscurity and irrelevance for 
the sake of scholarly minutiae. The editors 
aim for an integration of competent histori-
cal scholarship with modern adaptations 
that recognize the significance of both con-
tinuity and change in the just war tradition.
Not only do Brunstetter and O’Driscoll sat-
isfy these four challenges in their volume; 
they also achieve a thematic coherence 
throughout the anthology by establishing 
standard criteria for the examination 
of each seminal thinker. Every chapter 
investigates the contexts, texts, tenets, 
controversies, and enduring legacies of 
each historical figure, especially pertaining 
to the primary concepts of jus ad bellum 
(justice toward war), jus in bello (justice 
in war), and jus post bellum (justice after 
war). The editors highlight the divergence 
of methodologies among the historical 
approach (James Turner Johnson), the 
legalist perspective (Emmerich de Vattel), 
and the revisionist trend (Jeff McMahan).
The poignant conclusions drawn at the 
end of the book leave the reader wanting 
more commentary from these eminent 
scholars, and Brunstetter and O’Driscoll 
wisely caution that Just War Thinkers is 
not the stopping point but the start for 
further research. Unconventional in its 
choice of designated thinkers, diverse in 
its selection of subject-matter experts, 
visionary in its formulation of overarching 
themes, Just War Thinkers promises to 
inform, surprise, and awe the reader with 
the “intimation of possibilities” for jus pax 
(just peace) in the twenty-first century.
EDWARD ERWIN
Into the Dark Water: The Story of Three Officers and 
PT-109, by John J. Domagalski. Havertown, PA: 
Casemate, 2014. 288 pages. $29.95.
Writing an entertaining and readable 
account of one of the most famous naval 
vessels of World War II is a challenging 
task. However, John Domagalski displays 
his considerable knowledge of naval 
history in this well-informed narrative 
exploring the short-lived career of PT-109. 
The book is told through the lens of 
the vessel’s three commanding officers, 
and thus is organized in three parts.
The first ten chapters concentrate on the 
background and construction of small 
boats, the self-propelled torpedo, the 
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arrival of PT-109 in the Pacific, and the 
early skirmishes near Guadalcanal and 
the Solomon Sea. This exposition includes 
the evacuation by patrol torpedo (PT) 
boat of MacArthur from the Philippines, 
the keel laying of the eighty-foot PT-109 
by Elco in Bayonne, New Jersey, and 
a basic description of the boat and its 
armament. Including a blueprint of the 
boat at this juncture would have helped 
the reader visualize the ship’s vulnerability. 
The author personalizes the story when 
he introduces the two officers who would 
command PT-109 before John F. Kennedy: 
Rollin E. Westholm and Bryant Larson, 
both from Minnesota. Westholm was 
named squadron commander as well as 
commanding officer of PT-109; Larson 
served as his executive officer and later 
was named commanding officer of 109.
These early chapters relate the nocturnal 
combat operations wherein the PTs 
attempted to interdict Japan’s “Tokyo 
Express” destroyer supply runs. The 
narrative of the PTs’ operations as they 
patrolled, looking for the enemy, is written 
and researched extremely well. While the 
PTs were fast and maneuverable, they also 
had drawbacks, and crews constantly were 
learning new lessons from their combat 
mistakes. Larson recalled a December 1942 
engagement in which PT-44 was lost:  
“[F]or some reason Frank [Freeland] chose 
a high speed attack, leaving behind the boat 
a tremendous phosphorescent wake that 
was like a searchlight pointing toward the 
boat. He never had a chance. . . . [F]rom the 
forty-four we learned two lessons—don’t 
make a high speed night attack, and if you 
are hit, under fire, and dead in the water, 
get all hands off the boat before another 
salvo blows everyone to hell” (pp. 75–76).
Part 2 of the book consists of six chapters. 
John Kennedy was one of the volunteers 
recruited by Lieutenant John D. Bulkeley, 
famous for his PT boat evacuation of 
MacArthur from the Philippines. Bulkeley 
recruited those sailors who “want[ed] to 
get into a scrap without delay and who 
had plenty of guts” (p. 126). Referencing 
Kennedy’s letters to his parents, operational 
accounts, and related books, Domagalski 
skillfully weaves together the last few 
months of PT-109’s service. His description 
of the boat’s August 1943 final patrol 
explains that “the Battle of Blackett Strait 
was one of the most poorly executed boat 
operations in the South Pacific. Dogged 
by unsound operating procedures, poor 
judgement among division commanders, 
and possibly just plain bad luck, the 
Americans failed to score a single hit on 
two passes of the Tokyo Express” (p. 173).
Domagalski helpfully employs maps as aids 
in the combat narrative, as well as other 
graphics to identify the combatants. The 
manner in which the maps are referenced, 
however, is a bit difficult to follow. Never-
theless, the author does a credible job of 
putting the reader into the “fog of war” 
and portraying the difficulties involved 
in assessing the success of a PT patrol.
The third part of the book has three chap-
ters plus an epilogue. It traces the three PT-
109 commanding officers’ service after the 
loss of the boat and briefly recounts their 
postwar experiences. Kennedy’s evolving 
perspective on the war is noted, especially 
after the loss of two crewmen, which may 
be the foundation for his war-related learn-
ing as president. Domagalski summarizes 
Westholm’s impressive thirty-plus-year 
career in the Navy, which included 
destroyer division command, and Larson’s 
postwar business career, during which he 
remained in the Naval Reserve. Through 
these accounts, the reader is reminded of 
the “Greatest Generation’s” accomplish-
ments, as well as what might have been 
in store for the other lives cut short. The 
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book’s epilogue reminds the reader that the 
U.S. Navy has a continuing need for small, 
fast warships and daring sailors willing to 
operate them against larger opponents.
Readers will appreciate the way the author 
uses oral histories, letters, newspaper 
accounts, deck logs, military after-
action reports, written recollections, and 
background books and articles to tell an 
engaging sea story. This historical narrative 
will satisfy World War II buffs, sailors, and 
casual-interest readers. It is a quick and 
enjoyable read. Military scholars might ap-
preciate the focused examination of small 
boats. Domagalski deftly accomplishes his 
mission: to pay homage to the intrepid war-
fighting spirit of the patrol boat and motor 
torpedo boat sailors of World War II.
EDWARD GILLEN
Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 
1949, by M. Taylor Fravel. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 2019. 392 pages. $35.
During the Cold War, naval professionals 
working to understand Soviet military 
doctrine could call on a well-developed 
body of literature. Authoritative Western 
academic studies covered everything from 
the Soviets’ overall strategic design to their 
philosophy of troop leadership. Advanced 
students could call on textbooks from 
Soviet military colleges in translation. 
Taken together, these works were essential 
to understanding that the Soviet military 
viewed warfare through a philosophical 
lens fundamentally different from our own.
Today, professionals trying to understand 
the modern Chinese approach to warfare 
find comparatively meager fare. Western 
academic interest in the approaches 
taken by the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) to military strategy waned after the 
Maoist era. In many key areas, primary 
sources are scarce—often passed from 
practitioner to practitioner rather than 
being widely available. While a few 
overview works exist, there has been 
little focused academic analysis of the 
basics of Chinese military science.
In that context, Taylor Fravel’s volume on 
PRC military strategy represents a ground-
breaking contribution to Chinese military 
studies. In Active Defense, Fravel analyzes 
the nine “strategic guidelines” the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) has issued since 
1949. Each strategic guideline provided 
Chinese forces with four key elements: an 
authoritative analysis of the Chinese stra-
tegic situation, an explanation of warfare 
in the present era, and direction for both 
force development and force employment. 
Three of these documents—those issued 
in 1956, 1980, and 1993—each represented 
a major shift in direction for the PLA. 
Rebutting those who see the PLA as 
isolated and insular, Fravel concludes that 
these three revisions were driven primarily 
by PLA perception of significant shifts in 
the conduct of modern warfare. While in 
each case the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) wrote the overall analysis of the 
strategic situation—which is, at its core, 
a political assessment—the other three 
component parts of each strategic guidance 
document represented military judgments. 
Fravel suggests that such fundamental 
reassessments are possible only when the 
party leadership is internally unified and 
thus able to delegate this kind of work to 
its military experts. Many Western readers, 
focused on CCP control of the PLA, will be 
surprised at this long-standing empower-
ment of the PLA military leadership to 
decide foundational operational issues.
The level of trust the party extends to the 
military leadership in strategy development 
is only one of a number of arguments 
181
Naval War College: Spring 2020 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 1 7 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
that will be both new to most readers 
and controversial to specialists. While 
granting the significant influence of the 
Soviet Union on PLA development, Fravel 
offers a nuanced view of Soviet influence 
on PLA doctrine. During the 1950s, the 
Soviet Union provided extensive support 
to China, offering both military hardware 
and advisers. Despite this close relation-
ship, the 1956 strategic guidance was 
developed in part to articulate a specifically 
Chinese approach to warfare. While Soviet 
doctrine emphasized abrupt and aggressive 
offensive action, China remained mindful 
that it would be fighting from a position of 
relative weakness, so therefore at the opera-
tional level it focused instead on a dynamic 
transition between offense and defense.
Fravel also notes that “people’s war”—a 
powerful idea in Chinese Communist 
ideology—was never officially a central 
PLA military doctrine; rather, the PLA 
used guerrilla warfare only in areas where 
mobile forces could not be sustained. The 
phrase people’s war properly referred to 
the political integration of Communist 
military forces with the population, 
whether those forces were guerrilla bands 
or armored columns. Fravel also provides 
the best explanation yet of the lineage 
and significance of the concept of active 
defense, noting that Mao used the phrase 
as early as 1935. Active defense was an 
element of all nine strategic guidelines, 
and PLA officers still cite it today as 
an essential element of their strategy.
While the book covers the period from 
1949 to 1993 extensively, the treatment 
of PLA doctrine after 1993 consists of 
only nineteen pages. The PLA issued new 
strategic guidelines in 2004 and 2014, 
but Fravel assesses that these did not 
represent a basic shift in PLA approach. 
Given the relative scarcity of sources 
on more-recent PLA developments, 
and the fact that strategic changes take 
time to become apparent in forces, this 
view could be subject to reassessment 
in coming years. Nuclear strategy is 
covered in a separate but well-crafted 
section at the end of the book, reflect-
ing Fravel’s assessment that nuclear 
policy never was delegated to the PLA 
and thus represents a distinct topic.
With its focus on the long-term develop-
ment of Chinese military strategy, Active 
Defense does not offer quick and easy 
insights into current PLA operations. 
Although Fravel does an admirable 
job of balancing academic depth with 
approachable overviews of complex 
historical events, this is not the first book 
a student should read on the PLA. It is, 
however, an extraordinary work that will 
endure as essential reading for any serious 
student of Chinese military issues.
DALE C. RIELAGE
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
Edward Erwin is a Navy chaplain who holds a PhD in theology and ethics from Duke University. 
Dr. Erwin has taught world religions at Troy University and ethics at the University of Maryland 
University College.
Edward Gillen is the director of institutional effectiveness at the Naval War College.
Dale C. Rielage is a senior civilian with Naval Intelligence Activity, assigned as director for intel-
ligence and information operations at U.S. Pacific Fleet.
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Manager 
for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.
 In December 2019, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Michael M. Gil-day, USN, issued his Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 01/2019 that provided Navy 
leaders with guidance on how to simplify, prioritize, and build on the foundation 
established in A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0, which 
was published in December 2018. In this FRAGO, he directed the Navy to focus 
on three principal lines of effort: war fighting, warfighters, and the future Navy.
While revisions to the CNO Professional Reading Program will be forthcom-
ing, a number of books in the existing program already are clearly aligned with 
these three lines of effort.
WAR FIGHTING
Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World’s Oceans, by Admiral James 
G. Stavridis, USN (Ret.)
From one of the most admired admirals of his generation—and the only admi-
ral to serve as Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO—comes a remark-
able voyage through all the world’s most important bodies of water, providing the 
story of naval power as a driver of human history and a crucial element in our 
current geopolitical path. In Sea Power, Admiral Stavridis takes us with him on a 
tour of the world’s oceans from the admiral’s chair, showing us how the geogra-
phy of the oceans has shaped the destiny of nations, and how naval power has in 
a real sense made the world we live in today, and will shape the world we live in 
tomorrow. It is also a keen-eyed reckoning with the likely sites of our next major 
naval conflicts, particularly the Arctic Ocean, eastern Mediterranean, and South 
China Sea. Finally, Sea Power steps back to take a holistic view of the plagues to 
our oceans that are best seen that way, from piracy to pollution. When most of us 
look at a globe, we focus on the shape of the seven continents. Admiral Stavridis 
sees the shapes of the seven seas. Not since Alfred Thayer Mahan’s legendary The 
Influence of Sea Power upon History have we had such a powerful reckoning with 
this vital subject.
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Red Star over the Pacific, by Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes
Combining a close knowledge of Asia and an ability to tap Chinese-language 
sources with naval combat experience and expertise in sea-power theory, the 
authors assess how the rise of Chinese sea power will affect U.S. maritime strat-
egy in Asia. They argue that China has laid the groundwork for a sustained 
challenge to American primacy in maritime Asia, and to defend this hypothesis 
they look back to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea-power theories, now popular with 
the Chinese. The book considers how strategic thought about the sea shapes 
Beijing’s deliberations and compares China’s geostrategic predicament to that of 
the kaiser’s Germany a century ago. It examines the Chinese navy’s operational 
concepts, tactics, and capabilities and appraises China’s missile force. The authors 
conclude that China now presents a challenge to America’s strategic position of 
such magnitude that Washington must compete in earnest.
WARFIGHTERS
Make Your Bed, by Admiral William H. McRaven, USN (Ret.)
If you want to change the world, start off by making your bed. On 17 May 
2014, Admiral William H. McRaven addressed the graduating class of the 
University of Texas at Austin on commencement day. Taking inspiration from 
the university’s slogan, “What starts here changes the world,” he shared the ten 
principles he learned during Navy SEAL training that helped him overcome 
challenges not only in his training and long naval career but also throughout 
his life; and he explained how everyone can use these basic lessons to change 
themselves—and the world—for the better. Admiral McRaven’s original speech 
went viral with over ten million views. Building on the core tenets laid out in his 
speech, McRaven now recounts tales from his own life and from those of people 
he encountered during his military service who dealt with hardship and made 
tough decisions with determination, compassion, honor, and courage. Told with 
great humility and optimism, this timeless book provides simple wisdom, practi-
cal advice, and words of encouragement that will inspire readers to achieve more, 
even in life’s darkest moments.
Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World, by General Stan-
ley McChrystal, USA (Ret.)
When General Stanley McChrystal took command of the Joint Special Opera-
tions Task Force in 2004, he quickly realized that conventional military tactics 
were failing. Al-Qaeda in Iraq was a decentralized network that could move 
quickly, strike ruthlessly, and then seemingly vanish into the local population. 
The allied forces had a huge advantage in numbers, equipment, and training—
but none of that seemed to matter. General McChrystal led a hierarchical, highly 
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disciplined machine of thousands of men and women. But to defeat al-Qaeda 
in Iraq, his task force would have to acquire the enemy’s speed and flexibility. 
McChrystal and his colleagues discarded a century of conventional wisdom and 
remade the task force, in the midst of a grueling war, into something new: a net-
work that combined extremely transparent communication with decentralized 
decision-making authority. The task force became a “team of teams”—faster, flat-
ter, more flexible—and beat back al-Qaeda. In this powerful book, McChrystal 
and his colleagues show how the challenges they faced in Iraq can be relevant to 
countless businesses, nonprofits, and other organizations. The world is changing 
faster than ever, and the smartest response for those in charge is to give small 
groups the freedom to experiment while driving everyone to share what they 
learn across the entire organization. It has the potential to transform organiza-
tions large and small.
FUTURE NAVY
7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century, by An-
drew F. Krepinevich
A global pandemic finds millions swarming across the U.S. border. Major 
American cities are leveled by black-market nukes. China’s growing civil unrest 
ignites a global showdown. Pakistan’s collapse leads to a hunt for its nuclear 
weapons. What if the worst that could happen actually happens? How will we 
respond? Are we prepared? These are the questions that Andrew F. Krepinevich 
asks—and answers—in this timely and often chilling book. As a military expert 
and consultant, Krepinevich must think the unthinkable on the basis of the latest 
intelligence and geopolitical trends—and devise a response in the event our worst 
nightmares become reality.
As riveting as a thriller, 7 Deadly Scenarios reveals the forces—both overt and 
covert—that are in play; the real ambitions of world powers, terrorist groups, and 
rogue states; and the actions and counteractions both our enemies and our allies 
can be expected to take—and what we must do to prepare before it’s too late.
Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, by Geoffrey Till
The rise of the Chinese and other Asian navies, worsening quarrels over 
maritime jurisdiction, and the U.S. maritime pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region 
remind us that the sea has always been central to human development as a source 
of resources, and as a means of transportation, information exchange, and stra-
tegic dominion. It has provided the basis for mankind’s prosperity and security, 
and this is even more true in the early twenty-first century, with the emergence 
of an increasingly globalized world trading system. In contemporary conditions, 
navies, and other forms of maritime power, are having to adapt, in order to exert 
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the maximum power ashore in the company of others and to expand the range of 
their interests, activities, and responsibilities. While these new tasks are develop-
ing fast, traditional ones still predominate. Deterrence remains the first duty of 
today’s navies, backed up by the need to “fight and win” if necessary. How navies 
and their states balance these two imperatives will tell us a great deal about our 
future in this increasingly maritime century. This book investigates the conse-
quences of all this for the developing nature, composition, and functions of all 
the world’s significant navies, and provides a guide for anyone interested in the 
changing and crucial role of sea power in the twenty-first century. Seapower is 
essential reading for all students of naval power, maritime security, and naval 
history, and highly recommended for students of strategic studies, international 
security, and international relations.
These six titles are among many others that comprise the CNO Professional 
Reading Program. They will help all sailors meet the challenges we face as we 
move into the second decade of the twenty-first century. As the CNO has noted, 
“We have much to do. Your tenacity, drive, and initiative will take us where we 
need to go—and do so at flank bell.” Each and every one of us must be standing 
by to answer all bells!
JOHN E. JACKSON
(Note: All book descriptions are drawn from Amazon.com.)
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